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Resumen
Las redes ele´ctricas de nueva generacio´n, denominadas Smart Grids, deben pro-
porcionar una serie de servicios inteligentes con estrictos requisitos de operacio´n.
Para cumplir tales requisitos es necesario modernizar las subestaciones instalan-
do dispositivos electro´nicos inteligentes que proporcionen las funciones de control
y proteccio´n del equipamiento primario. Estos dispositivos pueden accederse de
forma local o remota para asegurar una respuesta ra´pida y automa´tica a posibles
problemas en el suministro energe´tico. Por tanto, estos deben interconectarse
mediante buses digitales constituyendo una red de comunicacio´n dentro de la
subestacio´n, y deben tambie´n proporcionar interfaces de comunicacio´n hacia el
exterior, por ejemplo, hacia un centro de control remoto.
Como consecuencia de esta digitalizacio´n de las subestaciones, surgen nuevas
amenazas digitales que en las redes ele´ctricas tradicionales no exist´ıan. Dado que
el equipamiento de proteccio´n esta´ conectado a grandes redes de comunicacio´n
externas e incluso a la red pu´blica de Internet, e´stas quedan expuestas a ataques
de individuos situados a cientos o miles de kilo´metros que pueden desembocar
en problemas grav´ısimos como la interrupcio´n del suministro ele´ctrico en grandes
a´reas urbanas o pol´ıgonos industriales. En ese sentido, los dispositivos de pro-
teccio´n normalmente esta´n basados en sistemas de computacio´n embebidos que
requieren de un enfoque espec´ıfico para afrontar los retos de ciberseguridad.
En la presente tesis, se pretende dar solucio´n a los problemas que presenta la
proteccio´n de uno de los protocolos de comunicacio´n ma´s sensibles de entre los
considerados por los organismos de estandarizacio´n para su aplicacio´n en sub-
estaciones. Es el caso del Precision Time Protocol (PTP), el cual tiene como
misio´n distribuir una referencia de tiempo desde un dispositivo maestro al resto
de dispositivos esclavos dentro de la red de forma muy precisa. Este protocolo
es altamente vulnerable, ya que introduciendo tan so´lo un error de tiempo de un
microsegundo, pueden causarse graves problemas en las funciones de proteccio´n
e incluso detener el funcionamiento del equipamiento primario.
vi Resumen
En primer lugar, se presentara´ el estado actual de la tecnolog´ıa de las comu-
nicaciones y la ciberseguridad en subestaciones. En particular, se describira´ la
problema´tica que supone la proteccio´n del protocolo de sincronizacio´n menciona-
do. A continuacio´n, se realizara´ un estudio detallado de los componentes hardware
y software existentes para el disen˜o de sistemas electro´nicos basados en dispo-
sitivos reconfigurables, con el fin de integrar el protocolo PTP con el esta´ndar
de seguridad para redes Ethernet conocido como MACsec. En segundo lugar, se
propondra´ una nueva architectura System-on-Chip (SoC) basada en dispositivos
reconfigurables que incluya soporte PTP y MACsec. Adema´s, se introducira´ un
nuevo sistema de gestio´n de claves de grupo para entornos industriales protegidos
mediante MACsec.
Para finalizar, el dispositivo Zynq de Xilinx sera´ utilizado como plataforma de
validacio´n de las arquitecturas propuestas. La tercera y u´ltima parte de la tesis,
por una parte, describira´ todo el proceso de disen˜o llevado a cabo para la va-
lidacio´n de la arquitectura PTP SoC segura. Este proceso incluira´ el desarrollo
de nuevas interfaces hardware y software necesarios para la integracio´n de los
mo´dulos identificados en el estado del arte. Por otro lado, se estudiara´ el efec-
to de los mecanismos de seguridad MACsec propuestos sobre el rendimiento del
protocolo de sincronizacio´n. Para ello, se analizara´n los resultados de diversos
experimentos realizados en una variedad de configuraciones, desde redes ba´sicas
experimentales implementadas en el laboratorio hasta redes ma´s complejas en
entornos industriales reales.
Abstract
New generation power grids, named Smart Grids, must offer some intelligent ser-
vices with strong operation requirements. In order to fulfil these requirements,
substations need to be modernised by installing new intelligent electronic devices
to provide primary equipment control and protection functions. These intelli-
gent devices might be accessed locally or remotely so as to assure a quick and
automatic response to power supply problems. Therefore, they must be inter-
connected through digital buses that configure a communication network within
the substation, and they must also provide external communication interfaces to
a remote control center, for example.
As a consequence of the digitalization process in substations, new digital threats
that did not happen in traditional power grids arise. Due to the interconnection
from protection equipment to external communication networks or even to the
Internet, substations are exposed to cyber attacks from people located at hun-
dreds or thousands of kilometres. These attacks could result in severe failures like
the interruption of the power supply over large urban or industrial areas. In this
sense, protection devices are normally based on embedded computing systems
that require an specific approach to face cyber-security challenges.
This thesis aims to solve the problem of securing one of the most sensitive com-
munication protocols among those recommended to be used in substations. This
is the case of the Precision Time Protocol (PTP), which distributes very pre-
cisely a time reference from a master to numerous networked slaves. PTP is
highly vulnerable since a timer error of only one microsecond could lead protec-
tion functions to serious problems or even interrupt the operation of the primary
equipment.
Firstly, the state of the art about communications and cyber-security in sub-
stations will be presented. Particularly, identified difficulties when securing the
mentioned synchronization protocol will be described. Then, it will be performed
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a deep study on off-the-shelf hardware and software components to be considered
in the design of electronic systems based on reconfigurable devices. The objec-
tive is to integrate the PTP protocol with the Ethernet security standard, known
as MACsec, in the same silicon chip. Secondly, a new System-on-Chip (SoC)
architecture based on reconfigurable devices including both PTP and MACsec
support will be proposed. In addition, a new group key management and distri-
bution scheme to be employed in industrial networks protected by MACsec will
be introduced.
Finally, Xilinx Zynq device will be used as the validation platform to analyse the
viability of proposed architectures. This last part of the thesis, on the one hand,
will describe the whole design process performed to validate the secure PTP SoC
architecture. It will include the development of new interfaces between those
hardware and software modules identified in the literature. On the other hand,
the effect of MACsec security mechanisms on PTP protocol performance will be
tested. In this way, results obtained from diverse experiments executed over a
variety of setup configurations will be analysed. The used setups range from
basic experimental networks in the laboratory to more complex real networks in
industrial plants.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Problem statement
The evolution of information and communication technologies have motivated
the transformation of traditional power grids to modern Smart Grids. The
Smart Grid defined as the next-generation electrical power system, has to ful-
fil strong requirements regarding reliability, flexibility, efficiency and environ-
mentally friendly operation. The communication systems in conjunction with
the cyber-security are critical parts in the power system that will allow a more
reliable and efficient generation and distribution of electricity. The ‘security-by-
obscurity’ of old proprietary solutions in Substation Automation Systems (SAS)
gives way to the use of very well-known cryptographic software and public stan-
dards [1]. The robustness of standard solutions is based on the complexity of the
algorithms rather than the inaccessibility to source codes. Therefore, while new
possibilities are emerging, also new digital threats must be properly handled by
communication systems.
Several significant events have exhibited the vulnerabilities of the communication
framework in power systems since 2003, when a nuclear plant crashed because
its control system network was infected by the Slammer worm that bypassed
firewalls causing the safety monitoring system to be disable for nearly five hours
[2]. Similarly, the computer worm Stuxnet infected the software of many indus-
trial sites in Iran, including a nuclear plant which uses Siemens industrial control
programs based on Microsoft Windows [3]. Stuxnet was the first worm known to
attack Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. It spies on
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the operations of the system and, then, it uses this information to take control
of machines turning them into failure. The worm is believed to have been cre-
ated with the support of a nation or state in an attempt of starting a cyber-war
caused by geopolitical conflicts. After that, other variants of the Stuxnet worm
were discovered such as Duqu, Flame and Gauss with the aim of spying on in-
dustries, people and banks. These worms can be quickly spread over USB sticks
and networks without being detected by automated detection systems.
In last ten years, several organisms, such as those that formed the International
Council on Large Electric Systems (in French, Conseil International des Grands
Re´seaux E´lectriques or CIGRE´ ), the International Electrotechnical Commission
(IEC) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineering (IEEE) have
put a great effort concerning cyber-security on power systems [1]. IEC 62351 Se-
curity Standards address security issues for the different power system operations
and communication standards defined by the IEC Technical Committee 57 (IEC
TC57) [4]. On the one hand, this standard mandates that an asymmetric cryp-
tosystem must be used to provide source authenticity of Generic Object Oriented
Substation Event (GOOSE) and Sampled Values (SV) messages. However, de-
spite expensive processors with crypto accelerators were utilized, execution times
would exceed the maximum transfer times stated in the standard for most time
critical applications [5]. On the other hand, the recommended synchronization
solution is the Precision Time Protocol (PTP), as defined in IEEE 1588-2008,
which introduced an optional security extension based on old keyed hash algo-
rithms that has also been demonstrated to be suboptimal due to latency times
and required resources.
This PTP security extension was defined in Annex K of the second version of
the standard, but presented several vulnerabilities. The third edition of the stan-
dard, on which 1588 working group is now intensively working, will include a set
of security mechanisms to be used individually or in combination to address secu-
rity requirements of each particular application. In general terms, these security
mechanisms will include an end-to-end security mechanism integrated in PTP
based on a new Security Type-Length-Value (TLV) field to provide source au-
thentication and, a hop-by-hop security solution based on some external security
protocols to provide hop-by-hop authentication and integrity protection.
In this sense, data that is not modify on each hop should not rise a problem if a
suitable key management scheme is used and symmetric cryptographic algorithms
are efficiently implemented in end nodes. The real challenge is the integration of
a hop-by-hop security solution without compromising the SAS performance. In
fact, one of the main problems of deploying secured and redundant substation
networks is the increased propagation delays of packets due to cryptographic
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units in intermediate nodes: since they modify the content of PTP messages,
they must recalculate the associated security checksums before transmitting the
messages. At the same time, the need for the participation of intermediate nodes
makes difficult the management and distribution of cryptographic keys.
In this thesis, the problem of integrating hop-by-hop security mechanisms in PTP
layer 2 networks is addressed. Media Access Control security (MACsec) as de-
fined in IEEE 802.1AE-2006 standard was identified as an appealing alternative
to provide cyber-security on each hop within PTP over Ethernet systems. Since
modern Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) devices provide flexibility of
reconfigurable logic and coexistence of hardware and software processing, they
acquire special relevance in the development of future substation Intelligent Elec-
tronic Devices (IEDs) that will integrate authentication and integrity protection
capabilities. As a consequence, the objective was focused on taking advantage
of the experience of the research group in the design of System-on-Chip (SoC)
electronic systems in conjunction with the knowledge on industrial communi-
cations and cryptographic algorithms implementation, with the aim of defining
a secure PTP SoC architecture and validating the protocol performance using
Xilinx FPGAs.
1.2 Objectives
As commented above, the aim of this work is to provide cyber-security mecha-
nisms to PTP over Ethernet networks by defining a new SoC architecture with
security capabilities. Bearing in mind this research line, this thesis deals with
several objectives:
• An analysis of the state-of-the-art in communication technologies and
cyber-security standards in substations, as well as the evolution of secu-
rity mechanisms to protect the recommended precise clock synchronization
protocol in SAS.
• A deep study on different techniques to design secure SoC architectures and
deploy IED nodes with PTP and security support. This study includes a
comparison of current available solutions and an early detection of required
improvements and possible enhancements.
• A new secure PTP SoC architecture proposal, taking into consideration
the issues discovered regarding the utilization of current commercial off-
the-shelf solutions to deploy secure IEDs. To accomplish this objective,
also new techniques to minimize the impact of cyber-security mechanisms
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on substation communication performance are presented.
• The design and development of several FPGA-based implementations and
different test setups in order to validate proposed secure SoC architectures
and demonstrate their operation without compromising PTP protocol per-
formance.
1.3 Organization
This manuscript is divided into three parts, where some parts span over multiple
Chapters:
• State of the art. Standards related to substation communications and
cyber-security measures in substations are presented and described in Chap-
ter 2. With regard of securing the precision time protocol, the work done
by the scientific community and the security committee within the stan-
dardization group is also deeply analysed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 gives an
overview on current commercial off-the-shelf and SoC architectures found
in the literature related to the development of IEDs with precise synchro-
nization and cyber-security support.
• Contribution. After summarizing all the information found in the liter-
ature regarding cyber-security in substations and synchronization systems
as a list of design and security requirements, a MACsec-based proposal is
presented in Chapter 5. Concretely, as a result of this thesis two main
contributions are described: a new key scheme for the management and
distribution of MACsec group keys for the particular case of PTP over
Ethernet Local Arean Networks (LANs) and a new secure SoC architec-
ture for the development of substation IEDs including PTP and MACsec
support.
• Validation. The viability of implementing the proposed SoC architectures
is demonstrated in Chapters 6 and 7. The former describes initial exper-
iments without MACsec support that were performed over different test
scenarios with the aim of acquiring a better knowledge of the design guide-
lines and testing techniques when working with PTP SoC architectures.
The latter means a step forward in the validation process, since MACsec
hardware units are integrated in the design.
Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes the complete manuscript and gives an outlook to
future research lines based on the scientific findings in this work.
Chapter 2
Cyber-security in substation
automation systems
2.1 Introduction
As it has been mentioned in Chapter 1, the cyber-security of several industrial
plants has been compromised for the last years by some worms and viruses, such
as Stuxnet, which was able to take control of the SCADA system of a nuclear
plant in Iran. Consequently, the research community and the international stan-
dardization committees raised their awareness about protecting information in
SASs. IEC 61850-5 and IEC 62351-6 standards respectively describe communi-
cation models and the security mechanisms to be deployed in current substations,
but they present some inconsistencies that are addressed in this Chapter.
Section 2.2 gives an overview of the evolution of substation communications from
parallel copper wiring architectures to modern SASs. The problem of interoper-
ability raised in traditional SCADA systems was solved with the publication of
the IEC 61850 family of standards, which is presented in Section 2.3. Security
aspects regarding the protection of different communication models defined in
IEC 61850 was targeted by the IEC 62315 family of security standards described
in Section 2.4. Other protocols in substations are introduced in Section 2.5 and
security issues to be considered in the near future are summarized in Section 2.6.
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2.2 Evolution of substation communications
Conventional power generation, transmission and distribution networks are nat-
urally evolving to Smart Grids and, consequently, the interest of the research
community in the development of new functions has been growing considerably.
The Smart Grid technology is defined by the European Technology Platform as
“an electricity network that can intelligently integrate the actions of all users
connected to it - generators, consumers and those that do both - in order to effi-
ciently deliver sustainable, economic and secure electricity supplies” [6]. In order
to optimize the operation of the interconnected elements in power systems, it is
required a two-way flow of power and information in electrical and communication
networks respectively [7].
Substations are the nodes in the electrical power network that connect the lines
and cables to transmit and distribute electricity. Local functions in substations
include data acquisition from the power grid via the switchgear (sensors) and ac-
tivation of changes by commands to switchgear devices (actuators). For instance,
a protection function may issue a trip command to the allocated circuit breaker
in case of fault detection.
In the eighties, the substation architecture gradually evolved from rigid paral-
lel copper wiring to some proprietary solutions based on telephone, teletype or
modem technologies [8]. Also, some standard protocols for industrial automa-
tion were employed in power systems, such as the Distributed Network Protocol
version 3 (DNP3). Local functions in substations were performed through central-
ized SCADA systems which consisted of a Master Terminal Unit (MTU) placed
at a control center, and several Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) geographically
distributed. RTUs were devices that gathered data and sent control commands
to switchgear components. The MTU continuously checked the state of the RTUs
and if they intended to use the shared bus, by sending them messages periodically.
Modern SASs consist of a variety of microprocessor based IEDs and primary
equipment (high-voltage circuit breakers, disconnectors, earthing switches, gas
insulators, transformers, etc.) that provide local or remote access to the power
system, manual or automatic functions and communication links and interfaces
to the switchgear. In contrast to RTUs, SASs perform all local tasks in a more
decentralized structure and the communication function of the RTU is often
implemented in a gateway IED, which should convert communication protocols in
both directions. Thus, the information collected and stored in IEDs is transferred
to the SCADA master via this gateway [9]. SASs improve the control of the
network, allowing a self-response to problems in few seconds. Hence, the highest
benefits of SASs are the minimization of the number of outages and their duration,
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the reduction of operating costs, the increase of productivity and the improvement
of power system performance [9]. In addition, since SASs improve the quality of
the service and the power quality, the positive impact on end customer experience
increases his satisfaction.
In traditional SCADA systems, the existence of many proprietary solutions made
difficult the interoperability between devices, even between different versions of
devices from the same supplier. Expensive protocol converters or re-engineering
were needed to mitigate the problem of interoperability. In 1994, the IEC started
to work on developing a common standard for substation communications, while
the IEEE started a similar work on developing a common communication frame-
work called Utility Communication Architecture (UCA). After that, in 1997,
both organisms started to work together on the development of the standard
IEC 61850, titled “Communication networks and systems for power utility au-
tomation” [7]. The different parts of the standard were first published between
2002 and 2005 becoming the only standard that provides an open architecture
and assures interoperability between IEDs from different vendors. The main ob-
jectives of the standard were interoperability, free architecture and long term
stability [10].
2.3 IEC 61850 standard overview
While communication technologies change very rapidly, substations have lifetimes
of 30 years and longer. Consequently, the standardization was focused on the ob-
ject data model rather than the communication technology. Objects are breakers,
controllers or other protection elements that exchange data with each other using
standardized services [9].
Although the IEC 61850 standard was initially oriented to communications within
the substation, it has been expanded to the whole power system including com-
munications between substations and other inter domain communications, as
shown in Figure 2.1. IEC 61850 parts are listed in Table 2.1. Parts from 3
to 5 define general and functional requirements as well as project management.
Part 6 defines the Substation Configuration Language (SCL) that is based on
Extensible Mark-Up Language (XML) and it is used to exchange configuration
information. The rest of parts define communication services, data models and
the mapping of services to different network protocols for both intra and inter
substation communications.
In order to meet the free configuration and long-term stability requirements,
the IEC 61850 standard follows an Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) 7 layer
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Figure 2.1: IEC 61850 standards family scope
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Tabla 2.1: IEC 61850 standard parts
IEC61850 Title Version Date
Part 1 Introduction and Overview ed2.0 2013/03
Part 2 Glossary ed1.0 2003/08
Part 3 General requirements ed2.0 2013/12
Part 4 System and project management ed2.0 2011/04
Part 5 Communication requirements for functions and device models ed2.0 2013/01
Part 6 Configuration description language for communication in
electrical substations related to IEDs
ed2.0 2009/12
Part 7-1 Basic communication structure - Principles and models ed2.0 2011/07
Part 7-2 Basic communication structure - Abstract Communication
Service Interface (ACSI)
ed2.0 2010/08
Part 7-3 Basic communication structure - Common data classes ed2.0 2010/12
Part 7-4 Basic communication structure - Compatible logical node classes and data
classes
ed2.0 2010/03
Part 7-410 Basic communication structure - Hydroelectric power plants - Communication
for monitoring and control
ed2.0 2012/10
Part 7-420 Basic communication structure - Distributed energy resources logical nodes ed1.0 2009/03
Part 7-510 Basic communication structure - Hydroelectric power plants - Modelling con-
cepts and guidelines
ed1.0 2012/03
Part 8-1 Specific Communication Service Mapping (SCSM) - Mappings to MMS (ISO
9506-1 and ISO 9506-2) and to ISO/IEC 8802-3
ed2.0 2011/06
Part 9-2 Specific Communication Service Mapping (SCSM) - Sampled
values over ISO/IEC 8802-3
ed2.0 2011/09
Part 9-3 Precision time protocol profile for power utility automation ed1.0 2016/05
Part 10 Conformance testing ed2.0 2012/12
Part 80-1 Guideline to exchanging information from a CDC-based data model using IEC
60870-5-101 or IEC 60870-5-104
ed2.0 2016/07
Part 80-3 Mapping to web protocols - Requirements and technical choices ed1.0 2015/11
Part 80-4 Translation from the COSEM object model (IEC 62056) to the IEC 61850
data model
ed1.0 2016/03
Part 90-1 Use of IEC 61850 for the communication between substations ed1.0 2010/03
Part 90-2 Using IEC 61850 for communication between substations and control centres ed1.0 2016/02
Part 90-3 Using IEC 61850 for condition monitoring diagnosis and analysis ed1.0 2016/05
Part 90-4 Network engineering guidelines ed1.0 2013/08
Part 90-5 Use of IEC 61850 to transmit synchrophasor information
according to IEEE C37.118
ed1.0 2012/05
Part 90-7 Object models for power converters in Distributed
Energy Resources (DER) systems
ed1.0 2013/02
Part 90-8 Object model for E-mobility ed1.0 2016/04
Part 90-12 Wide area network engineering guidelines ed1.0 2015/07
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Figure 2.2: IEC 61850 communication stack
model, where substation data services and applications are built above the ap-
plication layer. The communication stack is represented in Figure 2.2. The
Abstract Communication Service Interface (ACSI) is a virtual interface to an
IED that provides abstract services independently of the communication stack,
while the Specific Communication Service Mapping (SCSM) defines the concrete
mapping of ACSI services and objects into a particular protocol (IEC 61850-8-1
[11], IEC 61850-9-2 [12]).
The standard specifies three types of communication models for these ACSI ser-
vices: client/server communication, publisher/subscriber model with GOOSE
messages and multicast Ethernet based SV model. Most of IEC 61850 communi-
cations are based on client/server communication using the Manufacturing Mes-
sage Specification (MMS) standard over Transmission Control Protocol/Internet
Protocol (TCP/IP), as defined in [13], which provides a more reliable data trans-
fer. An example of these services is the fault and event recording. For time
critical applications, such as a protection function issuing a trip command, data
is directly mapped to the Ethernet data link layer as GOOSE messages or SVs
transmission using connectionless multicast addressing of frames. For instance,
a protection function issuing a trip command requires transfer times below 3
milliseconds and, hence, information is directly mapped into a GOOSE mes-
sage. While GOOSE messages generally transmit binary data such as indica-
tions, alarms and tripping signals, SVs are used to transfer current and voltage
raw samples from Current and Voltage Transformers (CTs/VTs) to IEDs.
Figure 2.3 shows the substation automation model and its communication inter-
faces [14], although not all the interfaces enumerated in the figure must be present
in any substation. There are three different levels: the station level, the bay level
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and the process level. The process bus is the communication network which con-
nects IEDs at primary equipment level, whereas the station bus connects IEDs at
bay level and IEDs at station level. Process level devices are typically switchyard
apparatus, intelligent sensors and actuators, remote IOs and CTs/VTs. Bay level
devices are needed for control, protection and monitoring functions. Therefore,
the primary equipment and the protection and control IEDs are in the process and
bay levels respectively. The station level consists of a computer with a database
and a Human Machine Interface (HMI) to be controlled by an operator and the
interfaces for remote communication. Originally, the process bus was specified
as the carrier of the SV traffic and the station bus as the carrier of MMS and
GOOSE traffic, but both can carry all types of traffic. Interfaces in Figure 2.3
are listed below:
1. Protection-data exchange between bay level and station level.
2. Protection-data exchange between bay level and remote protection.
3. Data exchange within bay level.
4. Analogue data exchange between process level and bay level.
5. Control data exchange between process level and bay level.
6. Control data exchange between bay level and station level.
7. Data exchange between the substation and a remote operator.
8. Direct data exchange between the bays especially for fast functions.
9. Data exchange within station level.
10. Control data exchange between the substation and remote control centre.
11. Control data exchange between substations.
For a detailed description on each communication model within substations ac-
cording to IEC 61850 standard, reader is encouraged to read parts 8-1 [11] and
9-2 [12].
2.4 IEC 62351 standard for security in IEC
61850 communications
The interest of the research community in the protection of critical infrastruc-
tures, specially the electricity generation and distribution grids, has increased
over the past decade: when the electricity stops, everything stops [15]. As it has
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Figure 2.3: Interface model within a SAS
been introduced in Section 2.2, power systems are becoming computerised and
control equipment interconnection is evolving from proprietary solutions to stan-
dard communication networks. This evolution reduces the costs of deployment
but also opens up new digital vulnerabilities, since clear information packets can
be easily sniffed, altered or recorded and played black. Examples of real-world
cases of cyber-security intrusions have already been described in Chapter 1.
A lot of effort has been put on preventing that people from the Internet could
gain unauthorized access to substation control systems. Therefore, the use of
firewalls and other boundary control devices to control the information flow be-
tween a power plant and the external network, like the Waterfall Unidirectional
Security Gateway [16], has been the highest priority. However, this perimeter
defences are insufficient as it was demonstrated with the infection of SCADA
control systems via USB flash drives, where no Internet access was needed. The
ideal scenario would be the protection of each individual device within the con-
trol network. In addition, security firewalls and gateways are very difficult to
maintain, since devices and networks in power systems are managed by multiple
firms and constantly require changes in network configurations [15].
The IEC TC57 working group 15 works in the development of cyber-security
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Tabla 2.2: IEC 62351 standard parts
IEC62351 Title Version Date
Part 1 Communication network and system security - Introduction to security issues ed1.0 2007/05
Part 2 Glossary of terms ed1.0 2008/08
Part 3 Communication network and system security - Profiles including TCP/IP ed1.0 2014/10
Part 4 Profiles including MMS ed1.0 2007/06
Part 5 Security for IEC 60870-5 and derivatives ed2.0 2013/04
Part 6 Security for IEC 61850 ed1.0 2007/06
Part 7 Network and System Management (NSM) data object models ed1.0 2010/07
Part 8 Role-based access control ed1.0 2011/09
Part 9 Key management ed1.0 Pending
Part 10 Security architecture guidelines ed1.0 2012/10
Part 11 Security for XML documents ed1.0 2016/09
Part 12 Resilience and security recommendations for power systems with Distributed
Energy Resources (DER) cyber-physical systems
ed1.0 2016/04
Part 13 Guidelines on security topics to be covered in standards and specifications ed1.0 2016/08
standards for power system communications, with the aim of covering both in-
formation infrastructure and communication security [4]. In particular, they
focused in the communication protocols defined in IEC 60870-5/6, 61850, 61970
and 61968 series. In 2007, the IEC 62351 security standard for the power system
information infrastructure was first published and the work is still in process.
Table 2.2 lists the parts that currently compose the standard. The first part
describes the background on security for power system operations and introduces
the remaining parts [17]. Parts 3-6 specifies how to provide security services for
the protocols mentioned above and listed in Table 2.1.
In particular, IEC 62351-6 [18] specifies the security mechanisms for protect-
ing communications defined in the IEC 61850 family of standards. The imple-
mentation of cryptographic algorithms in power system devices with constrained
memory and processing power is a challenge that is partially acknowledged in
this part. Thereby, applications based on GOOSE and SVs, which require short
transfer times, should only use authentication for ensuring data integrity and
source authenticity, but not confidentiality. This standard proposes protecting
GOOSE and SV messages with Message Authentication Codes (MACs) using the
Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA), which are digitally signed using Rivest, Shamir
and Adleman (RSA) public-key cryptosystem to provide source authenticity.
The main drawback of RSA digital signatures are the long execution times for
both computation and verification of the signature. Thus, even though a high-
end ARM processor with a crypto accelerator core were utilized in substation
14 Cyber-security in substation automation systems
equipment, RSA signature with 1024-bit keys could not be computed and veri-
fied within 3 milliseconds, which is the maximum transfer time required by some
GOOSE messages. In addition, deployment costs would increase considerably.
Another alternative to that proposed in the standard, would be the implementa-
tion of Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithms (ECDSA) in dedicated crypto
cores, which could offer latency times required by IEC 61850 for fast messages
[15].
IEC is now working on the first edition of the Part 9 regarding key management,
which is expected to be published as an international standard in 2017. This stan-
dard will be based on the Group Domain of Interpretation (GDOI). Similarly,
Part 6 is planned to be updated shortly as a second edition based on security
requirements defined in IEC 61850-90-5 for synchrophasor communications over
wide area networks [19]. In this case, communications are based on User Data-
gram Protocol (UDP) over IP, which also allows multicast transmission, and they
require confidentiality protection apart from integrity and authenticity. In order
to minimize the security impact on the performance of field devices, instead of
digital signatures, symmetric cryptography is proposed as the protection mecha-
nism. A shared group key should be distributed from a key center to the group
participants after being authenticated using GDOI protocol [20].
The rest of applications, which are based on MMS, should also include data
confidentiality in addition to authentication and they are secured at application
and transport levels as described in IEC 62351-3 and IEC 62351-4. End-to-end
authentication is provided using Transport Layer Security (TLS) Version 1.0, as
defined by the Request for Comments (RFC) 2246 [21]. Some of the included
cryptographic algorithms are RSA for key exchange, Advanced Encryption Stan-
dard (AES) for data encryption and SHA for message authentication.
2.5 Other communication protocols for efficient
and reliable SASs
Apart from cyber-security mechanisms to prevent attacks against the legitimacy
of the exchanged information, in order to deploy reliable and efficient communi-
cation networks in substations, additional protocols are required. In particular,
in this Section, some protocols that are needed to provide precise time synchro-
nization and redundancy are introduced.
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2.5.1 Synchronization protocols
When the blackout from August 2003 in the Northeast United States and On-
tario [22] occurred, the alignment of fault records from different locations in the
post-fault analysis was so difficult that time synchronization became the focus
in such systems. In the past, the identification of simultaneous incidents was
done by skilled personnel who observed continuously at the waveforms. However,
an automated evaluation of these incidents could quickly deliver hints that could
immediately be used for remedial action, not just for post-fault analysis. This au-
tomated evaluation is only possible by assigning accurate timestamps during the
recording of faults, and thus, a powerful time synchronization system is required
[23].
All devices in SASs must have the same time reference so as to analyse globally
the response of the system and, in case of fault, analyse precisely why, where
and when this fault occurred [9]. For current and voltage samples, a time syn-
chronization accuracy in the order of one microsecond is required. Even for fault
detection and location in power transmission lines of the power grid, in order
to measure the time that a travelling wave takes to traverse the line, a precise
synchronization accuracy below one microsecond is desired. As an example, a
time error of one microsecond results in a fault location error of 300 meters [23].
Traditionally, the time transmission standard defined by the Inter-Range Instru-
mentation Group (IRIG-B) [24, 25] was the common synchronization scheme in
substations, which provides one microsecond accuracy using dedicated cabling
infrastructure. This infrastructure is normally not redundant, increasing consid-
erably implementation and maintenance costs. Usually, substations need long
cables, in the range of 300-400 meters, from control building to instrument trans-
formers resulting in varying propagation delays that must be compensated with
complicated and bothersome calibration processes [26].
In addition, the tendency is to gather all communications over the same Ethernet
based data network, particularly over a shared network process bus in SASs.
The IEC Smart Grid Strategy Group and the National Institute of Standards
and Technology of the United States (NIST) [27] recommend PTP protocol, as
defined in IEEE 1588-2008 standard [28], for high precision time synchronization
in substations. Concretely, with the introduction of field specific profiles, the
IEEE firstly published a PTP Power Profile as the IEEE C37.238 standard [29]
for Power Systems.
PTP automatically compensates for propagation delays and distributes abso-
lute time across a substation directly over Ethernet providing accuracies in the
range of nanoseconds. Furthermore, in contrast to IRIG-B systems, time can be
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Figure 2.4: Example of a PTP network within the substation
transmitted over redundant Ethernet networks to increase the reliability of time
distribution.
PTP systems follow a master-slave hierarchy, where the master imposes the time
by sending regular Sync messages with accurate timestamps and slaves synchro-
nize with it in both phase and frequency. In Figure 2.4, an example of IEEE
1588-aware substation network is shown [30]. End devices are called Ordinary
Clocks (OCs) and may be Merging Units (MUs) that generate SV traffic or pro-
tection and control units. Intermediate nodes are Boundary Clocks (BCs) or
Transparent Clocks (TCs) and may also hold protection and control function-
alities. In contrast to BCs, TCs modify the content of PTP messages so as to
consider latencies introduced by network nodes when computing the propagation
delay. They basically measure the time the message takes to traverse the TC,
named residence time, and accumulate it in a special PTP field called the cor-
rectionField. A detailed description of each type of node is addressed in Section
3.2.2.
However, PTP presents some security vulnerabilities and threats that might lead
to different attacks on PTP systems ranging from Denial of Service (DoS) to
selective packet delay attacks passing through clock manipulation by inserting,
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removing or modifying PTP packets [31–33]. As a consequence, a slave clock
could be forced to be aligned to a false time or interruptions of PTP protocol could
be occasioned. Although PTP firstly introduced security as an optional extension
in Annex K of the second version of the standard, due to its limitations, it was
never formalized into a properly-defined security protocol. For more information
on Annex K security extension, see Section 3.2.4.
2.5.2 High availability networks
Apart from precise time synchronization, there are other critical issues in SASs
such as the need for high availability networking. For instance, no traffic in-
terruption is allowed for busbar protection functions in case of link failure. IEC
61850-90-4 considers the Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol (RSTP), the Parallel Re-
dundancy Protocol (PRP) and the High-availability Seamless Redundancy (HSR)
for IEC 61850-8-1 and IEC 61850-9-2 substation communications. The highest
level of availability is achieved using HSR and PRP [34]. Both protocols pro-
vide zero recovery time and no frame loses in case of network failure. Otherwise,
RSTP does not provide seamless recovery, but it recovers fast enough for most
applications that use the station bus. In this Section, both PRP and HSR are
considered, as defined in IEC 62439-3 standard [35].
On the one hand, PRP protocol uses a completely doubled network topology and
Doubled Attached Nodes (DANs) as network interfaces. DANs send and receive
all network traffic over both networks all at once. Detection and removal of
duplicated frames is handled by protocol interfaces in a completely transparent
way to the rest of devices [36]. On the other hand, HSR nodes only need an
additional physical port to build a ring topology where DANs are daisy-chained.
The sender sends two copies of the Ethernet frame in both directions of the ring
and the destination passes the first arrived frame to the upper layers, while the
second one is discarded in case of unicast communications. For multicast and
broadcast ones, the HSR node must also forward it.
The topology of substation communication networks may differ depending on
the physical location of IEDs as a consequence of electrical primary equipment
configuration. Normally, a group of IEDs per bay is attached to a bridge as
shown in Figure 2.1, although exceptions with IEDs serving several bays are
also possible. Thus, the interconnection of IEDs in substations vary from a star
topology to a daisy-chain or to a ring. With the aim of increasing the resiliency of
the substation network, it can be segmented into multiple redundancy domains.
An example topology with two redundancy domains for station and process bus
is depicted in Figure 2.5, where the block diagram of PRP/HSR nodes and PTP
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clocks of a complex substation is represented [30]. In this Figure, a double LAN
network is used on the station bus, which consist of two RSTP rings. The process
bus is an HSR ring per each bay. In small substations, also HSR could fit in the
station bus.
In order to couple non-redundant network nodes, such as the grandmaster clock
or the substation gateway, and couple PRP and HSR networks, Redundancy
Boxes (RedBoxes) are used. In the example network in Figure 2.5, there are two
RedBoxes in each bay: RedBox A couples the orange RSTP ring in the station
bus with the HSR ring in the process bus, while the RedBox B couples the green
one with the same HSR ring. Although RedBoxes can also be TCs, in this case
they are BCs and are treated as redundant clocks in the HSR ring. This means
that only one of them sends Sync messages. Otherwise, in case they were TCs,
they would inject four Sync messages with the same sequence number into the
HSR ring. HSR end nodes in the process bus have an Hybrid Clock (HC) that is
a combination of a TC and an OC.
2.5.3 Communication protocols incompatibility issues
PRP and HSR assume some principles about message propagation over the net-
work that are quite incompatible to PTP [37, 38]. Annex A of IEC 62439-3 [35]
defines how redundant PTP messages must be handled. This annex also specifies
that PTP messages must be directly transported in multicast Ethernet frames
and Peer-to-Peer Transparent Clock (P2P TC) functionality must be included in
intermediate nodes. The P2P TC is a type of transparent clock that use the peer
delay mechanism to measure the link delay and update the correctionField with
both the residence time and the link delay associated with the ingress transmis-
sion path of Sync messages. Chapter 3 provides a detailed description on PTP
operation and types of devices.
The IEC SC 65C subcommittee continued working on these incompatibility issues
and on a new new edition of IEC 62439-3 standard, which was released in March
2016 [39]. From this third edition, it was concluded that a new PTP profile
for Power Systems had emerged from IEC groups, named Utility Profile and
specified as an Annex. Consequently, the existence of two different PTP profiles
for Power Systems, the Power Profile defined in IEEE C37.238 standard [29] and
this Utility Profile, arose a new incompatibility problem. Since the Utility Profile
also considered the utilization of redundancy protocols, IEC and IEEE recently
agreed on the utilization of the Utility Profile for SASs. The definition of this
unique profile was moved from IEC SC 65C to IEC TC57 working group and it
was published as the IEC 61850-9-3 standard in May 2016 [40].
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In [41], authors firstly implemented a full hardware solution with IEC 62439-3 and
IEEE 1588 support. They demonstrated to be cost effective and fast. In the worst
case, the propagation delay through an HSR ring would be the product of each
node bridging delay by the number of nodes. Since this delay must be acceptable
for time critical messages in SASs, IEC 62439-3 estimates that each node in the
HSR ring should forward the frames within 5 microseconds. Hence, the utilization
of cut-through bridging is suggested, where the frame is forwarded before it is
entirely received. Even though cut-through switching were implemented, only the
average forwarding delay would be improved. In the worst-case scenario of all
nodes injecting a maximum size frame at the same time, the overall propagation
delay would not experience any reduction. In order to overcome this problem
and fully exploit the cut-through properties, a pre-allocated time window would
restrict the nodes to sending frames in particular moments and, accordingly, a
common precision clock is needed.
However, the utilization of PTP in secured HSR networks implies that all nodes
in the ring must recalculate the authentication code while the message passes
through the nodes, in order to consider changes in correctionField. P2P TC
functionality modifies the content of this field by adding the residence time and
the link delay and, therefore, cryptographic units located in ingress and egress
ports must respectively verify and recalculate security checksums that protect the
integrity of PTP messages. In fact, the main drawback of implementing security
mechanisms in substation redundant networks is the increased propagation delays
of packets, which should be considered and minimized. Otherwise, GOOSE or SV
messages will suffer long transfer times that will not meet timing requirements.
2.6 The future of cyber-security in SASs
Since the security mechanisms specified in both IEC 62351-6 and IEEE 1588-2008
standards have been demonstrated to be suboptimal, a dramatic change should
be carried out in future versions. On the one hand, the use of digital signatures to
protect GOOSE and SV messages is computationally expensive and presents long
execution times that are not permissible for time critical applications. On the
other hand, Annex K of IEEE 1588-2008 standard presents several vulnerabilities
that will be further described in Section 3.3.1.
Rather than specifying an independent security mechanism for each communica-
tion service in substations, in order to save computational resources in restricted
IEDs, the utilization of a common security framework to protect all substation
communications should be considered in future versions of standards. Differ-
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Tabla 2.3: Summary of security requirements for SAS communication services
Security Requirements
Communication Services in SASs Security Protocols
MMS GOOSE SVs End PTP Peer PTP TLS IPsec MACsec
Source authentication MUST MUST MUST MUST - X X -
Group authentication - - - MUST MUST - - X
Hop-by-hop integrity - MAY MAY MUST MUST - - X
End-to-end integrity MUST MUST MUST MUST - X X -
Confidentiality MUST - - - - X X X
Unicast key management MUST - - SHOULD - X X -
Multicast key management - MUST MUST SHOULD SHOULD - - X
ent types of traffic in SASs should meet different timing requirements, as well
as different security requirements. Table 2.3 summarizes the general security
requirements for different communication services found in substations. Apart
from the three communication models described in Section 2.3, also PTP syn-
chronization service is included. In fact, PTP messages have been classified into
two categories. While Peer PTP messages are those involved in the peer delay
mechanism and exchanged between adjacent nodes, End PTP messages are those
transmitted from the master to slaves, and vice versa, through the network.
Before continuing with the specification and development of a new security solu-
tion for SAS communications, it is worth performing a preliminary study about
the applicability of Information Technology (IT) security solutions in substation
environments. Figure 2.6 shows available security protocols and standards in the
OSI model that provide security services on each layer independently. Security
services offered by these security suites are very similar and also their crypto-
graphic mechanisms are often the same. However, they differ in the applicability
scope: while TLS provides security at application and transport layers, network
and data link layers are protected by Internet Protocol security (IPsec) and Media
Access Control Security (MACsec) respectively.
TLS was already considered by IEC 62351-6 standard to provide end-to-end au-
thentication of MMS-based client-server communications, as mentioned in Sec-
tion 2.4. IPsec and MACsec, in contrast, have not been considered to protect
substation communications yet because they show some drawbacks. While IPsec
provides a great security solution in almost all IT applications, it is limited to
data traffic that is transported over Internet Protocol (IP) at network layer. In
the case of real time communications within the substation, all events need to
be rapidly handled so as not to loss information and data is transported directly
over Ethernet at link layer, as it has been seen in Section 2.3. Therefore, se-
curity at network layer is not feasible. On the other hand, MACsec provides
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hop-by-hop integrity and authenticity, but not end-to-end source authenticity.
Moreover, since each node in the path has to verify the integrity and authenticity
of the message in the reception path and regenerate the authentication code in
the transmission path, long latencies could be introduced in cascaded topologies,
such as star or ring network configurations.
Apart from message protection using authentication codes, since many commu-
nications in SASs are multicast transmissions, a multicast key management pro-
tocol is also desired. In [19], several multicast key management protocols are
presented. These multicast key management protocols are generally used to dis-
tribute symmetric group keys, therefore only group authentication is assured. In
most cases, the protection offered by symmetric group keys only guarantees that
a message was sent or last modified by a group membership, since all nodes in
the group know the shared key and can both send and receive messages.
In order to achieve source or sender authentication, the most immediate method
could be the asymmetric cryptography [42]. The main drawback of this approach
is the computational cost, which is estimated to be about three times the cost of
symmetric encryption. This is mainly due to the utilization of complex arithmetic
functions with large numbers [43], since the length of asymmetric keys must be
almost ten times the length of symmetric keys to achieve an equivalent security
level. Nevertheless, the key management in asymmetric cryptography is simpler,
so it is basically used to authenticate entities using digital signatures and establish
symmetric keys that will encrypt session data.
As depicted in [19], the smarter solution to the problem of sender authentication
in multicast communications is the utilization of key chains, such as the Timed
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Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication (TESLA) protocol, which provides
source authentication using symmetric cryptography. In such a key management
scheme, keys are generated as the result of applying a cryptographic algorithm
repeatedly. Thus, each key is valid for sending only during a limited time interval;
when this interval expires, the sender release it in a secure way to receivers. The
main drawback of using key chains to protect real time traffic like GOOSE and
SV messages is the delay introduced when processing the received message while
the node is waiting for the key. In [19], authors propose the utilization of early
control command execution, which consists in performing the control action in
the receiver immediately after the message reception but, if later on the MAC is
invalid, the inverse operation is performed.
2.7 Conclusions
In this Chapter, the current outlook of cyber-security measures in substation
communications has been presented. Process bus in substations has recently
evolved to digital communication networks that connect microprocessor based
smart devices. In order to assure interoperability between devices from different
vendors, standard protocols defined in the IEC 61850 family of standards must
be employed. Apart from communication models described in this standard, ad-
ditional protocols such as IEEE 1588 and IEC 62439-3 for precise synchronization
and redundancy are required.
With the introduction of standard protocols and software, new digital threats
must be properly handled by communication systems and, hence, the IEC 62351
standard specifies the security mechanisms to protect communications defined
in IEC 61850 standard. Similarly, the IEEE 1588 standard firstly introduced
security as an optional extension in Annex K of the second version of the stan-
dard. However, both approaches have been demonstrated to be inefficient due to
computational costs and processing latencies. Therefore, with the aim of saving
computational resources, future versions of standards should specify a common
security framework to protect all substation communications.
In order to address specific application requirements, the common security frame-
work should consider an hybrid solution with hop-by-hop group authentication
and integrity protection using symmetric cryptography and end-to-end source
authentication using efficient cryptographic methods. Data that is not modified
by IEEE 1588 transparent clock functionality in network nodes should not raise
a problem if a suitable key management scheme is used and symmetric crypto-
graphic algorithms are efficiently implemented in end nodes. The real challenge is
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the integration of a hop-by-hop security solution without compromising the SAS
performance. In fact, as mentioned previously, one of the main problems of de-
ploying secured and redundant substation networks is the increased propagation
delays of packets due to cryptographic units in TCs: since they modify the con-
tent of PTP messages, they must recalculate the associated security checksums
before retransmitting the messages. At the same time, the need for the partici-
pation of intermediate nodes makes difficult the management and distribution of
cryptographic keys.
Chapter 3
Cyber-security in precise
time synchronization
networks
3.1 Introduction
As presented in Chapter 2, the use of time based systems in substations required
all nodes to share a common sense of time. Traditionally, IRIG-B was the common
synchronization scheme in substations. However, it requires a dedicated cabling
infrastructure and complex calibration processes to compensate the varying prop-
agation delays caused by disproportionate cable lengths in substations [24, 25].
Consequently, PTP protocol, as defined in IEEE 1588-2008 standard [28], is the
synchronization protocol recommended by the IEC Smart Grid Strategy Group
for SASs. In contrast to IRIG-B, PTP provides automatic compensation of prop-
agation delays and can distribute absolute time across a substation directly over
Ethernet, providing accuracies in the range of nanoseconds.
Due to its hop-by-hop synchronization approach, PTP introduces a security chal-
lenge: while an end-to-end security approach is generally more robust and secure,
the need for the participation of intermediate nodes becomes a real challenge from
the security perspective, since every cryptographic mechanism is as weak as the
number of nodes that hold the cryptographic keys [33]. The Security Subcom-
mittee within the IEEE P1588 Working Group (P1588 Security SC), is immerse
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in specifying the PTP security solution.
In this Chapter, a detailed review of PTP protocol and the evolution of the
proposed cyber-security mechanisms to protect PTP traffic are drawn.
3.2 IEEE 1588 standard overview
The work in IEEE 1588 begun around 1990 in the Hewlett-Packard laboratories,
and continued at Agilent Technologies headed by Dr John Eidson [26]. The initial
goal of the protocol was to distribute timing in control and measurement systems.
In November 2002, the first version of the standard was published as IEEE 1588-
2002. Two years later, the IEC approved it as IEC 61588 First Edition.
After that, IEEE continued specifying the second version of the protocol, which
was finally published in March 2008 as IEEE 1588-2008 [28] and adopted by
the IEC as IEC 61588 Edition 2.0 in February 2009 [44]. This second version
emerged because of the need to cover new areas such as telecommunications,
audio/video bridging networks and power industry. In addition, some new re-
quirements needed to be targeted: higher accuracy, variable update rates, rapid
reconfiguration and fault tolerance, among others.
Some of the most important improvements in the new version were the support
for hardware timestamping and the addition of a new device type, the transparent
clock, a kind of IEEE 1588-aware bridge. Other relevant advancement was the
introduction of application specific profiles, which are subsets of attributes and
parameters that are specific for an application field. Also, an optional security
extension was firstly introduced to provide integrity and authentication.
PTP systems follow a master-slave hierarchy, where the master imposes the time
by sending regular Sync messages, and slaves synchronize to it in both phase and
frequency. Accuracies in the nanoseconds range are achieved by simply exchang-
ing regular PTP messages, which contain accurate timestamps as described in
Section 3.2.1. These timestamps must be compensated by slaves for the propa-
gation delay, which may be computed using two measurement mechanisms that
need the participation of intermediate nodes, as explained in Sections 3.2.2 and
3.2.3. Finally, in Section 3.2.4, a description of the optional security extension
included in the second version of the standard is reported.
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Figure 3.1: PTP over IEEE 802.3/Ethernet mapping
3.2.1 PTP messages
PTP messages can be transported over several network protocols such as UDP
over IP, Ethernet, DeviceNET, ControlNET and Fieldbus. Since the tendency
in substations is to gather all communications over the same Ethernet based
data network, in this document only the mapping of PTP messages directly into
Ethernet frames is considered. In this case, in order to identify PTP messages,
the Ethertype field in the Ethernet header is set to 0x88F7 in hexadecimal.
Figure 3.1 shows the mapping of PTP messages over Ethernet frames. PTP
messages consist of header, body and optional suffix. The header is common
to all PTP messages and its format can be seen in Figure 3.2. The length of
the message is indicated by the third and fourth octets within the PTP header
and the sourcePortIdentity field contains a value that identifies the port that
originated the message. In order to protect PTP protocol against replay attacks,
a sequence number is included in the sequenceId field. The correctionField is the
sum of all corrections made in transparent clocks as described in Section 3.2.2.3.
More information about the rest of the fields may be found in the standard [28].
The type of PTP message is indicated by the messageType field in the header, so
as to identify the information contained in the body. Table 3.1 lists the values of
this field. The Announce message is used to indicate the capabilities of a clock
to the rest of clocks in a domain, in order to establish the master-slave hierarchy.
The Sync message is periodically sent by a master clock and it contains the
time when the Sync message was sent, which is called the originTimestamp. If
the master has not the capability to include the precise originTimestamp in the
proper Sync message, it will be sent in the associated Follow Up message. The
Delay Req message allows a slave to start the delay request-response mechanism
to calculate the propagation delay, as explained in Section 3.2.3. After receiving a
Delay Req, the master responses with a Delay Resp message to finish this process.
On the other hand, Pdelay Req and Pdelay Resp messages are used to compute
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the link delay with the peer delay mechanism. The former is sent by a delay
requester clock to initialize the process and the latter is sent by a delay responder.
If the responder clock cannot include the timing information required to compute
the link delay in the Pdelay Resp, also a Pdelay Resp Follow Up is sent containing
the timestamp. For a detailed explanation see Section 3.2.3.
Signalling messages are used to send additional information and to perform op-
tional or implementation-specific functionalities that are defined in the standard
or outside the scope of the standard. Management messages are used to trans-
mit information from a clock to a management node and vice versa for system
management operations.
3.2.2 PTP device types
Normally, time distributed systems consist of a combination of PTP and non-
PTP devices. PTP devices are classified as ordinary clocks, boundary clocks,
transparent clocks and management nodes. Additionally, although they are not
defined in IEEE 1588-2008 standard, manufacturers widely deploy hybrid clocks.
They are a combination of a transparent clock and an ordinary clock. On the
other hand, non-PTP devices might include bridges, routers and other network
devices such as computers, printers, or field specific devices that are not IEEE
1588-aware.
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Tabla 3.1: PTP message types
Message Class Message Type Mechanism
Sync
Delay request-response mechanism
Delay Req
Pdelay Req
Peer delay mechanism
Event Messages
Pdelay Resp
Announce Synchronization hierarchy establishment
Follow Up
Delay request-response mechanism
Delay Resp
Pdelay Resp Follow Up Peer delay mechanism
Management Initialization and configuration of nodes
General Messages
Signalling Other
In addition, each PTP device may work as either one-step or two-step mode for
the transfer of timestamps. One-step clocks generate egress timestamps on-the-fly
and transport them directly over Sync and Pdelay Resp event messages. Other-
wise, two-step clocks include this timestamping information in the corresponding
Follow Up and the Pdelay Resp Follow Up general messages. Since the utiliza-
tion of two-step clocks requires more network bandwidth and data processing, in
order to maximize the efficiency of the protocol, the use of one-step operation is
recommended.
3.2.2.1 Ordinary clock
An Ordinary Clocks (OC) is a system end device that contains a PTP clock with
a single physical network connection. It can adopt the role of PTP master or
slave. Figure 3.3 depicts the architecture of an OC device. One of the logical
interfaces is used to send and receive PTP event messages and the other one sends
and receives PTP general messages, as defined in Table 3.1. The former uses the
Timestamp Unit (TSU) to timestamp event messages based on the value of the
local clock and, then, passes the messages to the protocol engine. The latter
directly passes general messages to the protocol engine.
An OC only has a single copy of the protocol, i.e. the protocol engine. When it is
in the slave state, it deals with the computation of the reference time from master,
based on the received PTP timing messages and local timestamps generated by
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the event interface. The local clock normally consist of a counter and a control
loop, which adjusts the counter parameters until agreeing with the time of its
master. When it is in the master state, the local clock acts as a free-running
clock, although it might be possibly synchronized to an external reference clock,
such as a GPS receiver.
In addition, the protocol engine of an OC maintains a clock data set and a port
data set with the necessary attributes to run the protocol.
3.2.2.2 Boundary clock
A Boundary Clocks (BC) is a network device that contains specialized IEEE 1588
functionality and, unlike ordinary clocks, it has several physical ports. While OCs
are usually used as end devices, BCs are essentially used as network elements
without additional functionalities. They are used by the protocol to segment the
network logically and to create the master-slave hierarchy in each region.
They also have event and general logical interfaces per physical port, as shown
in Figure 3.4. There is a single local clock and a clock data set common to all
of the ports. In addition, one protocol engine per port must resolve its state to
be slave or master and, hence, it must determine which port provides the time
signal used to synchronize the local clock.
In a BC, PTP received messages are not forwarded, except from Management
messages that are not restricted to be propagated through different clock regions.
That is, a BC synchronizes to the master and generates new PTP messages
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to share its own timing reference with the rest of slaves. As a consequence,
time errors are accumulated in cascaded topologies where PTP messages passed
through several BCs. All non-PTP messages are managed as if it was a normal
network component, such as a bridge, a switch or a router.
3.2.2.3 Transparent clock
Similarly to BCs, Transparent Clocks (TCs) are embedded in network elements
but, on the contrary, they forward PTP and non-PTP messages. The most
significant difference is that TCs measure the time the message takes to traverse
the switch or router, called the residence time, and accumulates it in a special
PTP field of event messages, named correctionField.
The value of the residence time is computed as the difference between the ingress
and egress timestamps. This computation is usually based on the difference be-
tween the timestamps generated when the message enters and leaves the node.
A TC device might have two or more ports and, therefore, the paths of messages
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crossing it might differ depending on the source and destination addresses. Con-
sequently, associated residence times will vary due to queueing delays and traffic
prioritization. Since the payload content will change as message crosses a TC, all
network protocol affected checksums must be updated before leaving the device.
Figure 3.5 depicts a TC block diagram. The ingress and egress timestamps are
generated from the local clock, which may be a free-running1 or a synchronized
clock. The implementation of the residence time bridge function in the TC is not
specified in the standard, but it needs to add a kind of logic interface to each
port in order to get the captured timestamps and compute the time difference.
There are two types of TCs: End-to-End Transparent Clocks (E2E TCs) and
Peer-to-Peer Transparent Clocks (P2P TCs). E2E TCs measure the residence
time and accumulate it in the correctionField of event messages, in order to
allow the slave to compute the propagation delay by using the delay request-
response mechanism, as explained in Section 3.2.3.3. Otherwise, P2P TCs use
the peer delay mechanism to measure the link delay, as described in Section
3.2.3.4. They update the correctionField with both the residence time and the
1Due to the fact that the rates of the master and the TC are likely to be different, the
introduced errors in the correction factor must be considered when using free-running clocks.
For instance, with a typically difference of 0.02% in clock rates, the maximum error for a
residence time of 1 milliseconds will be 200 nanoseconds, which may be or not acceptable for
some applications.
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link delay associated with the ingress transmission path of Sync messages. Since
there is no point in measuring the propagation delay after changing the Sync
path, P2P TCs allow a faster reconfiguration after network topology changes.
How PTP messages traverse E2E and P2P TCs is shown in Figures 3.6(a) and
3.6(b) [45].
The peer delay mechanism is not compatible with the delay request-response
mechanism and, as a consequence, P2P TCs only can work with ports supporting
the peer delay mechanism as link peers. In order to connect a region using E2E
TCs to another one with P2P TCs, a BC might be used as the interconnection
element.
3.2.2.4 Management nodes
Management nodes might be combined with any of the mentioned clock types.
They have one or more physical network connections and serve as an interface to
PTP management messages.
3.2.3 PTP operation
The protocol consists of four operational processes:
1. Establishment of system boundaries, through which domains with the
same time reference are established. The standard defines a domain as
an area in which the protocol is executed and, as a consequence, different
independent synchronization systems can be maintained within a physical
network. In order to limit the extent of a domain, in Ethernet networks
for example, the propagation of multicast messages is typically managed by
configuring switches and routers.
2. Master-slave hierarchy establishment, through which all the PTP
nodes are logically configured into a tree structure where the root is the
grandmaster clock, OCs are the leaves of the tree and BCs or TCs cre-
ate the branch points. The Best Master Clock (BMC) algorithm allows
the selection of the grandmaster based on the clock quality, accuracy and
stability. For a detailed description of the BMC algorithm, the reader is
encouraged to read the standard [28].
3. Synchronization and syntonization, which are two independent process
executed by OCs and BCs to synchronize their local clocks in phase and
frequency respectively. Since they are the most important procedures in
PTP protocol operation they are thoroughly explained below.
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4. System and clock management, which is done via Management mes-
sages, as it has been mentioned in Section 3.2.1. Although the default
management mechanism is described in the standard, another alternative
might be used if necessary.
Synchronization and syntonization processes involve:
• The computation of the clock offset from master in the slave, called
offsetFromMaster.
• The computation of the fractional frequency offset from master in the slave,
called frequencyDrift.
• The measurement of propagation delay, called meanPathDelay, using the
delay request-response mechanism in the slave or the peer delay mechanism
in every P2P port.
• The correction of the meanPathDelay by adding the residence time to the
correctionField value of Sync and Follow Up messages in any TC.
• The correction of the meanPathDelay for path asymmetries.
3.2.3.1 Clock offset computation
The computation of clock offset is done in OCs and BCs and its value will depend
on the twoStepFlag bit of the flagField of the Sync message. If this bit is set to
FALSE, one-step mode was selected and a Follow Up will not be received. On
the contrary, if it is set to TRUE, the peer clock is using two-step mode, therefore
a Follow Up message will be received.
The clock offset is computed based on Equation 3.1 following the rules shown in
Table 3.2 for one-step and two-step operation mode.
offsetFromMaster = syncIngressT imestamp− correctedMasterT imestamp (3.1)
Tabla 3.2: Correction of master timestamps
Mode correctedMasterTimestamp
One-Step originT imestamp + meanPathDelay + correctionF ield of Sync message
preciseOriginT imestamp + meanPathDelay + correctionF ield of Sync message
Two-Step
+ correctionF ield of Follow Up message
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Continuing with the clock offset computation process, the terms used in Equation
3.1 and Table 3.2 are explained below:
• The syncIngressT imestamp is the value of the timestamp generated by
the slave upon the receipt of the Sync message.
• The originT imestamp is the value of the originTimestamp field of Sync
message.
• The preciseOriginT imestamp is the value of the preciseOriginTimestamp
field of the Follow Up message.
• The meanPathDelay shall be computed accordingly to the propagation
delay measurement mechanism.
3.2.3.2 Drift computation
The frequency drift, or fractional frequency offset, is computed using the Equation
3.2 and it is used by the slave to adjust the frequency of its local clock. It is
estimated as the ratio of the elapsed time of the slave to the elapsed time of the
master between two Sync messages, which are N syncInterval apart from each
other (N > 0).
frequencyDrift =
syncIngressT imestamp2N − syncIngressT imestamp21
correctedMasterT imestamp1N − correctedMasterT imestamp11
(3.2)
Figure 3.7 and Equation 3.3 represent an example of frequency drift computation.
t′11 and t
′
1N are master timestamps t11 and t1N but corrected by the propagation
delay, as seen in Table 3.2.
frequencyDriftFIG =
t2N − t21
t′1N − t′11
(3.3)
3.2.3.3 Delay request-response mechanism
Timestamps contained in PTP messages must be corrected in slaves by the prop-
agation delay, which can be measured using one of the two mechanisms defined
in the standard: the delay request-response or the peer delay mechanism. The
first one uses the messages Sync, Delay Req, Delay Resp and possibly Follow Up
as represented in Figure 3.8.
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The slave needs four measurement values t1, t2, t3 and t4 to compute the propa-
gation delay, which are the ingress and egress timestamps of Sync and Delay Req
messages as shown in Figure 3.8. Follow Up and Delay Resp messages transport
the time values captured by the master down to the slave. The propagation delay
from master to slave and from slave to master, named DelayMS and DelaySM
respectively, are:
DelayMS + Offset = t2 − t1 (3.4)
DelaySM −Offset = t4 − t3 (3.5)
From Equation 3.5:
Offset = DelaySM − (t4 − t3) (3.6)
and substituting from 3.4 above:
DelayMS + DelaySM = (t2 − t1) + (t4 − t3) (3.7)
Assuming that the message transit delay is the same for both directions, the
simplified equation for the propagation delay can be obtained:
DelayMS = DelaySM =
(t2 − t1) + (t4 − t3)
2
(3.8)
Actually, in order to compensate latencies in network nodes, the value of t1
and t4 must be corrected with the values of the correctionField in the Sync,
Follow Up and Delay Resp messages. Therefore, in the standard, the value of
the meanPathDelay is computed as follows:
meanPathDelay =
(t2 − t′1) + (t′4 − t3)
2
=
(t2 − t3) + (t′4 − t′1)
2
(3.9)
where t′1 and t
′
4 are the corrected timestamps, as defined in Table 3.3.
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Tabla 3.3: Correction of master timestamps in delay request-response mechanism
Mode t1’
One-Step originT imestamp of Sync message + correctionF ield of Sync message
Two-Step preciseOriginT imestamp of Follow Up message + correctionF ield of Sync message
+ correctionF ield of Follow Up message
Mode t4’
One-Step receiveT imestamp of Delay Resp message + correctionF ield of Delay Resp message
Two-Step receiveT imestamp of Delay Resp message + correctionF ield of Delay Resp message
3.2.3.4 Peer delay mechanism
While the delay request-response mechanism measures the meanPathDelay be-
tween a pair of PTP ports using the Sync, Delay Req, Delay Resp and possible
Follow Up messages, the peer delay mechanism measures the link delay between
two peer ports2 that support this mechanism using the Pdelay Req, Pdelay Resp
and possibly Pdelay Resp Follow Up messages. This approach is represented in
Figure 3.9.
Similarly to Equation 3.9, the meanPathDelay between Ports A and B is com-
puted as follows:
meanPathDelay =
(t2 − t1) + (t4 − t3)
2
=
(t4 − t1)− (t3 − t2)
2
(3.10)
The elapsed time t3 − t2 is directly transported from Port-B to Port-A in the
correctionField of the Pdelay Resp message when Port-B is a one-step clock.
For two-step clocks two possibilities are available. On the one hand, the cor-
rectionField of the Pdelay Resp Follow Up message can be used to transport
the difference t3 − t2. On the other hand, both the Pdelay Resp and the Pde-
lay Resp Follow Up messages can be used to transport t2 and t3 respectively.
When measuring link delay by the peer delay mechanism, timestamps are not cor-
rected by the propagation delay but asymmetries should be considered if known.
For a detailed understanding, the reader is encouraged to read the standard.
2Peer ports are communicating ports of two adjacent nodes that are directly connected in
the network, e.g. the peer port of a master port can be the port of the adjacent P2P TC.
40 Cyber-security in precise time synchronization networks
Port-A 
time 
Port-B 
time 
t1 
t4 
Port-A to 
Port-B delay 
t2 
t3 
Port-B to 
Port-A delay 
Figure 3.9: IEEE 1588 P2P propagation delay correction
3.2.3.5 Residence time computation
The residence time is the time that an event message takes to traverse a TC,
which is calculated as shown in Equation 3.11:
residenceT ime = egressT imestamp− ingressT imestamp, (3.11)
ingressT imestamp and egressT imestamp terms in the above Equation are re-
spectively the times of reception and transmission of an event message on the
ingress and egress port of the TC.
The way the residence time is transferred from the TC to the slaves depends on
the type of message and on the type of TC. As a summary, in Table 3.4, the
main concepts involved in residence time computation have been reflected. E2E
TCs has to measure the residence time for all event messages listed in this Table,
whereas P2P TC only has to modify Sync messages. In addition, Pdelay Req and
Pdelay Resp messages terminate at P2P TCs.
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Tabla 3.4: A summary of residence time transferring options
Message Type TC type Mode Residence time transfer method
One-Step Added to the correctionField of the transmitted Sync message
Sync E2E/P2P
Two-Step Added to the correctionField of the transmitted Follow Up message
One-Step Added to the correctionField of the transmitted Delay Req message
Delay Req E2E
Two-Step Added to the correctionField of the transmitted Delay Resp message
One-Step Added to the correctionField of the transmitted Pdelay Req message
Pdelay Req E2E
Two-Step Added to the correctionField of the transmitted Pdelay Resp Follow Up message
One-Step Added to the correctionField of the transmitted Pdelay Resp message
Pdelay Resp E2E
Two-Step Added to the correctionField of the transmitted Pdelay Resp Follow Up message
3.2.3.6 Asymmetry correction
Although the protocol cannot detect asymmetries in the propagation paths, they
are sometimes known. For instance, the asymmetry introduced by physical layer
due to different delays in Ethernet transceivers might be determined from ba-
sic experiments. If they are known, a PTP node must apply corrections for
asymmetries. The way to manage Sync, Delay Req, Pdelay Req and Pdelay Resp
messages when correcting the path asymmetry for the path connected to the
corresponding ingress or egress port of a device is specified in the standard. For
instance, when managing the path asymmetry correction of a Sync message by
an ordinary clock, the asymmetry correction must be done for incoming Sync
messages through any ingress port, but not for the path connected to the egress
port.
3.2.4 Cyber-security protection of PTP messages
Annex K in [28] defines an optional security extension that provides group source
authentication, message integrity and replay attack protection for PTP messages
using symmetric MAC functions. This extension is composed by two basic mech-
anisms:
• An integrity protection mechanism, which uses the MAC functions to verify
that a received message was sent by an authenticated source, it was not
modified in transit, and it is fresh (i.e. not a message replay).
• A challenge-response mechanism, which is a three way mutual authentica-
tion process used to affirm the authenticity of new sources and to maintain
the freshness of the trust relations.
The Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) functions supported by
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Figure 3.10: Annex K security data set
the protocol are HMAC-SHA1-96 and HMAC-SHA256-128, but the addition of
other MACs in the future is allowed. The implementation of these algorithms
must be in accordance with several RFC documents from the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF) community and with NIST standards: RFC 2104 [46], RFC
2404 [47], NIST Secure Hash Standard [48] and NIST HMAC Standard [49].
Master and slaves share secret symmetric keys, which could be shared by the
whole domain or by subsets of the domain. The generation of secret keys and
the key distribution, which may be done either manually or by an automatic key
management protocol, are out of scope of the standard.
3.2.4.1 Security data set
PTP nodes maintain Security Associations (SA) to perform the aforementioned
mechanisms, which will be explained in next Sections. These associations are
established using the challenge-response mechanism between two nodes to confirm
their identity. In addition, they are unidirectional and, consequently, they can
be used to protect traffic from the source to the destination, but no viceversa.
Each node maintains a table of incoming SAs and a table of outgoing SAs, which
are respectively used for verification and protection of incoming and outgoing
traffic. The entire list of incoming and outgoing SAs together with a list of keys
and a list of default data set parameters, composes the security data set, as it
has been represented in Figure 3.10.
SAs can be static and configured in advanced. They can also be created dynami-
cally on-the-fly once the clock receives a PTP message from a port that does not
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Tabla 3.5: Annex K ICV and pad length
Algorithm ICV length
(octets)
Pad length
(octets)
NULL 0 16
HMAC-SHA1-96 12 4
HMAC-SHA256-128 16 0
match with any entry of the incoming SAs table. There are two possibilities for
creating dynamic SAs by the sender:
1. A single SA for each source and all destinations. The sender creates an SA
with its source address being one of its interface unicast addresses and the
destination being ”all”.
2. An SA per source and destination. That is, the sender creates multiple SAs
with the same source address and different multicast and unicast destina-
tions.
3.2.4.2 Secure transmit and receive processing
To use the security extension, the security flag bit in the flagField of the PTP
message header must be set to TRUE in all secured transmitted PTP messages,
so as to indicate that the message carries the security AUTHENTICATION TLV
field. This TLV includes security information of the associated outgoing SA and
the Integrity Check Value (ICV), as shown in Figure 3.11(a). The ICV is the
result of computing the MAC algorithm over all PTP message fields beginning
with the first octet of the common header and ending with the last octet of the
security AUTHENTICATION TLV.
In order to facilitate hardware implementations of the security protocol, the AU-
THENTICATION TLV is the final TLV field appended to the PTP message. The
last 16 octets are distributed between the padding (all zeros) and the ICV field
depending on the selected algorithm as stated in Table 3.5.
When a PTP message is received, the ICV in the message is checked. This
checksum must match with the result of applying the MAC function specified by
the algorithm identifier, which is retrieved from the key list data set indexed by
the key identifier. If the key identifier in the message is neither valid nor known,
or the algorithm identifier in the message is not equal to the one associated in the
incoming SA, the ICV check fails. If the computed ICV does not match the ICV
carried in the message the ICV test also fails. Therefore, if any of the previously
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Figure 3.11: Annex K security TLVs
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mentioned checks fails the packet should be silently discarded, i.e. the message
is discarded without further processing and without internal or external resource
allocation, so as to limit the ability of a DoS attack.
After checking the ICV, the received PTP message is matched against the corre-
sponding incoming SA in the SA lookup process, to determine whether they are
received from a trusted source. The source port identifier of the PTP header and
the source protocol address must match the source port and the source address
of the incoming SA. Then, the key identifier value in the AUTHENTICATION
TLV must be checked. If it is equal to the one stored in the incoming SA the
test passes; if it does not match, the message is silently discarded. After that,
the replay counter is checked following the replay protection mechanism. The
incoming lifetime identifier is compared with that of the incoming SA. If they are
identical, then the replay counter is compared. On the contrary, if it is smaller
or equal to the stored one, the message must be silently discarded3.
3.2.4.3 The challenge-response exchange
The challenge-response exchange is a three-way mutual authentication protocol,
in which two nodes are able to affirm their authenticity and freshness. It is
initialized when a clock receives a message from an untrusted source.
During the challenge-response exchange the AUTHENTICATION-CHALLENGE
TLV is used. In Figure 3.11(b) the format of this TLV is represented. Whereas
AUTHENTICATION TLV described above is appended at the end of all PTP se-
cure messages, the AUTHENTICATION-CHALLENGE TLV must be appended
as the first TLV of the secured signalling message. The challengeType field de-
fines the challenge type as challengeRequest, challengeResponseRequest or chal-
lengeResponse. Thus, the sender of the challengeRequest and the challengeRe-
sponseRequest sets the request nonce to a random number. After that, the re-
ceiver of the challengeResponse and the challengeResponseRequest matches the
request nonce it sent before in the request to the reply. If it does not match the
challenge-response check fails and the challenge message is silently discarded.
3The replay protection mechanism relies on the fact that the probability for the sourcePor-
tIdentity, lifetimeId and replayCounter triplet appearing twice is extremely low and depends
on the shared keys lifetime. There is a trade-off between this probability and the key exchange
frequency, i.e. the smaller the shared keys lifetime, the higher the key exchange frequency.
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3.2.4.4 The security association update exchange
A challenge-response exchange is also initiated to update SA parameters, such
as the lifetime and the key identifiers, of the outgoing SA using the SECURITY-
ASSOCIATION-UPDATE shown in Figure 3.11(c), which is sent in challengeRe-
sponse and challengeResponseRequest signalling messages. By specifying the
address type the TLV can be used to deliver the SA update relevant to all ad-
dresses or, on the contrary, deliver SA update information for a particular address
type if different outgoing SAs are maintained by the challenge-response.
3.3 The future of PTP security
PTP presents some security vulnerabilities and threats that might lead PTP
systems to different attacks ranging from DoS to selective packet delay attacks
passing through clock manipulation by inserting, removing or modifying PTP
packets [31–33]. PTP firstly introduced security as an optional extension in
Annex K of the second version of the standard, but it presented some limitations
that have been studied during last years [50–52]. In this Section, firstly, the most
significant security flaws of Annex K are collected. After that, a summary of
the contributions regarding PTP security of related standardization committees
is presented.
3.3.1 PTP security extension limitations
The security extension for PTP, as defined in Annex K of the second version
of the standard, was never implemented in real networks due to several security
vulnerabilities identified in the literature. An attacker could directly manipulate
nodes and maliciously modify protocol stacks or install some malware in order
to take advantage of these weaknesses. Some of the most significant threats are
summarized below:
Unsecure and congested startup phase
In the startup phase, a manipulated PTP node can take advantage of the
lack of verification of announced accuracies and, hence, it might become a
byzantine master4 and gain system control by announcing a wrong time.
In addition, since the first Sync messages from all non-authenticated nodes
will not have associated an incoming SA, every node will trigger a challenge
4A byzantine master is an attacker that becomes PTP master, for example by announcing
false clock accuracies in the startup phase, in order to establish a wrong reference time.
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request-response procedure for every received message causing a storm of
messages jamming the network, which might lead the system to a DoS
attack [32].
Source address modification
Network protocol addresses used for the SA lookup process are not pro-
tected bacause the ICV value is computed over all PTP message fields
excluding network or transport protocol addresses. Therefore, the source
address can be changed by an attacker, who might cause DoS attack by
overloading the SA table with new entries or produce replay packets as a
man-in-the-middle attacker. The attacker could take advantage of this se-
curity flaw by creating a twin SA or resetting an existing one as authors
affirmed in [51].
Sub-optimal ICV calculation
In the transmission path, the ICV must be computed after drawing the
timestamp in order to allow one-step mode of operation. Hence, on-the-fly
calculation of the ICV should be performed close to physical layer, which
requires MAC computation of one block to be finished before fetching the
next block. Both HMAC-SHA1 and HMAC-SHA256 operate on blocks of
512 bits, which need 64 cycles at 1 Gbit/s or 512 nanoseconds to process an
entire block. For SHA1 algorithm collision attacks were demonstrated, and
therefore the utilization of SHA256 is recommended. However, hardware
implementations of SHA256 need loop unrolling techniques to compute the
hash in less than 64 cycles with the consequent area cost. In addition to this,
HMAC architecture introduces an additional delay because the final hash
value of the message has to be digitally signed [53]. Modern MAC hardware
implementations based on the AES algorithm offer the same security level
than HMAC-SHA256 with reduced latency and area [52].
Additional overhead
The additional overhead introduced by the security extension can be di-
vided into network load and computational load. Network load is caused
by the need for additional messages due to security management and ad-
ditional AUTHENTICATION TLVs appended to each message. Thus, the
overhead of the payload is around 60% of the acutal message volume [50].
The computational load relates to the computational resources required to
implement security extension. In [54], several performance tests were exe-
cuted over a practical implementation of a software security layer to analyse
CPU load under both normal operation and when a DoS attack was sim-
ulated. These tests showed that the CPU load considerably increases with
the number of PTP nodes, specially in the startup phase.
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Security for switches
In case of using TCs, the highest difficulty is to manage and distribute the
high number of keys for different SAs running on a switch [50]. Supposing
that multicast addressing is used to distribute timing information, keys for
different groups must be additionally distributed to all TCs to recalculate
the ICV after modifying the correctionField. Authors in [50] also identified
the need for implementing a single security unit for each sending path in
a TC, so as to minimize the jitter under load conditions. In addition,
long execution times of SHA algorithm must be taken into account for the
calculation of the residence time.
Unnecessary challenge-response exchange
The three-way authentication scheme generates additional traffic, consumes
resources and interrupts the useful traffic for a while [52]. As synchro-
nization frames are broadcast, the challenge-response mechanism with all
destinations increases the message traffic. Consequently, the grandmas-
ter suffers from high CPU load. This mechanism could be replaced by a
one-way authentication with the support of a key distribution scheme.
3.3.2 TICTOC working group contributions
The Timing over IP Connection and Transfer of Clock (TICTOC) working group
belongs to the IETF community and is concerned with highly accurate time and
frequency distribution over packet switched networks. After some years of anal-
ysis for protecting synchronization messages over Internet, the TICTOC group
moved forward with the definition of security requirements for Network Time
Protocol (NTP) and PTP networks in a succession of Internet Drafts that had
an informational purpose. There are already twelve versions of the draft, with
the last one published in September 2014. Finally, in October 2014, the work of
the group resulted in the publication of the RFC 7384 [55]. There, the possible
threats and the required security services for packet based synchronization net-
works are defined and security requirements for time synchronization protocols
are specified.
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 list types of attacks and security requirements respectively.
As it can be seen in Table 3.6, attacks are classified according to two criteria:
the accessibility of the attacker to the security information and the localization
of the attacker within the network. On the one hand, an attacker can be internal
or external. An internal attacker has access to a trusted segment of the network
or to an intermediate node that possess the security keys. Consequently, it can
tamper information as well as generate traffic maliciously. Otherwise, external
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Tabla 3.6: Summary of PTP cyber-attacks
Types of attacks
Impact Attacker Type
False
Time
Accuracy
Degrad.
DoS
Internal External
MITM Injector MITM Injector
Manipulation X X
Spoofing X X X
Replay attack X X X
Rogue master (rogue TC/rogue BC) X X X
Interception and removal X X X X
Packet delay manipulation X X X
Layer 2/layer 3 DoS attacks X X X X X
Cryptographic performance attacks X X X X X
Time protocol DoS attacks X X X
Master time source attack
(e.g. GPS spoofing
X X X X X
attackers do not have access to security keys.
On the other hand, an attacker can be Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) or packet
injector. The former is located somewhere in the network that allows intercepting
and modifying packets, like an attacker that has gained control of one of the
nodes. The latter generates new traffic, even from an external network that
is connected to the network under risk. An injector could also perform replay
attacks.
Attackers may exploit different threats to align slaves to a false time or frequency
value, to induce accuracy degradation5 or to cause DoS. For example, by packet
interception and manipulation, an internal MITM attacker can modify the origin-
Timestamp and correctionField of PTP Sync packets causing the receiving nodes
to be aligned to a false time. Other important threats are spoofing and replay
attacks. An internal MITM or Injector attacker can spoof a clock and send mes-
sages that appear to receivers to be generated by the legitimate master, or even
record PTP messages and replay them later.
A rogue master could be the result of manipulating the best master clock selec-
tion, which is based on the quality of the clocks that is advertised in the startup
phase through Announce messages. If an attacker generates malicious Announce
messages with false clock quality or Media Access Control (MAC) address6, it
5All attacks with a false time alignment effect implicitly causes accuracy degradation, but
in the table they represent two levels of severity
6When multiple clocks have the same clock quality the selection is done based on the MAC
addresses.
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could become an illegitimate master clock.
The rest of attacks can be performed by both internal and external attackers in
common PTP networks. For a detailed description of each attack the reader is
encouraged to look up the document [55].
Tabla 3.7: Summary of PTP cyber-security requirements
Security Requirement Level Corresponding Threat
Authentication & authorization of sender MUST
Spoofing attack and rogue masterAuthentication & authorization of master MUST
Recursive authentication & authorization MUST
Authentication & authorization of slaves MAY
DoS against the master
Authentication & authorization of P2P TCs by master MAY
Authentication & authorization of Announce messages MUST
Spoofing attack and rogue masterAuthentication & Authorization of Management messages MUST
Authentication & authorization of Signalling messages MAY
Integrity protection MUST Packet manipulation
Master/slave/P2P TC spoofing protection MUST Spoofing attacks
Availability SHOULD DoS attacks against the time protocol
Replay protection MUST
Replay attacks
Key freshness MUST
Security association SHOULD -
Unicast and multicast associations SHOULD -
Performance: no degradation in quality of time transfer MUST -
Performance: computation load, storage and bandwidth SHOULD -
Confidentiality protection MAY MITM attacks
Protection against delay and interception attacks MUST Packet delay attack
Secure mode MUST -
Hybrid mode SHOULD -
In order to represent the impact level and the difficulty of performing the cor-
responding attacks in case the requirement in question were not implemented,
different requirement levels are defined in Table 3.7. MUST means the definition
of an absolute requirement, whereas SHOULD and MAY terms relate to rec-
ommendations and optional features that should be considered. When securing
clock synchronization networks in general, confidentiality and non-repudiation
are not usually considered as crucial security services in today’s industrial en-
vironments. In particular, time information is public in the network. In this
way, confidentiality is not required and encryption can be avoided. Therefore,
the work on cyber-security issues in PTP systems has been focused on integrity,
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authentication and availability.
Regarding clock identity authentication and authorization, which are imple-
mented to prevent spoofing and rogue master attacks, the requirement level varies
depending on the device type. Authentication refers to verify that a node is who
it claims to be, whereas authorization refers to verify that a node is permitted
to play the role it plays. For example, only nodes that are authorized to be
masters could announce their clock capabilities to participate in the best master
clock selection. While slaves must authenticate and authorize masters, it is not
absolutely necessary to authenticate slaves by masters. Similarly, masters are not
forced to authenticate P2P TCs that are directly connected to it.
In addition, the recursive authentication and authorization of masters must be
supported when intermediate clocks participate in the protocol. In those cases,
the PTP slave authenticates the intermediate clock as well as the master, and
the intermediate clock authenticates another attached TC through which time
information is forwarded if necessary. It is important to note that Announce
messages in the startup phase and Management messages must also be protected
by authentication mechanisms.
The integrity protection prevents from packet manipulation by ensuring that the
packet has reached the destination intact. In this sense, there is a discussion
regarding hop-by-hop versus end-to-end integrity protection. The hop-by-hop
integrity protection acquires importance in PTP networks because intermediate
nodes modify the content of PTP packets and, as a consequence, the integrity
protection tags must be verified and re-generated on each hop. The drawback of
such a solution is that it allows rogue TCs to modify protocol packets. In contrast,
end-to-end integrity protection is maintained from source to destination, limiting
the ability of rogue TCs to maliciously modify the packet, but it needs a separate
integrity protection mechanism to protect the correctionField.
The security solution must additionally include a replay protection mechanism to
prevent replay attacks, which typically consists on an increasing packet sequence
number that is commonly included in the authentication mechanism. Replay
attacks are also avoided by guaranteeing the freshness of cryptographic keys by
replacing current keys by new ones frequently7. Moreover, it is recommended
the utilization of a security association protocol that might establish unicast and
multicast authentication relationships between two or more clocks to agree on
session keys.
Another challenging requirement is the protection against packet delay and inter-
7The value of the frequency at which keys must be refreshed will depend on the system
requirements.
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ception attacks to prevent that a MITM attacker could degrade the time accuracy.
A possible solution to packet delay protection is the utilization of redundant mas-
ters or redundant paths between the master and the slave, and ignore time values
that significantly differ from the others [56].
Finally, time transfer quality must not suffer degradation due to security mea-
sures. Also, the performance of the protocol should not be compromised in terms
of computation load, storage or bandwidth overhead. In order to get detailed
information on each security requirement, the reader is encouraged to read [55].
3.3.3 P1588 security subcommittee contributions
With the aim of facing all the security challenges described before, cyber-security
solutions have to be implemented in PTP systems. When employing authenti-
cation and integrity protection mechanisms, the impact of external attackers is
drastically reduced. If it is combined with sophisticated key management and
security association establishment protocols, the robustness to internal attacks is
strengthened.
Now the P1588 Working Group is working on the third edition of the standard.
Concretely, the P1588 Security SC is immerse in specifying the most suitable
PTP security solution. There are five security proposals that were discussed by
members of the subcommittee. In this Section, these approaches, identified by
the names of their forefathers, are presented and discussed.
3.3.3.1 First proposal: Kirrmann - modified annex K
Hubert Kirrmann’s proposal is the result of the work done in [52], where the PTP
security extension was thoroughly analysed. The computational and bandwidth
overhead caused by the challenge response mechanism, the lack of key manage-
ment and distribution and the suboptimal MAC computation using HMAC were
the main drawbacks of Annex K solution identified by authors.
The aim of this work was to demonstrate the necessity of improving current
security extension and to propose the following modifications:
1. Replacement of the three way mutual authentication with one way authen-
tication by using a modified AUTHENTICATION TLV with replay at-
tack protection. The signalling messages involved in the challenge-response
mechanism are removed and, consequently, the network overhead is re-
duced. Thus, when a node joins a network, it shall send periodical super-
vision frames, e.g. PRP supervision frames, which must include an ICV.
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Figure 3.12: Annex K vs Kirrmann’s proposal AUTHENTICATION TLV
2. Removal of the security association updating mechanism. The freshness
of authentication relationships are maintained by listening to these super-
vision frames and verifying a replay counter. If a message from a source
is successfully verified for the first time, a new SA is created. If no more
messages are received from that source in a given time, the SA is removed.
3. Utilization of modern MAC algorithms to compute the ICV. HMAC shall
be replaced by the Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC)
algorithm with AES block cipher, known as AES-CMAC, for on-the-fly ICV
calculation and verification. Moreover, the new ICV shall protect protocol
destination and source addresses in addition to PTP message payload.
4. Definition of a new AUTHENTICATION TLV format, as shown in Fig-
ure 3.12. The replay counter of the associated outgoing SA is copied into
the TLV in every sent message and then increased by two for future mes-
sage transmissions. Hence, the key ID is automatically changed for each
transmitted message.
5. Distribution of a list of shared and symmetric secret keys to authenticated
participants. IPsec shall be used to distribute this list, where participants
authenticate themselves by certificates. They receive updated key lists often
enough in order for the replay counter not to roll over. Instead of being
associated to particular SAs, each key is used only once since the key ID in
the TLV changes in every message.
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IP+IPsec Header UDP Header PTP Header PTP Payload 0 or more TLVs
IP Header UDP Header PTP Header PTP Payload 0 or more TLVs
Figure 3.13: Mizrahi’s proposal IPsec-based Security TLV
3.3.3.2 Second proposal: Mizrahi - IPsec-based security TLV
Tal Mizrahi began his work on PTP security in 2011 when he analysed the utiliza-
tion of IPsec and MACsec as potential security solutions to protect PTP messages
as well as the security threats and types of attacks [33]. After that he started
to collaborate on the development of the security requirements draft document
for time synchronization protocols within the TICTOC group. He was the main
author of subsequent Internet Drafts prior to the publication of the RFC 7384
introduced in Section 3.3.2.
In April 2014, he proposed the definition of a new IPsec-based Security TLV [57]
applicable to all transport protocols, so as to provide authentication and integrity
protection in two-step mode of PTP operation. The Security TLV contains IP
and UDP headers where IP addresses represent PTP clocks and can be unicast or
multicast. These headers are generated as if the PTP packet were encapsulated
using UDP over IP and protected with IPsec [58], as it can be seen in Figure 3.13
taken from [57]. IPsec header refers to fields containing the Encryption Security
Payload (ESP) with null encryption based on the IP packet, which shall be used
to provide authenticity and integrity protection.
In this case, the challenge is how to manage IP addresses contained in the Security
TLV. On the one hand, using native addresses is simple but presents problems
when traversing Network Address Translation (NAT) routers in private-public
network schemes8. On the other hand, if specific IP addresses were allocated
for PTP, the management would be too difficult. A viable solution could be
generating clock identity-based IP version 6 addresses.
This proposal only covers the encapsulation issue but it does not specify neither
8With NAT technology, a private IP address space is remapped into another public IP
address space, and vice versa, when packets traverse a NAT routing device in face of IPv4
address exhaustion.
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a key management scheme nor cryptographic algorithms to be used. Mizrahi
suggests the utilization of Internet Key Exchange (IKE) [59] encapsulation into
the PTP TLV for key distribution.
One of the main drawbacks of an IPsec-based TLV as proposed by Mizrahi is
that it only works in two-step mode of PTP operation. In addition, a problem
rises with regard to the insertion of a layer 3 address into the PTP packet body,
because it brakes OSI layer model.
The main advantage is that the Mizrahi solution is based on a very well-known
and widely deployed security protocol. Therefore, it should not require the defi-
nition of a new security protocol, but rather reuses tools defined for IPsec. IPsec
is thoroughly maintained by IETF and there is open source code to implement it
in software. However, the off-the-self IPsec software cannot be used because an
specific mapping has to be created.
3.3.3.3 Third proposal: Fries - new authentication TLV and group
key management
Steffen Fries from Siemens is an important cornerstone in the development of
cyber-security solutions for energy automation in Smart Grids. His work on
P1588 Security SC consists on extrapolating the conclusions derived from pro-
tecting GOOSE and SV messages in SASs to PTP scenarios [60].
Security for SASs communications was initially covered in IEC 62351-6 stan-
dard, in which digital signatures were considered to provide source authenticity.
However, as explained in Section 2.4, using asymmetric cryptography and digital
signatures do not fulfil substation communications performance requirements. As
a consequence, the IEC working group has moved forward to the utilization of
symmetric group keys and GDOI to distribute them.
Two main tasks are covered in Fries’ proposal [61]. On the one hand, the key
management is handled out of band, i.e. using a separate distribution channel
outside PTP messages, instead of the triple handshake of Annex K. In this case,
the key management might be unicast or multicast and manual or automatic.
For multicast and automatic key management, a group key distribution scheme
like GDOI is suggested, but also other distribution mechanisms could be used
[19].
On the other hand, a new Security TLV is appended to the PTP message to
provide authentication and integrity protection. The content of this TLV will de-
pend on chosen key management protocol. Figure 3.14 shows two example TLV
formats [61]. Since the security TLV B contains a key identifier corresponding to
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Figure 3.14: Fries’ proposal new Security TLV
an available key on the receiver side, it cannot be used with TESLA. The security
TLV A format may be usable with TESLA because the SAId field identifies the
security association that is previously established by the key management proto-
col. Also the validity time of the key or time-to-live (TTL) and the cryptographic
algorithm identifiers are negotiated by the key management protocol.
In this proposal, the ICV can be computed using cryptographic algorithms uti-
lized by other applications that use PTP, such as GOOSE communications. PTP
payload encryption could be optionally provided, but confidentiality is preferably
achieved by external protocols like MACsec. For early recognition and ICV pre-
processing, one security flag in the PTP header must indicate the utilization of
security TLV. Once a message is received, the receiver looks for the corresponding
SA based on the sourcePortId field of the PTP header and the sequenceId field
for replay protection.
In addition, there is available open source code for GDOI implementation with
small footprint [62]. The small processing overhead and the possibility of on-the-
fly ICV computation makes this proposal very interesting for applications that
demand cut-through operation to reduce frames switching latency. As Mizrahi’s
proposal, this approach is applicable to all transport protocols and only software
or firmware upgrading would be required if two-step operation is selected.
3.3.3.4 Fourth proposal: Ellegaard - MACsec security
In the security group also MACsec, as defined in IEEE 802.1AE-2006 standard
[63], has been contemplated as an appealing security approach to provide hop-by-
hop user data confidentiality (optionally), frame data integrity, authenticity and
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Figure 3.15: Ellegaard’s proposal to secure PTP with MACsec
replay protection. The first member to suggest MACsec as an external security
solution for protecting PTP traffic was Lars Ellegard from Vitesse Semiconduc-
tor Corporation, acquired by Microsemi Corporation in 2015. Ellegard proposed
to include as an appendix in the standard a document on how MACsec can be
used to protect PTP networks [64]. He affirmed that MACsec could be added
to PTP packets, even in one-step operation if cryptographic algorithms were im-
plemented in hardware, without compromising the clock accuracy. Nevertheless,
considerable latencies introduced by cryptographic units on each hop must be
taken into account.
One of the key points of MACsec is that it can be used in both point-to-point
and shared LANs, and in both layer 2 bridged and layer 3 routed networks. How-
ever, Ellegaard’s proposal was only focused on the point-to-point LAN case with
pairwise connectivity associations, as Figure 3.15 shows for routed and bridged
networks. Moreover, he does not contemplate neither key management nor au-
thorization of clocks.
External security solutions like MACsec could also protect the startup phase,
where the protection of announce messages could avoid attacks on BMC algo-
rithm. However, this proposal provides link-based security due to the utilization
of pairwise associations. Additional mechanisms to verify the clock identity are
required to provide source authenticity and authorization. On the contrary, an
attacker could ‘hijack’ a TC, for example, and act as a rogue master forcing the
slaves to align to a false time.
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3.3.3.5 Fifth proposal: Sibold/Dickerson - NTS and TESLA for
source authentication
Dieter Sibold from the Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt in Berlin, is cur-
rently engaged in the definition of a new security protocol for NTP, named Net-
work Time Security (NTS) [65]. He begun his collaboration with P1588 Security
SC to discuss the applicability of NTS for IEEE 1588 protocol [66].
NTS provides time servers authentication by clients and end-to-end integrity pro-
tection using X.509 certificates and HMAC algorithm respectively. There are two
modes of operation: using pairwise keys for unicast mode, which are exchanged
via asymmetric cryptography, or broadcast mode using TESLA [67] with a poste-
riori verification of buffered packets. In Figure 3.16 the time diagram of TESLA
operation is represented, where the whole operation is divided in N time inter-
vals. Firstly, the sender randomly generates the last key KN of the chain. The
rest of the symmetric keys are generated using a one-way hash function over the
next key to be used in the next interval following the Equation 3.12:
K0,K1,K2, ...KN / Ki−1 = H(Ki) 1 ≤ i ≤ N (3.12)
As represented in Figure 3.16, during T0, the sender releases K0 protected with
a digital signature. Then, it starts sending messages protected with MACs gen-
erated with K1 during time interval T1. During time interval T2, MACs are
generated with K2, and K1 is distributed in clear to group members and so on.
Thus, once the receiver owns a single source authenticated key of the chain, i.e.
K0, subsequent keys of the chain are self-authenticating.
Since TESLA requires time synchronization, in the startup and convergence
phases of PTP protocol, messages have to be protected by other means. NTS
uses pairwise symmetric keys in this phase, until slave clock reaches sufficient
accuracy. In the unicast mode of operation, a cookie is negotiated between the
master and a slave and exchanged via asymmetric cryptography. This cookie is
used as a key for computing the HMAC-based MAC in unicast time synchro-
nization messages. Once the slave is well enough synchronized, NTS might be
employed in a broadcast mode of operation. Then, in the bootstrapping phase,
all TESLA parameters are transmitted form sender to destination nodes using
asymmetric cryptography: time intervals, one-way function, disclosure delay and
the initial key. Then, broadcast transmitted messages are protected by symmet-
ric keys as TESLA mandates. Regarding subsequent key distribution for using
TESLA schemes in PTP systems, two alternatives were identified in the group:
using GDOI, out-of-band as proposed by Fries in Section 3.3.3.3, or carrying key
information inside an specific security TLV, within PTP protocol.
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Figure 3.16: Time representation of TESLA protocol operation
Bill Dickerson, from Arbiter Systems, also promotes the utilization of TESLA for
source authentication in PTP networks in security subcommittee discussions. In
addition, in order to provide hop-by-hop traceability in PTP networks, Dicker-
son proposed the introduction of a new type of message, named Hop Delay [68].
This message is sent from each TC and contains the residence time and peer
delay values for the previously transmitted Sync message. The slave is responsi-
ble for authenticating Sync and all Hop Delay messages, besides correcting the
preciseOriginTimestamp by the delays received in Hop Delay messages.
The highest benefit from using TESLA to secure PTP networks is that it provides
good source authentication using computationally efficient symmetric cryptogra-
phy. However, TESLA presents a compromise between the authentication delay
and the propagation delay of messages. On the one hand, the authentication
delay due to the key delivery time should be as short as possible. On the other
hand, this time should be enough not to overtake any of the messages protected
with that key.
3.3.3.6 Comparison
Table 3.8 shows the comparison between all solutions discussed in the P1588
Security SC. The third column in the Table shows the compliance of security re-
quirements for PTP, whereas the second column collects those that were adopted
from the RFC 7384 [55] for time synchronization protocols over packet switched
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networks in general. In the table, security requirements marked with an ‘X’ are
completely fulfilled, whereas an ‘?’ symbol indicates partially accomplishment
and the need for additional definitions or specifications. A ‘-’ indicates lack of
mechanisms to fulfil the requirement. Many features should be enhanced on each
solution to address PTP security requirements defined by TICTOC and P1588
Security SC.
In Kirrmann’s solution, authentication, data integrity and replay counter pro-
tection are performed hop-by-hop using symmetric cryptography. At the same
time, nodes are authenticated using certificates and they periodically transmit
supervision frames in order to maintain freshness of security associations. Al-
though authorization of PTP nodes is not implicitly provided by this solution,
some authorized role information could be carried out in these supervision frames.
Nevertheless, if multicast security associations are employed, this role based au-
thorization would be based on protocol addresses or clock identifiers. As a con-
sequence, a ‘hijacked’ authenticated node, for example, could perform spoofing
attacks because all authenticated nodes posse the group key associated to that
multicast association. In contrast, the utilization of unicast security associations
with pairwise symmetric keys guarantees that a packet was sent by the legiti-
mate node because only it knows the key. However, that results in complex key
management and distribution in large networks with numerous TCs.
With Mizrahi’s and Fries’ solutions, the same problem of using unicast or multi-
cast security associations for symmetric cryptography and the lack of authoriza-
tion protection are presented.
On the other hand, the utilization of MACsec and pairwise keys according to
Ellegaard’s solution, apart from raising the problem of managing pairwise keys,
also lacks a mechanism to provide node authorization. Therefore, additional and
specific PTP signalling is required to verify that the sender of a Sync message
is authorized to be a master, for instance. Consequently, authenticated nodes
that belong to the secure domain could become rogue masters by performing
spoofing attacks. Similarly, internal attackers could perform DoS attacks that
might compromise the availability of the PTP service. Moreover, performance
degradations should be further analysed due to the processing delay at each hop.
The last solution, promoted by Sibold and Dickerson, provides sender authenti-
cation using TESLA and recursive authentication by introducing the Hop delay
message, but the network overhead and the computation overhead should be
deeply analysed. Particularly, key management for protecting unicast messages
in the initial phase could be too complex in large networks with many cascaded
TCs, which at the same time could flood the network with Hop delay messages.
Master authorization can be easily achieved by maintaining a list of authorized
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masters on each node, which can be delivered by the authentication server in
conjunction with public keys.
The risk of DoS, message manipulation and packet delay attacks can be reduced
but never eliminated. Without data encryption, lots of information are avail-
able in PTP messages such as vendor’s name, address, PTP message types and
lengths, master clock identity and class or accuracy and timestamps. All this
information could be maliciously used to perform an attack that could compro-
mise the availability of the synchronization protocol. In risky PTP networks,
encryption could be supported optionally and externally by mappings to IPsec
or MACsec security protocols. Nevertheless, even if encryption is performed, the
transmission pattern defined by packet lengths and transmission frequency could
ease the detection of PTP messages.
Packet delay attacks can be minimized using redundancy techniques as stated
by Mizrahi in [56]. Other additional goals such as algorithm agility and map-
pings should be considered as guidelines in the development of next IEEE 1588
security solution. For instance, PTP security solution should support multiple
cryptographic algorithms and provide clean and tested transition strategies be-
tween algorithms.
3.3.4 The way to the third edition of IEEE 1588 standard
As a result of all this work done by the security subcommittee, three categories
were identified to classify PTP security mechanisms: end-to-end security, hop-
by-hop security and network redundancy. This classification was called the ‘three
pronged approach’ and consists of three aspects. First, strong source authentica-
tion of PTP messages sent by grandmaster to provide end-to-end security. Then,
shared group key authentication to provide hop-by-hop security for messages that
are modified in TCs. Finally, architectural enhancements such as the utilization
of redundant communication paths and redundant grandmasters to facilitate the
detection of tampering or performance degradation attacks.
In October 2014, they agreed on the need for editing a document, named Security
Standing Document, with the aim of reflecting the current status of the Security
Subcommittee discussions. Immediately, another prong regarding monitoring
and management was added to the multi-pronged approach.
Finally, in January 2015, they agreed on a ‘four pronged approach’ [69]:
- Prong A: a security mechanism integrated in PTP, which will define a new
Security TLV and the utilization of GDOI/TESLA/NTS to provide end-
to-end strong source authentication.
3.4 Conclusions 63
- Prong B: a security mechanism external to PTP, like MACsec or IPsec, to
provide hop-by-hop security. The test scenarios for using PTP over MACsec
and IPsec need to be investigated further.
- Prong C: architectural guidance that will describe the use of redundant
communication paths and/or grandmasters to facilitate the detection of
tampering or performance degradation attacks.
- Prong D: monitoring and management guidance.
The Security Standing Document is based on the assumption that industry pro-
files will specify security approaches and mechanisms to protect specific appli-
cations from threats and deployment paradigms for each particular application.
Therefore, the standard will include several optional security mechanisms to be
used individually or in combination.
This document evolved to a draft of the informative annex that will target secu-
rity features in the next edition of the IEEE 1588 standard. During last months,
special attention was made by group members to Prong A specifications such
as the Security TLV format. The rest of Prongs will only include guidelines to
include external security mechanisms, descriptions of some redundancy architec-
tures and a brief summary on performance monitorization. As a consequence,
Prongs B, C and D need further clarification that will be left for future versions
of the annex.
3.4 Conclusions
PTP protocol security vulnerabilities, like the manipulation of the best master
clock selection by a rogue master, have been intensively studied for last ten years.
Although an experimental security extension was firstly introduced in the second
version of the IEEE 1588 standard, it was never formalized into a proper defined
security solution due to its limitations.
In this Chapter, the evolution from this experimental security extension to cur-
rently discussed approaches is outlined. The great challenge of PTP security is
the hop-by-hop scope because intermediate nodes need to participate in the se-
curity protocol. Hence, all nodes in a PTP domain must share the cryptographic
keys in order to modify the correctionField in TCs. The higher the number of
nodes sharing the keys, the weaker becomes the security solution.
Nowadays, the security subcommittee is still working on the development of the
new annex that will be indexed in the third edition of IEEE 1588 standard. This
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annex will be a set of security mechanisms, rather than a security protocol, which
is intended to satisfy different design and security requirements for each protocol
application field. The mentioned set of mechanisms were collected on the four
Prongs A, B, C and D described at the end of this Chapter.
However, the work done by the members of the subcommittee has been mainly
focused on the definition of the new security TLV to address the problem of
end-to-end security integrated in PTP messages as stated by Prong A. On the
contrary, Prongs B, C and D need further contribution and will only be described
as informative guidelines. It is expected that future work on these Prongs would
be included in next revisions of the security annex. Therefore, contributions from
the research community to any of the mechanisms targeted in Prong B, C and D
are crucially important.
Chapter 4
Implementing secure PTP
SoC architectures
4.1 Introduction
Conclusions section in Chapter 2 states the challenging process of integrating a
hop-by-hop security solution to protect PTP frames in SASs without compromis-
ing substation communication performance. This hop-by-hop security solution is
needed to protect synchronization because PTP messages are modified on each
hop. TCs must verify incomming messages, modify the correctionField to in-
clude the residence time and regenerate the corresponding security checksums of
outgoing messages. In order to provide hop-by-hop message authentication and
integrity protection, in this Chapter, several tools and technologies to provide
MACsec based layer 2 security in PTP networks are explored.
This Chapter consists of two clearly separate parts. On the one hand, in Section
4.2, a general hardware-software architecture to provide IEEE 1588 support is
described. In addition, the most relevant PTP software and hardware modules
used by the research community and industrial manufacturing companies are
presented. These approaches have been identified in the bibliography as well as
in the numerous attended conferences and plugfests.
On the other hand, Section 4.3 is about how to integrate layer 2 security mecha-
nisms in PTP networks. In particular, different alternatives to include MACsec
in hardware and the needed software support are briefly explored.
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4.2 Designing SoC architectures with IEEE 1588
hardware support
Hardware assistance to precisely timestamp IEEE 1588 messages is currently
supported on Ethernet network interface controllers and on Ethernet physical
layer devices, which can be found in multiple Network Interface Cards (NICs),
such as the Intel 82576EB Gigabit Ethernet Controller [70] and the DP83640
Precision Physical Interface Transceiver (PHY) from Texas Instruments [71].
Although there are some pure software or hardware IEEE 1588 solutions, most
of them are mixed solutions consisting of a CPU running the PTP software and
some hardware modules capturing timestamps as close as possible to physical
layer. In this Section some general mixed SoC architectures in conjunction with
available IEEE 1588 software and hardware modules are presented.
4.2.1 Hardware vs. software timestamping techniques
In order to achieve precise synchronization using PTP, timestamps should reflect
the send and receive times as precise as possible. PTP environment offers differ-
ent possible timestamping points as shown in Figure 4.1 [72]. Two options are
discussed in this Section:
1. The hardware assisted approach, in which time stamps are taken at the
Medium Independence Interface (MII), between Media Access Controller
(MAC) and PHY chips.
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2. Pure software solutions take time stamps in the NIC driver or at the appli-
cation layer.
Time stamping at the application layer has the advantage of platform inde-
pendence, but it presents relative large variations on the message transit delay
through the protocol stack, which is commonly known as jitter. Time stamping
at the driver level is the optimal software solution but requires a modified net-
work driver. Both options result on inaccurate measurements due to Operating
System (OS) load and interrupt latency.
The closer to the physical layer are messages timestamped, the better is the
achieved accuracy. In order to get better synchronization results, timestamps
should be taken as near as possible to the physical layer and, therefore, the most
accurate solution is that implemented in hardware. As a consequence, several
vendor solutions have emerged in last years, which are enumerated in Section
4.2.5.
4.2.2 General SoC PTP ordinary clock architecture
Hardware assisted PTP solutions generally consist of a Central Processing Unit
(CPU) containing the PTP stack and, at least, two specific hardware modules:
the Real Time Clock (RTC) and the TSU. The RTC is normally a 80 bit counter
that represents seconds and nanoseconds and can be tuned changing the values
of some configuration registers of the core. Basically, these registers control the
frequency at which the timer is updated and the amount of nanoseconds have to
be added to it each time [72]. The TSU is the responsible for storing interesting
information about the frame such as sequence ID, message type or clock identity,
as well as time stamping information.
Figure 4.2 shows the SoC architecture for a PTP OC with one port, which could
take the role of master or slave depending on the configuration of the PTP stack
that is running in the CPU. This general architecture is only valid for two-step
operation. In case one-step operation is desired, the IEEE 1588 Intellectual Prop-
erty (IP) core should be able to modify PTP packets on-the-fly before throwing
them to the PHY.
As it can be seen in Figure 4.2, other additional modules might be required. This
is the case of the Frame Parser and the Register Interface. The Frame Parser
sometimes is included inside the TSU module and it is connected to the PHY
device interface sniffing all Ethernet frames and detecting which ones are IEEE
1588. Depending on the hardware solution, it can detect frames IEEE 1588 tagged
in layer 2 or/and 3. Also, some implementations generate an interrupt signal
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Figure 4.2: General SoC PTP OC architecture with hardware timestamping
when detect an event message (Sync, Delay Req, PDelay Req, PDelay Resp) so
as to become noticeable on the PTP stack, because these are time sensitive.
The Register Interface may be required by the CPU as an interface between
the processor and the PTP hardware modules. Through these registers, the
corresponding IEEE 1588 drivers might read the information about the frame
and the timestamping, as well as control the RTC configuration. These drivers
provide an abstraction layer and define the set of functions to be employed by
user applications to manage the TSU and RTC cores.
Finally, other additional peripherals that are not represented in the Figure might
also be needed to run the PTP stack, like timers, Double Data Rate (DDR)
memory controller, Universal Asynchronous Receiver-Transmitter (UART) mod-
ules, etc. The system configuration depends on the specific application and the
software to be run in the CPU.
4.2.3 General SoC PTP hybrid clock architecture
The architecture in Figure 4.2 can be extrapolated to a multiple port PTP HC
by adding Ethernet switching and TC capabilities as shown in Figure 4.3. In
this case, apart from the PTP stack and the IEEE 1588 drivers, also additional
software modules to manage Ethernet switch could be needed.
TC functionality in Ethernet switches can be implemented following different
techniques found in the literature [73]. They are basically divided into two cat-
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egories depending on how they address the problem of transferring information
from input ports to output ports. On the one hand, some techniques forward the
ingress timestamp with the frame itself and the transmission unit captures it to
compute the residence time. On the other hand, timestamps can be stored in a
buffer or memory which is writeable from the reception unit and readable from
transmission unit, which also computes the residence time.
The later was demonstrated to be viable by implementing a Content Addressable
Memory (CAM) based design and using Wishbone Bus (WB) as represented in
Figure 4.4 for two ports TCs [73]. In the experiment, better residence times
were achieved if compared with Spider TC solution [74], which forwards ingress
timestamp in a special TLV field. However, the required resources would pro-
portionally increase with the number of ports because several modules should
be replicated. Also, proportional delay should be introduced in the transmission
unit in order to avoid failures due to congested WB.
The optimal technique would be forwarding the ingress timestamp in the PTP
header, for example in the reserved field, from the ingress port to the egress port.
In this case, the residence time experienced by Spider TC would be considerably
reduced, since the transmission unit wouldn’t have to wait to the end of the frame
to start transmitting it to the output port. In this sense, there is already a patent
from Siemens that uses the reserved field of PTP over UDP packets to transport
the reception or transmission timestamp from the physical layer to application
layer [75].
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4.2.4 Open source available PTP stacks
In order to run the PTP stack on the CPU of an OC SoC device, several solutions
may be considered as shown in Table 4.1. They can be classified into open
source and licensed software. Licensed software solutions are usually offered
in conjunction with complete maintaining and training services packages, while
open source are normally poorly documented and support is usually provided
through mailing lists. Most of them support hardware timestamping to achieve
synchronization accuracies in the nanoseconds range.
Apart from the lower cost, using open source software has the advantage of ag-
ile evolution because there are so many developers testing it that any flaws will
be quickly detected and fixed. In addition, with Berkely Software Distribution
(BSD) license and GNU General Public License (GNU GPL), users are free to
customize the code in order to add a specific functionality, like hardware times-
tamping support if needed.
4.2.4.1 PTP daemon and its derivatives
The PTP daemon, named ‘PTPd’, is an open source software available under
BSD-style lincense, which was originally developed by two engineering students
at Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland (Ohio, USA) as a software-only
system supporting IEEE 1588-2002 standard [86]. It was written in C language,
for Unix based OSs and its first release was hosted on SourceForge in 2005. This
code was capable of synchronizing computer clock frequency and time to an IEEE
1588 grandmaster without the support of specialized hardware. Neither hardware
timestamps nor hardware clocks were employed by this stack. ‘PTPd’ performs
time stamping of incoming packets using the SO TIMESTAMP socket option of
the IP stack, and outgoing packets are also timestamped using this feature after
being looped back via IP MULTICAST LOOP. The SO TIMESTAMP option
enables the receiving of a control message containing the reception time of the last
packet passed to the application using the socket system call. These timestamps
are captured from system clock.
The code of the first release evolved to improved versions of the stack and, in
2010, it led to the first release of ‘PTPd’ implementing IEEE 1588-2008 standard.
This ‘PTPd’ stack version 2 continued evolving to a more robust implementation
of PTP version 2. The current version of the stack is the 2.3.1, which was hosted
in SourceForge in 2015 [78].
The major components of ‘PTPd’ code are:
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Figure 4.5: Software components of ‘PTPd’ stack
• Protocol Engine. It contains the main protocol state machine implemented
as a forever loop and executed after Start-up.
• BMC Algorithm. This part of code implements the best master clock algo-
rithm and returns the proper state, master or slave.
• Clock Servo. This component computes the offset from master and the
corresponding clock tick rate to minimize it.
• Message Packer. It is responsible for gathering data into and extract data
from PTP messages.
• Network Layer. It initializes connections, sends and receives data between
PTP clocks, as well as retrieves timestamps from the control message.
• Timer. This component consists of several low resolution timers for con-
trolling periodic Sync and Delay Req messages, in addition to periodic runs
of the BMC and timeouts.
• Start-up. It retrieves command line arguments and parameters in the con-
figuration file as run-time options.
The first open source hardware assisted time stamping solutions were based on
‘PTPd’. For example, in 2008, engineers from Intel released a fork of that dae-
mon that takes advantage of the hardware timestamping capability of the Intel
network card by using a specially modified driver and ‘ioctl’ calls to get hard-
ware timestamps [87]. Two main modes of operation were added to the original
‘PTPd’ stack. On the one hand, the assisted system time mode synchronizes the
system time but, each time the NIC timestamps a PTP packet, the NIC-system
time offset is measured and added to it. On the other hand, the two-level mode
synchronizes the NIC time to the grandmaster time over the network using PTP,
and system time is also synchronized against NIC via local PTP.
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In [88], synchronization accuracies were demonstrated to be better when using
hardware timestamping of prototype Intel NIC cards, if compared to those accu-
racies in the order of one sub-microsecond achieved with software-only solutions.
After that, P. Ohly developed a patch to incorporate hardware timestamping into
Linux kernel using the Intel Gigabit Ethernet driver, which added a new socket
option called SO TIMESTAMPING and a new Application Programming Inter-
face (API) as defined in ‘net tstamp.h’ header file [89]. He also developed a new
modified ‘PTPd’ making use of this new API [90]. The patch was finally inte-
grated into version 2.6.30 of the kernel, where the Intel driver was the only Linux
MAC driver which supported the new feature. In version 2.6.35 of the kernel new
MAC drivers were included to support it, such as the Freescale’s PowerPC and
Analog Devices’s Blackfin microprocessors. Nowadays, the list of Linux MAC
drivers that support SO TIMESTAMPING option has been extended.
4.2.4.2 The Linux PTP project
The linuxptp stack is another open source software developed and maintained
by R. Cochran that implements the PTP stack under GNU GPL. The code is
available within the Linux PTP project webpage [84]. It supports both hardware
and software timestamping via the SO TIMESTAMPING socket option and uses
the Linux PTP Hardware Clock (PHC) infrastructure.
This PHC infrastructure provides an interface to access and program hardware
clocks in the Linux kernel, in order to use them as time sources in PTP devices.
It was originated as a result of the work presented by Cochran in [89]. He started
working on PTP software using the ‘PTPd’, but more and more problems arose
when trying to keep the code up-to-date while supporting new hardware. With
the aim of reducing the need for hardware-specific code in user space, Cochran’s
contribution provide a standardized PTP clock API for developing clock drivers
and synchronizing Linux with external clocks, as well as control them from user
applications. There is a PHC class driver that is used by clock drivers to register
themselves and to pass events such as alarms and timestamps. At the same
time, this class driver creates a character device for each registered clock, so user
space programs are able to control the clock through ‘ioctl’, ‘read()’ and ‘poll()’
methods.
The PHC class finally merged into kernel version 3.0 in July 2011. After that,
Cochran continued his work by implementing a mechanism to synchronize the
Linux kernel to the very precise PTP clock. Instead of running two instances of
PTP stack in the node, as the Ohly’s two-level method proposes, the utilization
4.2 Designing SoC architectures with IEEE 1588 hardware support 75
Linux OS
User
Space
Kernel
Space
NIC Driver
linuxptp
Clock
PHC Class
ptp4lhwstamp_ctl phc_ctl phc2sys pmc
PPS
Figure 4.6: Software components of linuxptp stack
of a Pulse Per Second (PPS) signal to synchronize the system clock to the PHC
was firstly presented by Cochran in [91].
As a consequence of all his efforts, in December 2012, the first release of the
linuxptp stack was available and it evolved for three years until September 2015,
which is the publication date of the last release. Two main programs are available
within the code: the ‘ptp4l’ and the ‘phc2sys’. However there are other three
programs available:
• Ptp4l. It is the protocol engine and implements the PTP Boundary Clock
(BC) and Ordinary Clock (OC) according to IEEE 1588-2008 standard.
• Phc2sys. This program synchronizes two or more clocks in the system; for
example, it is typically used to synchronized the system clock to a PHC
clock that is synchronized to a grandmaster using the ‘ptp4l’ program.
• Hwstamp ctl. It can be used to get and set the hardware timestamping
policy at the network driver level with the SIOCSHWTSTAMP ‘ioctl’ as
a a debugging tool (‘ptp4l’ program automatically sets the policy in an
appropriated way).
• Phc ctl. The user can use this program to directly control a PHC clock for
debugging purposes.
• Pmc. This is the PTP management client which reads actions specified by
name and management identifier, sends them over the selected transport
protocol and prints received replies.
By using the ‘phc2sys’ application, two modes of synchronization are supported.
A PPS signal can be provided by the source clock and the Linux PPS API
can be used to synchronize the system clock to the PHC. Otherwise, the source
clock is directly read and set using general system calls like ‘clock gettime’ and
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‘clock adjtime’.
Depending on the source clock capabilities, one mode or another should be se-
lected in function of desired accuracy, because it will depend on latencies intro-
duced by hardware and driver implementation as discussed in [91]. Normally, the
PPS mode is usually preferred, because reading the PHC is slow and introduces
variable errors in the readings. However, not all PTP clocks are able to provide
the PPS signal.
4.2.5 Commercial off-the-shelf PTP hardware assisted so-
lutions
Besides implementing the protocol engine in software, dedicated hardware mod-
ules are required in PTP-aware SoC architectures if sub-microsecond accuracy is
a requirement. Several solutions to assist PTP in hardware have been identified
in the literature, which can be classified into five groups:
• IEEE 1588-aware PHYs
• IEEE 1588-aware Ethernet MACs
• Microcontrollers with on-chip IEEE 1588 hardware logic
• IEEE 1588 IP cores
• MAC IP cores with IEEE 1588 support
Ethernet PHYs and MACs are hardware modules implemented in Silicon to pro-
vide network interface to processors. Microsemi and Texas Instruments are leader
suppliers of external IEEE 1588-aware Ethernet PHYs and controllers. Also,
some high end microcontrollers integrate IEEE 1588 hardware logic in the same
chip, like the F28M36x family of Concerto microcontrollers from Texas Instru-
ments [92]. Also, the IXP46X product line of network processors from Intel [93]
and the SAM4E series of microcontrollers from Atmel [94] provide IEEE 1588
hardware support.
Other vendors within the IP core business have been developing dedicated IP
cores to provide IEEE 1588 support in reconfigurable devices. Some of the most
distinguished have been collected in Table 4.2. There different types of cores
available in the market have been identified using the following notation: (1)
dedicated IEEE 1588 IP cores only consisting in TSU and RTC components, (2)
MAC IP cores with IEEE 1588 support, (3) IEEE 1588-aware Ethernet switch
IP cores and (4) full IEEE 1588 engines that do not require software stack.
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Tabla 4.2: Commercial off-the-shelf IEEE 1588 IP cores
Vendor
Type of IP core
Funtionalities Targeted FPGA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Flexibilis – X X – OC/BC/TC Altera
SoC-e X – X X OC/BC/TC Xilinx
MorethanIP – X X – OC/BC/TC Altera
Oregano X – – X OC/BC Lattice
Verylogic – – X – TC Altera
Arasan – X – – OC/BC Altera/Xilinx
Cadence – X – – OC/BC Xilinx
In modern substations, the integration of latest communication models and proto-
cols in the process bus is really challenging due to new specific hardware and sig-
nificant embedded software integration. The need for flexibility of these emerging
Ethernet based protocols makes FPGAs, and reconfigurable devices in general,
the best candidates to implement substation network devices [95, 96]. FPGAs
offer hardware processing capabilities to achieve low switching latency times and
flexibility enough to adapt the design to specific customer requirements, protocol
updates and complex protocol combinations (e.g. IEC 62439-3 [35] and IEEE
1588).
Furthermore, IP core business is mature for FPGAs allowing time-to-market
being dramatically reduced and scaled to different types of nodes required in
networks topologies. Using IEEE 1588 IP cores and FPGAs seems to be the
most precise and accurate method for implementing flexible embedded solutions
capable of timestamping PTP messages in hardware. There are two main com-
petitors that supply IEEE 1588 IP cores to companies who demand FPGA-based
solutions for industrial communications. They are System-on-Chip engineering
(SoC-e) and Flexibilis, which clearly target Xilinx and Altera families of FPGAs
respectively.
4.2.5.1 System-on-Chip engineering IP cores
System-on-Chip engineering, commonly named SoC-e, offers communication so-
lutions based on FPGA technology for critical systems. Their solutions consist
of optimized hardware and software architectures that face the challenges of im-
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plementing standards for synchronization and reliability in substation communi-
cations like IEEE 1588 and IEC 62439-3. Their product line includes networking
and synchronization IP cores, as well as boards and modules, to allow the im-
plementation of custom routers/switches and end-equipment with powerful net-
working capabilities.
SoC-e provides different IP cores to integrate IEEE 1588 functionalities in net-
work nodes:
• PreciseTimeBasic: master/slave OC and BC
• 1588Tiny: CPU-less slave-only OC
• Managed and Unmanaged Ethernet Switch: TC functionality
• HSR/PRP Switch: TC with redundancy support
The PreciseTimeBasic IP core [97] provides a hardware TSU capable of accurately
timestamp IEEE 1588-2008 compliant event messages and an adjustable timer
with sub-microsecond precision. The TSU was designed to be connected to the
[Gigabit] Medium Independient Interface ([G]MII), between the MAC and the
PHY, supporting 10/100/1000 Mbit/s interfaces. The reference design targets
different Xilinx FPGA families and it also includes software modules and PTP
stack are provided with the core for implementing OC/BC clocks.
In contrast to PreciseTimeBasic, the 1588Tiny IP [98] is a hard core that provides
basic slave functionalities using minimum resources. This IP requires neither an
embedded processor to run the PTP stack nor a generic Ethernet MAC. All these
functionalities, including an optimized Ethernet MAC to process PTP frames, are
implemented as hardware modules.
SoC-e’s both Managed Ethernet Switch and Unmanaged Ethernet Switch IP cores
[99, 100] implement a store-and-forward switching approach using non-blocking
crossbar matrix and forwarding optimization techniques to achieve latencies in
the nanoseconds range. Both IPs support TC functionalities, even in one-step
mode of operation, implemented in an independent hardware module for each
port. While the Managed Ethernet Switch can be managed through several
interfaces, Unmanaged Ethernet Switch does not require external configuration
and it is focused on providing Ethernet switching capabilities on plug-and-play
devices.
Finally, the HSR/PRP Switch IP core [101] implements redundancy protocols
as defined in IEC 62439-3 for Reliable Ethernet communications and supports
10/100/1000TX- 1000FX interfaces. This switch is an all-hardware module and,
consequently, it does not need software running on a microprocessor. It provides
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P2P TC functionality as specified in PTP power profile.
4.2.5.2 Flexibilis IP cores
Flexibilis Oy also develops solutions for critical communication systems based on
FPGA technology. They are mainly focused on wired Ethernet and offer several
IP cores with IEEE 1588 support, as well as redundancy protocols. Flexibilis
work together with Altera Corporation in the development of reference designs
and solutions to integrate these cores in Altera FPGAs.
Some of the IP cores that Flexibilis offers are:
• Advanced Flexibilis Ethernet Controller: Ethernet Controller with IEEE
1588 support
• Flexibilis Ethernet Switch: TC functionality
• Flexibilis Redundant Switch: TC functionality with HSR/PRP support
• Flexibilis Deterministic Switch: TC functionality with Time Sensitive Net-
working (TSN) support
The Advanced Flexibilis Ethernet Controller IP core [102] resulted from the nat-
ural evolution of their first Ethernet controller, and provides both copper and
fiber 10/1000/1000 Mbit/s interface support. As PTP protocol was becoming
more and more deployed, they also decided to add IEEE 1588 support to it.
In conjunction with their XR7 PTP stack running on an embedded Linux host,
master/slave OC and BC can be implemented in latest Altera families of FPGAs.
An evaluation version can be obtained through their webpage.
The rest of the IP cores offered by Flexibilis all implement an Ethernet layer 2
switch with TC functionality and 10/100/1000 Mbit/s interface support. Firstly,
the Flexibilis Ethernet Switch IP core [103] is a store-and-forward switch with
error-checking that provides E2E TC functionality. An evaluation setup is pro-
vided by Flexibilis to evaluate this core using the Altera Cyclone IV FPGA.
Secondly, the Flexibilis Redundant Switch IP core [104] also provides seamless
redundancy compatible with IEC 62439-3 standard for HSR/PRP networking
and E2E TC functionality (P2P TC functionality is also supported with control
software running on a CPU). This switch provides both cut-through and store-
and-forward operation, although broken frames are also forwarded in cut-through
mode. Several reference designs for Altera Cyclone IV and V FPGAS are available
on the webpage.
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Thirdly, the Flexibilis Deterministic Switch switch [105] makes possible to com-
bine deterministic Ethernet with seamless redundancy protocols implementing
TSN as defined in IEEE 802.1CB protocol. In addition, it also provides E2E/P2P
TC functionality and cut-through or store-and-forward operation. At the mo-
ment, neither a reference design nor an evaluation version are available on the
webpage.
4.3 MACsec support for securing PTP networks
Despite MACsec had already been considered by the P1588 Security SC as de-
scribed in Section 3.3.3, they only contemplated the utilization of pairwise keys
to protect point-to-point links and no key management was taken into account.
This Section addresses both the key management scheme and the SoC architec-
ture for implementing MACsec aware devices. Firstly, from a networking engineer
point of view, the utilization of MACsec and 802.1X standard in PTP networks is
outlined. Secondly, different solutions for integrating MACsec encryption units in
general SoC architectures are explored. Finally, available software and hardware
implementations are identified.
4.3.1 Overview of MACsec and 802.1X standard
As it has been presented before, MACsec is a security framework [63] which
provides hop-by-hop user data confidentiality, data integrity, authenticity and
replay protection. A secured Ethernet frame is identified by the MACsec Ether-
type (0xh‘88E5’) and it includes a security tag (SecTAG) and an ICV as shown
in Figure 4.7.
The SecTAG includes parameters that identify the protocol and the key, and
also provides the replay protection through the Packet Number (PN) field. If
confidentiality is required, the Secure Data is the User Data but encrypted. The
ICV ensures the integrity of the MAC Destination Address, the MAC Source
Address, SecTAG and Secure Data. The mandatory cipher suite to compute
the ICV uses the AES block cipher with 128-bit keys and the Galois Counter
Mode (GCM) symmetric cryptography algorithm, which is known as AES-GCM-
128. The AES-GCM-256 algorithm is optionally supported. In addition, other
cipher suites may be implemented in the future whenever security requirements
specificed in [63] were met.
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Figure 4.7: MACsec frame format
On the other hand, MACsec relies on the IEEE 802.1X authentication standard
[106], which specifies a port-based network access control and defines the state
machines to implement the MACsec Key Agreement (MKA) protocol among
others. Consequently, different entities are involved in the normal operation
of MACsec, as they have been represented in Figure 4.8. Each MACsec-aware
port within a station has one MACsec entity (SecY), which provides the secure
MAC service to its clients, such as the Logical Link Control (LLC) entity. Apart
from the SecY, there is a MAC Security Key Agreement Entity (KaY), which
discovers other authenticated KaYs in other stations attached to the same LAN
by confirming mutual possession of a Connectivity Association Key (CAK) as
a result of a successful authentication procedure. The KaY also uses the MKA
protocol to agree the Security Association Keys (SAKs) to be used by the SecY
[63].
As defined in IEEE 802.1X-2010 standard, the Port Access Entity (PAE) consists
of several state machines and components represented in Figure 4.9: the Port
Access Control Protocol (PACP) state machines, the Controlled Port (CP) state
machine and the KaY component among others. The KaY is responsible for
executing the MKA protocol, which allows PAEs to discover other PAEs in the
LAN, to confirm mutual possession of a Connectivity Association Key (CAK)
as a result of a successful authentication procedure and to agree the Security
Association Keys (SAKs) to be used by the SecY. This CAK is derived from
the Master Session Key (MSK) after an authentication procedure using the Key
Derivation Function (KDF) for automatic CAK management. However, a pre-
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Figure 4.8: Entities involved in MACsec normal operation
shared CAK might also be used. Moreover, a group CAK can be distributed by
other MKA instance in a PAE entity that acts as a key server to create a group
connectivity association. In any case, the CAK is never used directly but two
further keys are derived from it using the KDF function, as represented in Figure
4.10.
On the one hand, the ICV Key (ICK) is used to verify the authenticity and
integrity of the MKA protocol data unit. On the other hand, the Key Encryp-
tion Key (KEK) is used to transport a succession of secret keys from the key
server to other members of the connectivity association that will be used by the
SecY entities to protect user data. The KDF function is compatible with the
counter mode KDF described in the NIST Special Publication 800-108 [107] and
it uses the AES-CMAC-128 or the AES-CMAC-256 algorithm as the pseudoran-
dom function, as specified in IEEE 802.1X-2010 standard [106].
Therefore, in order to allow the PAE to participate on the MKA protocol, it
needs to be authenticated against an authentication server using a remote user
authentication and accounting protocol, such as the Remote Authentication Dial-
In User Service (RADIUS), as it can be seen in Figure 4.11. The result of the
authentication process would be the CAK, the key that is used by the MKA
protocol to establish the connectivity association and negotiate the key material.
Although IEEE 802.1X standard does not define any authentication procedure, it
specifies the use of Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) as defined in RFC
3748 [108] and, concretely, EAP over LAN (EAPOL) to transmit EAP messages
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Figure 4.9: PAE state machines and components
between PAEs. Besides components represented in Figure 4.9, the PAE also im-
plements a higher layer supported by PACP which provides EAP functionality
in the supplicant, and EAP functionality and Authentication, Authorization and
Accounting (AAA) functionality in the authenticator. Thus, each PAE entity
adopts the role of authenticator or supplicant in order to perform the EAP au-
thentication exchange, and there is an authentication server that can be located
in the same device as the authenticator or in a remote system.
To sum up, regarding key management in MACsec-based secured networks, two
main solutions can be distinguished: using pre-configured keys or distribute them
dynamically. Taking into account these two key management alternatives, three
approaches have been identified to provide MACsec key material in PTP net-
works:
• Using pre-shared SAKs. This is the simplest solution to introduce
MACsec in PTP networks because it does not need key distribution
schemes. Several pairwise keys are installed in all PTP nodes before launch-
ing the PTP stack and they are periodically used after some time interval
defined in the security policy. The utilization of static keys that are used
repeatedly is recognized as a strong weakness due to brute force attacks
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Figure 4.11: Authentication and key agreement exchange between PAEs
from external attackers. Therefore, using pre-shared SAKs is only rec-
ommended for evaluation purposes in experimental networks to test the
viability of MACsec operation in PTP systems. The only additional entity
to be implemented in all PTP nodes is the SecY.
• Using pre-shared CAKs. Instead of installing SAKs directly, pre-shared
CAKs might be installed, which can be used periodically to negotiate the
SAKs or each time a new device is connected to the same LAN. In this
case, the volume of messages protected with the same static key is much
lower than in the previous solution, and so the risk of brute force attacks
is considerably reduced. Besides implementing the SecY, also one KaY
per port should be implemented in this solution, in order to run the MKA
protocol. Using pre-shared CAKs could be a good solution as a transition
from a laboratory experimental network to a full authenticated and secured
network.
• Using EAP methods to derive pairwise CAKs. A full authenticated
network needs additional key management and distribution schemes, as
the one proposed in IEEE 802.1X standard, which uses EAP methods to
authenticate end nodes against an authentication server, as it can be seen
in Figure 4.11. After a successful authentication, the server delivers the
pairwise CAK to both supplicant and authenticator. This CAK would be
used to negotiate group CAKs and fresh SAKs using the MKA protocol.
Although this solution only requires the implementation of supplicant state
machines in end nodes, both supplicant and authenticator state machines
must be implemented in intermediate nodes, as shown in Figure 4.12 taken
from [106]. Additionally, PAEs are completed with a SecY unit and a KaY
instance for every PTP port.
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4.3.2 Adding MACsec capability to a general SoC archi-
tecture
In order to provide hop-by-hop security using MACsec, two development planes
must be considered. On the one hand, the MACsec control plane that is respon-
sible for key management should consist in a set of software modules running
on the processor. This software might implement the PAE state machines and
components, such as the KaY entity, which have been introduced in previous
Section.
On the other hand, regarding MACsec data plane, encryption units should be im-
plemented in hardware to avoid throughput bottlenecks in the CPU due to heavy
processing demands. Cryptography implemented in software to be executed on
general purpose microprocessors is not as fast as hardware implementations that
are designed in hardware description languages, such as the VHSIC Hardware
Description Language (VHDL). Due to parallel processing and pipelining capa-
bilities as well as instruction efficiency, hardware implementations offer really
good performance in terms of processing speed. Hence, the total number of clock
cycles required by an FPGA implementation is notably reduced if compared with
software implementations running on a CPU [109].
Particularly, the AES block cipher used in MACsec was designed to be efficient
in both software and hardware. In spite of being well suited for 8-bit processors,
software implementations of AES are not particularly efficient on 32-bit or 64-bit
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machines [110]. Due to the fact that all time-critical functions in an AES round
operate on individual bytes, processing one byte per instruction is inefficient on
32-bit machines like the ARM Cortex-A9 processor. Even with fast software im-
plementations based on optimized round functions that operate on 32-bit words,
the fastest known software implementation achieves a theoretical throughput of
1.6 Gbit/s approximately, whereas commercial hardware implementations can
easily exceed throughputs of 10 Gbit/s.
Three different options have been identified to integrate MACsec data plane hard-
ware modules in conventional Ethernet hardware subsystems. These approaches
have been summarized in Figure 4.13. In Figure 4.13(a) the MACsec unit is
placed in the MAC, while in Figure 4.13(b) it is place in the PHY. An alterna-
tive solution represented in Figure 4.13(c) is to place the MACsec unit between
the MAC and the PHY [111].
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If the MACsec entity is implemented in the MAC, the available MAC cores need
modifications to support MACsec and only two-step operation is feasible, since
timestamps are captured just before the PHY. Otherwise, if the MACsec entity
is placed between the MAC and the PHY, neither the MAC nor the PHY need
modifications because they do not need to be MACsec-aware. In addition, one-
step operation should be possible if the IEEE 1588 IP core is capable of adding
egress timestamps on-the-fly before passing PTP packets through the MACsec
entity. The only requirement for one-step operation would be to introduce con-
stant delays in MACsec entities. Specific MACsec-aware PHY devices would be
required if MACsec entity is placed in the PHY and variable latencies are also
not allowed in this case.
4.3.3 Open source available 802.1X software
As it has been commented in previous Section, the addition of specific software
modules is required to implement MACsec control plane responsible for key man-
agement as specified in IEEE 802.1X standard. Table 4.3 summarizes all IEEE
802.1X related open source software found in the literature. There are mainly
three types of 802.1X software: supplicants, authenticators and servers. Some
authenticator solutions may also implement local servers and some stacks allow
operating as both supplicant and authenticator.
Tabla 4.3: IEEE 802.1X software solutions
Name Ref.
Functionality
Platform Licence
Supplicant Authenticator Server
xsupplicant (Open1X) [112] X – – Linux BSD
hostapd [113] – X X Linux/FreeBSD BSD
wpa supplicant [114] X – – Linux/BSD/Windows/Mac BSD
FreeRADIUS [115] – – X Linux/OpenBSD/Solaris BSD
One of the most deployed software implementations of 802.1X standard is the
one maintained by J. Malinen [116], which contains two main applications:
wpa supplicant and hostapd. The former was designed to act as a WiFi Pro-
tected Access (WPA) supplicant in client stations for key negotiation with the
peer WPA authenticator and authentication of the wireless station following the
IEEE 802.11i standard [117]. This software uses some IEEE 802.1X security
mechanisms and architecture concepts [43]. hostapd application implements a
WiFi access point including IEEE 802.1X/WPA/WPA2 authenticator function-
alities, but it is also able to act as an EAP server with RADIUS functionality.
These open source applications are available as portable C code, which includes
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Figure 4.14: Block diagrams of the wpa supplicant and hostapd applications
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separate files with hardware specific functionality implementing a driver API,
a control interface and EAP methods as represented in Figure 4.14 [116]. In
addition, another module allows the implementation of the EAPOL state ma-
chines conforming to the specifications in the IEEE 802.1X-2004 [118] and RFC
4137 [119]. Otherwise, in the IEEE 802.1X-2010 standard, new PACP state ma-
chines are defined in order to enforce a stricter separation between them and the
proper EAP state machines. Additionally, a new component implementing KaY
for managing MKA protocol instances is also defined in the last version of the
standard. Therefore, those EAPOL state machines used by wpa supplicant and
hostapd applications are obsolete and they do not include MKA protocol support
for establishing and refreshing MACsec key material.
In J. Malinen applications, a software library that implements the PAE state
machines as defined in 802.1X-2010 is also included, but the utilization of these
functions in this library is limited to QCA MACsec Driver from Qualcomm. Mod-
ifications on wpa supplicant and hostapd applications to support MKA protocol
should be deeply analyzed.
4.3.4 Commercial off-the-shelf MACsec hardware solutions
Besides software modules running the control plane previously described, MACsec
encryption units must also be implemented in hardware. In this Section, nowa-
days available out-of-the-box MACsec hardware based modules are presented,
which are available as IP cores for being integrated into Application-Speci
c Integrated Circuit (ASIC) or FPGA devices. It can be distinguished between
general AES-GCM crypto cores that can help building MACsec IP cores and
proper full MACsec hardware cores which include frame classification and key
material lookup to facilitate the integration on MAC interfaces.
Examples of AES-GCM crypto cores are those offered by IP Cores [120], Helion
[121], Barco Silex [122] and Algotronix [123]. However, apart from Algotronix,
these companies only provide the code for hardware processing of AES-GCM data
blocks but they do not offer proper SecY functionalities to comply with IEEE
802.1AE standard.
On the other hand, there are several companies that offer hardware modules with
full MACsec functionality support:
• Microsemi Corporation. The MACsec product offered by this company is
based on MACsec-aware PHY devices from Vitesse combined with Intellisec
technology [124, 125]. Vitesse Semiconductor was acquired by Microsemi
in 2015.
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• Inside Secure. This company provides a complete solution to provide secure
Ethernet networking using MACsec. It is based on a MACsec software
toolkit implementing the control plane and the family of SafeXcel hardware
IP cores implementing the data plane [126].
• Algotronix Ltd. This company offers a complete crypto-core portfolio for
Xilinx FPGAs. They provide different versions of MACsec IPs to support
wire-speed processing from 1 Gbit/s to 40 Gbit/s. Algotronix claims low-
latency and area-efficient in their IPs for equipment manufacturers [127].
• Synopsis, Inc. MACsec offered solutions by this company are based on
integrating MACsec unit in the MAC, in the PHY or between the MAC
and the PHY [111, 128]. These technologies were developed by Elliptic
Technologies that was acquired by Synopsis in 2015.
Special attention deserve Microsemi and Algotronix among the companies that
are offering hardware solutions for MACsec integration. Microsemi currently of-
fers multiple physical transceiver solutions with MACsec support such as the
VSC8584 or the VSC8490, which also includes VeriTime technology to enable
timestamping of IEEE 1588 packets [124]. Since there is no Packet Delay Varia-
tion (PDV), there is no negative effect on PTP performance. On the other hand,
the MACsec block operates in cut-through mode and, hence, frames with wrong
ICV cannot be discarded. Otherwise, they must be dropped by the line or the
system MAC when the frame abort signal is asserted by the MACsec block.
Microsemi also has a patent pending of approval [129] which proposes the utiliza-
tion of their MACsec-aware PHYs in Wide Area Network (WAN) environments
by leaving Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN) tags unencrypted, in order to
forward frames and provide security in an end-to-end basis, instead the natural
hop-by-hop operation of MACsec [130]. In that way, MACsec only needs to be
implemented at the end nodes, reducing the cost of deployment.
Regarding MACsec IP cores, the one from Algotronix has gained popularity due
to its partnership with Xilinx to be listed on their webpage [131, 132]. The core is
supplied as VHDL/Verilog source code and it can be configured via compilation
options to fulfil different performance and area trade-offs. Its pipelined imple-
mentation is able to provide throughputs from 1 to 40 Gbit/s. The host system
should provide the core with the keys for each secure channel through a specific
processor interface managed by a driver software, on top of which the KaY entity
should be implemented. The MACsec core includes a SecY management module
responsible for storing key material in a CAM.
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4.4 Conclusions
In this Chapter, different hardware and software solutions to build MACsec-aware
PTP nodes are explored. The definition of the SoC architecture that integrates
MACsec hardware entities and PTP cores becomes a challenging process because
of time sensitiveness of PTP event messages. The mixed software-hardware ar-
chitecture should not negatively affect on PTP protocol performance and on time
critical substation communications in general.
Hardware modules would add IEEE 1588 timestamping capability as well as
MACsec authentication and integrity services, whereas software modules would
be responsible for running PTP and IEEE 802.1X authentication stacks. Addi-
tionally, multiple port nodes would need the implementation of switching and TC
functionalities between ports and also MACsec hardware units would be repli-
cated on each port.
IEEE 1588 IP cores offered SoC-e and Flexibilis are off-the-self components to
provide hardware timestamping support in FPGA-based designs. In the same
way, MACsec core from Algotronix or MACsec-aware physical transceivers from
Microsemi could be used to complete the secure PTP SoC architecture.
Regarding software support, the ‘PTPd’ and the linuxptp daemons have been
identified as the most used open source solutions for executing PTP protocol
engine in Linux systems. On the other hand, the wpa supplicant and hostapd
applications seem to be suitable candidates for implementing IEEE 802.1X stacks
in embedded Linux hosts, but further modifications of the EAPOL state machines
should be developed so as to conform to the last version of the standard that
includes the MKA protocol needed by MACsec to establish session keys.
Chapter 5
SoC architecture for secure
PTP
5.1 Introduction
In the literature, several embedded and SoC architectures for implementing IEEE
1588-2008 and IEC 61850 standards were found, but no one includes cyber-
security mechanisms. The main objective of this thesis is to propose a new
PTP SoC architecture that integrates MACsec hardware units, taking into con-
sideration all the information gathered in Chapter 4.
A general overview of the proposal and a whole set of design and security re-
quirements that the new SoC architecture should fulfil is outlined in Section
5.2. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 will truthfully be the key contributions: a modification
of the general procedure described in IEEE 802.1X-2010 standard for MACsec
key management and distribution and the proposed SoC architecture. Finally,
conclusions are summarized in Section 5.5.
5.2 MACsec-based proposal for securing PTP
Chapters 2 and 3 explain issues derived from securing SAS communications and
PTP messages in particular. In Table 5.1 each issue is associated with a security
or design requirement. Bearing in mind the information found in the literature
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regarding security mechanisms for substation communications and the work done
by the P1588 Security SC, an hybrid security solution is proposed: the utilization
of MACsec protocol to provide hop-by-hop group authentication, in combination
with a new PTP Security TLV to address the problem of end-to-end source
authentication. How these two main security mechanisms might face major PTP
security problems, is explained in Annex A and summarized in Table 5.1.
Tabla 5.1: MAcsec-based proposal
No. Requirement Issue description Proposal
R1 Source authenti-
cation and autho-
rization
Some PTP messages need
source authentication. Group
keys used to protect multicast
PTP messages do not guaran-
tee source authentication.
A new Security TLV includes
an ICV computed with a sym-
metric group key that belongs
to a TESLA key chain. This
ICV is only verified in destina-
tion nodes.
R2 Group authenti-
cation and autho-
rization
Some PTP messages are mod-
ified by TCs. Intermedi-
ate nodes need to demonstrate
they belong to the group of
nodes authorized to modify
PTP packets.
The MKA protocol is used be-
tween peer nodes to verify the
possession of the group CAK
and establish pairwise SAKs.
R3 Hop-by-hop
integrity
The security checksums of
some PTP messages must be
verified and regenerated on
each hop.
PTP messages are encap-
sulated in MACsec frames,
and the ICVs are veri-
fied/regenerated on each hop
using pairwise SAKs.
R4 End-to-end in-
tegrity
Most PTP messages need to
protect end-to-end integrity of
PTP fields that are not modi-
fied in the forwarding path.
The ICV included in the new
Security TLV guarantees the
end-to-end integrity.
R5 Replay protection PTP accuracy might be de-
graded if an attacker captures
messages and replays them
later.
Both the Security TLV and
MACsec SecTAG include a
kind of sequence number to
provide end-to-end and hop-
by-hop replay protection mech-
anism.
R6 Unicast key man-
agement
Unicast addressing of PTP
messages is not employed in
PTP power profile. A unicast
key management scheme could
be used in early stages of au-
thentication protocols.
Protocols like TLS or IKE
might be used to derive uni-
cast symmetric keys. Also,
IEEE 802.1X standard dis-
tributes unicast keys at the be-
ginning of the authentication
mechanism.
Continued on next page
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Tabla 5.1 – Continued from previous page
No. Requirement Issue description Proposal
R7 Multicast key
management
An efficient key management
and distribution scheme to pro-
vide group keys is required.
TESLA keys may be dis-
tributed within the Security
TLV from master to slaves.
IEEE 802.1X standard is
proposed to distribute group
CAKs from a server to all
authorized PTP nodes.
R8 Sub-microsecond
accuracy
In PTP power profile, the syn-
chronization accuracy is speci-
fied to be better than one mi-
crosecond, so hardware times-
tamping and TC functionali-
ties should be integrated in the
design.
IEEE 1588 IP cores and IEEE
1588-aware switch IP cores are
integrated in the SoC architec-
ture.
R9 Avoid nega-
tive impact on
time-critical SAS
communications
Within SAS communications,
traffic with the most restric-
tive latency requirements are
GOOSE and SV, which require
response times of 4 millisec-
onds. Processing and forward-
ing latency in SAS network
nodes should be minimized.
Traffic separation is performed
in MACsec crypto units de-
pending on the Ethertype.
Time-critical messages like
GOOSE or SV are transmitted
without SecTAG-ICV fields
through the Uncontrolled Port
(UP) of the SecY.
R10 Avoid through-
put bottlenecks
Security checksums of frequent
PTP messages, like Sync mes-
sages, which are in addition
modified on each hop, should
be verified and regenerated in
hardware, in order to avoid a
negative impact on PTP stacks
or on other time critical soft-
ware.
MACsec crypto units are im-
plemented in hardware. The
utilization of crypto accelera-
tor cores is also recommended
to check and compute the ICV
in the Security TLV, or to pro-
tect EAPOL frames.
R11 Reduce the prob-
ability of external
attackers
Since PTP messages are mod-
ified on each hop, an attacker
could gain access to network,
intercept packets and modify
packets with the aim of making
slaves to align to a false time
value.
With MACsec external attack-
ers have not access to crypto-
graphic keys and, as a conse-
quence, they can only perform
packet delay attacks on PTP
protocol, apart from intercep-
tion and removal of packets.
R12 Reduce the prob-
ability of internal
attackers
A TC could be highjacked
and used to perform a MITM
attack, for instance, modify-
ing maliciously the correction-
Field.
If TC and switching func-
tionalities are implemented in
hardware, the risk of inter-
nal attacks is reduced to end
nodes.
The definition of a new Security TLV has been the main focus of the P1588
Security SC for last years and different approaches were considered within Prong
A of the Security Standing Document, which was introduced in Section 3.3.3.6.
As a result, there is currently a draft document of the informative Annex that
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will address PTP security approach in next edition of IEEE 1588 standard. The
proposed Security TLV in the draft can operate in two modes: using group-based
key management or using TESLA-based key management. Since our proposal
involves the utilization of MACsec to provide hop-by-hop group authentication,
there is no sense on using a group-based key management mechanism with that
additional TLV. The aim of specifying a new Security TLV is to provide an
end-to-end source authentication and, consequently, only the TESLA-based key
management is supported by this proposal.
Transport Header PTP Header 0 or more TLVs Security TLV Transport TrailerPTP Payloads
Integrity Protec�on
SPILengthType ICVResseqNoInterval disclosedKeyI
16 octets2 octets 2 octets 4 octets 4 octets 2 octets 2 octets 16 octets
Figure 5.1: New Security TLV to be used with TESLA as defined by P1588 Security
SC
The Security TLV format when using TESLA-based key management is repre-
sented in Figure 5.1. The TESLA key scheme can be employed to share keys
between masters and slaves in a delayed fashion, while the Security TLV pro-
tects all PTP fields that are not modified by intermediate nodes, such as the
correctionField. Instead of the key management being handled above layer 3
communications as stated in the mentioned draft, old TESLA keys to be dis-
closed might be included in a dedicated field, named disclosedKey of the Security
TLV, as it can be seen in Figure 5.1. Since the operation of TESLA-based key
schemes need participants to be synchronized, in the first stage of PTP protocol,
additional key management schemes using asymmetric cryptography should be
employed to distribute TESLA parameters and even the full TESLA key chain
(or alternatively the first key, from which the whole chain can be generated).
Regarding the proposed hop-by-hop group authentication mechanism, Ether-
net frames carrying PTP messages are encapsulated with MACsec security tag
and the ICV as represented in Figure 4.7, where the MAC Protocol Data Unit
(MPDU) is the PTP message to be transported over layer 2 networks. Peer nodes
use the MKA protocol described in Section 4.3.1 to distribute MACsec session
keys, which are pairwise SAKs, after they had been authenticated and authorized
to a key server using EAP methods. Nevertheless, EAP methods as described in
IEEE 802.1X standard can be employed to provide pairwise CAKs, but not to
stablish and distribute group CAKs. Therefore, a new approach scheme to derive
group CAKs using EAP methods is proposed in Section 5.3.
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Taking into account this proposed key management scheme for PTP over layer
2 networks protected by MACsec, a new SoC architecture is also presented in
Section 5.4. This architecture should provide sub-microsecond accuracy with
hardware timestamping units and implement security units in hardware to avoid
throughput bottlenecks. In this sense, the whole system throughput and latency
need to be analysed in order to study the impact of MACsec on protocol perfor-
mance.
5.3 TimeWardenKey: a new key management
approach for PTP networks
5.3.1 Group keys distribution problem
Since the nature of MACsec is hop-by-hop operation, SAKs distributed by the
MKA protocol are only valid at one physical link, no matter they are pairwise
keys or group keys. The utilization of group SAKs acquires sense when protecting
broadcast and multicast traffic with MACsec over wireless LANs, because several
stations share the physical media. In contrast, in wired LANs, two stations are
directly connected through point-to-point links and pairwise SAKs can be used
to protect all types of traffic between them.
It can be thought that the only advantage of using group SAKs in wired networks
is the utilization of a shared memory for storing group SAKs in intermediate
nodes, which is accessible from all SecY units with the consequently saving of
storing resources. However, a dedicated SA memory for storing SAKs is typically
included in MACsec hardware implementations, such as the Algotronix IP core
introduced in Section 4.3.4, and one instantiation of that core is required per port.
Hence, if the same SAK is aimed to be used by all ports, it must be replicated on
every SA memory implemented on each port, avoiding users to be able to save
storing resources even using group SAKs.
In order to negotiate and transport pairwise SAKs between peer ports using the
MKA protocol, both must own the same CAK as a result of an authentication
procedure that was ended successfully. Instead of using pre-shared CAKs, IEEE
802.1X-2010 standard specifies the derivation of pairwise CAKs from EAP meth-
ods to achieve a full authenticated scheme. But, if this full authentication scheme
is employed in wired Ethernet networks, intermediate nodes like switches must
implement both supplicant and authenticator state machines, in addition to AAA
functionality, as explained in Section 4.3.1.
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Otherwise, if a more centralized authentication approach is employed, where
there is only a multi-host authenticator and all PTP nodes in the LAN act as
supplicants, intermediate nodes only need to implement the supplicant state ma-
chines. As a consequence, this approach could suit better on substation nodes
with limited resources. In the next Section, a new key management scheme to
address the problem of limited resources in substation nodes is proposed, which
uses EAPOL messages to perform EAP methods and to derive the group CAK.
This new key scheme must overcome two main identified problems:
• EAPOL messages are filtered by IEEE 802.1D and IEEE 802.1Q confor-
mance switches and bridges. The destination group addresses of EAPOL-
EAP frames as specified in Table 11-1 of 802.1X-2010 standard are not for-
warded by neither switches nor bridges. Hence, a new addressing scheme
must be defined in order to allow these frames to be forwarded through
multi-hop transmission paths.
• All PTP nodes in the LAN must share a group CAK. As a result of the
EAP authentication each station obtains a pairwise key, named the Master
Session Key (MSK), which is only known by the supplicant and the au-
thenticator and it is not used directly to protect data. In order to allow
the secure communication between peer ports of PTP nodes an additional
group CAK must be distributed from the authenticator to all the suppli-
cants, before using the MKA protocol to establish SAKs.
In the next Section, a new full authenticated scheme to derive group keys using
EAP methods is proposed for PTP layer 2 networks. The goal of the proposed
solution is to implement a simplified 802.1X authentication scheme targeted for
applications that require layer 2 PTP and have constrained resources, like Sub-
station Automation Systems.
5.3.2 TimeWardenKey description
As introduced above, all PTP nodes are expected to act as supplicants in the
proposed key management scheme, and there is a multi-host authenticator node
that also implements the AAA functionality if required to transport the authen-
tication messages to the authentication server. However, IEEE 802.1X standard
currently does not support such a centralized scheme in wired networks due to two
main problems that have already been identified: the EAPOL frames addressing
and the derivation and distribution of the group CAK.
Figure 5.2 represents a PTP network where the gateway acts as the multi-host
authenticator and all PTP clocks assume the role of supplicants. The multi-host
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Figure 5.2: Example of the utilization of TimeWardenKey scheme in PTP layer 2
networks
authenticator delivers the group CAK to all PTP nodes as a result of successful
individual authentication exchanges. By this way, TC switches only have to
implement one supplicant state machine, which installs the received group CAK
on each MKA instance associated to each PTP port.
Nevertheless, IEEE 802.1X-2010 standard only specifies the derivation of pairwise
CAKs from EAP methods. Concretely, input parameters of the key derivation
function are the MSK and the MAC addresses of both supplicant and authenti-
cator, among others. Therefore, additional message exchange to negotiate this
group CAK is needed. The proposal described in this Section is inspired in
the IEEE 802.11i standard for wireless networks [117] and includes a group key
handshake, which is presented below.
Moreover, with the aim of deriving and distributing the group CAK, a new key
hierarchy is defined as depicted in Figure 5.3. From the MSK, a pairwise CAK is
generated with the KDF function as specified in IEEE 802.1X. Similarly, ICK and
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Figure 5.3: New key hierarchy proposed by TimeWardenKey
KEK keys are generated to distribute a group CAK using EAPOL-Key frames.
A new key descriptor could be defined in order to transport the group CAK using
EAPOL-Key, which might be based on the key descriptor defined in IEEE 802.11i
standard, but using the KEK and AES Key Wrap functions to encrypt the frame
and the ICK and AES-CMAC algorithm to compute the ICV.
After that, PTP nodes start the MKA protocol to demonstrate the possession
of the group CAK. On each physical link, one peer node assumes the role of
key server, generates the SAK and distributes it as specified in IEEE 802.1X-
2010 standard. Now, all stations belonging to the group of authorized PTP
nodes share the SAKs with their peers and are able to secure PTP frames using
MACsec encapsulation.
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Figure 5.4: New EAPOL message exchange defined by TimeWardenKey
The resulting EAPOL message exchange for the new group CAKs distribution
scheme has been represented in Figure 5.4. In order to exchange EAP authen-
tication messages between supplicants and authenticator, as well as to deliver
the group CAK from the multi-host authenticator to all supplicant PTP nodes,
EAPOL-EAP messages must traverse intermediate nodes. The new addressing
scheme for EAPOL messages is proposed to be as following:
• Supplicants send an EAPOL-Start frame with a multicast address as the
destination MAC address, in case the MAC address of the authenticator is
unknown. For example, the PTP multicast address 01:1B:19:00:00:00 might
be used. An EAPOL-Start frame is only processed by the authenticator.
• Subsequent EAPOL-EAP and EAPOL-Key frames to derive the MSK and
the group key respectively must contain a unicast destination MAC address.
• EAPOL-MKA frames used to negotiated and establish the pairwise SAKs
between peer ports must use a group MAC address as specified in Table 11-
1 of IEE 802.1X-2010 standard, in order to avoid accidentally or maliciously
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creation of multi-hop MACsec tunnels.
• EAPOL-Logoff frames from supplicants employ the individual address of
the authenticator to terminate the EAP authentication, but MKA protocol
and the connectivity between peer ports continue until MKA fails because
of an error or the deletion of all state associated with the authentication
by the supplicant, including MKA and EAP derived state.
5.4 TimeWardenSoC: a new SoC architecture for
secure PTP
Bearing in mind the security and design requirements collected in Section 5.2, as
well as the new key management scheme proposed in Section 5.3.2, a new SoC
architecture to protect PTP traffic over layer 2 networks like the process bus
in substations will be presented. After being described the block diagram of the
proposed architecture, it is modelled in terms of throughput and latency. Finally,
other design issues such as an estimation of area cost are also outlined.
5.4.1 TimeWardenSoC architecture description
With the aim of defining a new SoC architecture for IEDs that integrates both
MACsec and IEEE 1588 protocols, MACsec hardware units have been added
to the architectures explained in Section 4.2. These MACsec cores have been
integrated between the MAC IP core and the PHY external device. The resulting
SoC architecture has been represented in Figure 5.5. This placement requires a
MAC ‘sandwich’ around MACsec core to adapt its specific data transmit and
receive interfaces to standardized [G]MII interfaces.
The MACsec ‘sandwich’ should be responsible for adapting data rates by changing
data bus width, as well as generating flow control signals based on [G]MII signals
comming from the PHY and the MAC. In addition, a frame filter should be
implemented to classify frames. The ones that require MACsec protection, like
PTP event messages, have to be delivered through the controlled port. The rest
of frames must be forwarded through the uncontrolled port, for key management
purposes for example.
Furthermore, the MACsec ‘sandwich’ must verify and regenerate the Frame
Check Sequence (FCS) checksum of ingress and egress Ethernet frames that tra-
verse the controlled port using the Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) algorithm.
This operation is requested because the SecY unit changes the content of the
5.4 TimeWardenSoC: a new SoC architecture for secure PTP 103
[G]MII [G]MII 
PHY
Register
Interface
RTC
Frame
Parser
Hard/Soft
CPU
System
Bus
TSU
MACMACsec IP MACsecsandwich
MACsec
sandwich
Reset
Clock
SecY Mgmnt
Secure Frame Veriﬁca�on
Secure Frame Genera�on
Encryp�on Unit Tx/Rx
SA keys
SecY
CP
UP
CP
UP
Rate
Adapter
Frame Filter
CRC Check/Gen
Rate
Adapter
Frame Filter
CRC Check/Gen
IEEE 1588 IP
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frames in both directions: from network to processor, the SecTAG and the ICV
are removed and, from processor to network, the SecTAG and the ICV are added.
In the transmit path, the CRC Checker in the MAC side of the ‘sandwich’ removes
the FCS of the Ethernet frame, while the CRC Gen in the PHY side appends
the new generated FCS at the end. In the receiver path, the same happens in
the opposite direction. Network errors detected by a wrong FCS code at one
side might be notified to the other side with an error signal, which should take
the corresponding action. For instance, when the calculated FCS in the CRC
Checker does not match with the value of the received FCS, the CRC Gen is
ordered to append a well known false FCS value of all ones, for example.
The module called SecY within the MACsec IP core provides secure verification
of receiving frames and secure generation of transmitting frames using an en-
cryption unit. This encryption unit implements two instances of the AES-GCM
algorithm, because receive and transmit paths cannot share the same block ci-
pher 1. Session keys, named SAKs in IEEE 802.1AE standard, are written by the
SecY Management module under the order of control plane software, which at the
same time controls the security parameters of MACsec channels and associations
between peers.
The proposed architecture represented in Figure 5.5 for a single port PTP node
can be extrapolated to multiple ports by adding an Ethernet switch IP core with
TC functionality, and replicating the MACsec IP core on each port. The resulting
architecture is depicted in Figure 5.6.
In substation communications, traffic separation should also be implemented by
the frame filter in IEDs, throwing time-critical messages to the uncontrolled port.
For instance, in the case of an HSR ring topology for the process bus, GOOSE and
SV messages would be transmitted with Ethertype=0xh‘892F’ within the HSR
tag immediately after the Ethernet source address, and without SecTAG-ICV
fields. In case the IED is not connected to an HSR ring, but to a PRP switch,
the frame filter within the MACsec ‘sandwich’ should also detect GOOSE and SV
frames with Ethertypes 0xh‘88b8’ and 0xh‘88ba’ respectively, and deliver them
through the uncontrolled port. The particular case of an IED SoC architecture
with MACsec and High Availability Ethernet support is shown in Figure 5.7.
A CPU is needed in all proposed architectures in order to run the PTP stack
and the MACsec control plane as explained in Sections 4.2 and 4.3.2. The block
diagram of the resulting software architecture is depicted in Figure 5.8. At the
left side of the block diagram, software modules related to IEEE 1588 standard
are included. It can be seen that a generic PTP stack retrieves timestamping
1The encryption unit must be able to handle receiving and transmitting frames
simultaneously.
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information from the driver of the IEEE 1588 IP core. The stack can also op-
tionally make use of the PTP Hardware Clock infrastructure and the PPS Class
as explained in Section 4.2.4.2, as represented with a dashed line in the Figure.
In Figure 5.8, the software related to IEEE 802.1X standard is typified as MAC-
sec control plane. According to the new MACsec key management approach
presented in Section 5.3.2, there is an only Supplicant PACP module that im-
plements modified EAP state machines to include the distribution of a group
CAK using EAPOL-Key frames. This module orders the KaY entity to manage
as many MKA instances associated to that group CAK as the number of ports.
Each MKA instance allows the operation of the MKA protocol on each link and
controls the parameters and the keys to be used by the SecY. All ports might also
have in common a single Controlled Port module to configure MACsec security
parameters, such as the cipher suite or the utilization of confidentiality services
in addition to authentication if desired.
5.4.2 TimeWardenSoC architecture characterization
In this Section, the viability of implementing the proposed SoC architecture to
protect IEEE 1588 frames without compromising PTP protocol performance is
analysed. There are two paths within the SoC architecture shown in Figure 5.5
that meet at software user level on the execution of the PTP stack. These paths
must be analysed separately.
On the one hand, timestamping information goes through the timestamping path
defined by those components that constitute the IEEE 1588 IP core. Through-
put and latency are determined in this path by the [G]MII interface bit-rate,
because the information of the received PTP event message and the correspond-
ing timestamp must be provided to the Register Interface before the arrival of the
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next PTP event message. Since interfaces between components within the IEEE
1588 IP core are vendor specific, the IP vendor is responsible for designing them
appropriately in order to meet throughput requirements. Data throughput and
processing latency analysis of IEEE 1588 IP core is outlined in Section 5.4.2.1.
On the other hand, there is the data path that forwards Ethernet frames from
physical interface to CPU in order to be processed by the PTP stack, the MACsec
control plane or other user applications. This path would include MACsec and
Ethernet switch IP cores among other hardware modules.
Several issues should be considered to assure that PTP protocol is able to oper-
ate correctly, even introducing the MACsec IP core within the data path. The
MACsec IP core should accomplish with network bandwidth or line frequency,
which is defined for Ethernet networks as the channel capacity and is typically
expressed in bits per second. Section 5.4.2.2 analyses data throughput and pro-
cessing latency of MACsec IP core.
Both paths meet at Linux user level on the execution of the PTP stack; therefore,
several issues must be considered to assure that PTP protocol is able to operate
correctly, even introducing the MACsec IP core within the data path. Designers
must implement the proper MAC and Ethernet Switch IP cores in order to sup-
port the required Ethernet bandwidth. As stated in [133], since SV messages in
substation process bus consume approximately 5 Mbit/s of the Ethernet band-
width with a single MU, tens of MUs connected to the same LAN would need
Gigabit capacity. Hence, bit-rate of network links between switches in substa-
tions need to support bit-rates of 1 Gbit/s or more, while end nodes containing
an OC might still operate with Fast Ethernet technology at 100 Mbit/s. Some
guidelines to allow Ethernet subsystem to fulfil throughput and latency require-
ments are exposed in Section 5.4.2.3, in which time calculations are computed
for Gigabit Ethernet and must be multiplied by 10 for Fast Ethernet.
5.4.2.1 Data throughput and processing latency analysis of IEEE
1588 IP core
When a PTP event message is detected by the Frame Parser, relevant PTP
information in conjunction with the timestamp captured by the TSU must be
stored in the Register Interface before the next PTP frame is acquired. Otherwise,
the information about the first PTP message would be lost. The processing
latency of the IEEE 1588 IP core should be short enough to assure information
of two consecutive messages is registered correctly. This latency is the time since
the timestamp is captured until all relevant PTP fields of the frame are gathered
and registered in the Register Interface.
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Apart from timestamps, the PTP fields that must be stored in order to identify
the message in the stack are: messageType, sequenceID and sourcePortIdentity.
Therefore, at Gigabit Medium Independent Interface (GMII), TSU takes 62 cycles
from the end of the preamble until the end of the sequenceID field2 to acquire all
the information. The minimum latency of the core would be 496 nanoseconds at
Gigabit Ethernet.
However, higher latencies could be experienced in the timestamping path if such
high throughputs are not achieved by interfaces inside the IEEE 1588 IP core.
The maximum latency times allowed not to overwrite PTP information are com-
puted bellow for the cases of two received and two transmit non-stop PTP frames.
At the receiving side, a Pdelay req message could be received immediately after
a Sync message, for example. The timestamping information of both messages
must be available as soon as possible at processor interface, but particularly
the information of Sync message must be stored in the Register Interface before
capturing the Pdelay req. Supposing that the transmission of the latter is started
from a peer port once the transmission of the Sync is finished, the maximum
latency allowed is the transmission time of the Sync plus the Inter Frame Gap
(IFG). The worst case would be the transmission of a Synq message directly over
Ethernet and encapsulated with MACsec, which is 108 bytes long including the
SecTAG and the ICV. At Gigabit Ethernet, the transmission time would be 816
nanoseconds plus 96 nanoseconds for the IFG. At transmission side, the same
happens when transmitting a Pdelay req message right after the Synq.
Consequently, the maximum allowed latency for the IEEE 1588 IP core is 912
nanoseconds in total. The throughput of the IEEE 1588 IP core is defined as
the number of bits to be registered in this latency time, as specified in Equation
5.1. In the Equation, the timestamplength is 64 bits and the PTPdatalength
is 100 bits, which is the sum of the lengths of messageType, sequenceID and
sourcePortIdentity fields.
Throughput1588 =
timestampglength + PTPdatalength
Latency1588
=
164
Latency1588
(5.1)
As a consequence, the minimum allowed throughput inside IEEE 1588 IP core is
in the order of 180 Mbit/s:
Throughput1588min =
164
912 · 10−9 = 0.180Gbit/s (5.2)
2The sum of 12 bytes for Destination and Source MAC addresses, 16 bytes of the SecTAG,
2 bytes of the Ethertype and 32 bytes of the PTP header including the sequenceID is 62 bytes,
which take 62 cycles for transmitting through GMII interface.
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Since interfaces between components within the IEEE 1588 IP core are vendor
specific, the IP vendor is responsible for designing these interfaces appropriately
in order to meet throughput and latency requirements. As an example, with
a Register Interface input frequency of 50 Mhz and an input word width of 4
bits, PTP timestamp and data registration would take 820 nanoseconds and the
throughput would be 200 Mbit/s.
5.4.2.2 Data throughput and processing latency analysis of MACsec
IP Core
In this Section, the MACsec IP core is referred to as the set of hardware mod-
ules that implement the SecY entity and its management. The throughput and
latency of this MACsec core are extremely important in order to guarantee the
selected Ethernet technology bandwidth, because the only requirement for on-
the-fly computation of the ICV is to finish the current block computation before
the next one is ready.
There are some factors that negatively influence MACsec IP core latency:
• First block processing
• Ethernet IFG assessment
• Detection of short frames
• MAC computation
The processing time of the first block, named Lfirst block, is the time it takes to
receive the Ethernet preamble and a whole block of input data. Since the input
data width of an AES block cipher is 128 bits, a latency of 8 and 16 cycles for
the preamble and the first block, 192 nanoseconds in total, is introduced when
the MACsec core is placed between the MAC and the PHY at GMII. The latency
due to the IFG assessment, LIFG, is introduced when two consecutive Ethernet
frames are going to be transmitted. Frames forwarded from the common port of
the MACsec core to the PHY need more time to be retransmitted because the
SecTAG and the ICV might have been added. This additional latency will vary
depending on the nature of the previous retransmitted frame. If it is forwarded
through the uncontrolled port no latency is introduced. In contrast, when it is
forwarded through the controlled port, LIFG can increase up to 192 nanosec-
onds at GMII in the case that the SecTAG does not include the Secure Channel
Identifier (SCI), or 256 nanoseconds if the SCI is implicitily included in it.
Apart from assuring the IFG, the transmit path of the MACsec core also needs
to wait in order to check if the Ethernet frame is short. An Ethernet frame
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Figure 5.9: General hardware architecture of an AES-GCM crypto core
is considered short when its data length is less than 48 bytes, and so must be
indicated in a specific field of the SecTAG. Therefore, before coding the SecTAG,
the MACsec core must wait until it receives 60 bytes to start the computation
of the first block. Since the latency corresponding to process the first block was
already considered, the core should wait for receiving 44 bytes more. The time
it takes to receive them is named LSL and it will depend on MACsec core input
word width. Considering the worst case of an input word width of 128 bits, up to
three additional blocks need to be buffered before starting the MAC computation.
In this case, LSL would be 384 nanoseconds.
Finally, the time the MACsec core takes to compute the MAC is referred to as
LAES−GCM and depends on the AES-GCM cryptographic algorithm implemen-
tation. In order to analyse the latency of the AES-GCM algorithm, a typical
hardware architecture is depicted in Figure 5.9 extracted from [134]. AESK de-
notes the AES block cipher using the key K and multH stands for Galois field
multiplication by the hash key H, which is computed as H = AES(K, 0128).
Hardware implementations usually utilize three different paths: the authentica-
tion only path, the hash encrypting path and the normal path.
The authentication-only data, represented as AAD in Figure 5.9, is fed into the
multiplication function following the authentication only path. Then, the mul-
tiplication function input is switched to the ciphertext coming from the normal
path. Also, the Initialization Vector (IV) is fed into the increment function and
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Figure 5.10: General hardware architectures of block ciphers
successive counter values are obtained as outputs, which at the same time fed
into the AES block cipher. The first output of the block cipher is exored with the
output of the multiplication function, after all the data input has been processed,
producing the authentication tag. This process follows the hash encrypting path.
On the one hand, if only authentication service must be provided, besides the
computation of the binary Galois field multiplication over each block of authen-
tication data, a single iteration of the AES block cipher is required. While the
Galois field multiplication is especially suitable for hardware implementations
and latency times of one clock cycle can be achieved with parallel techniques, the
AES block cipher needs 10 or 14 cipher rounds, depending on the key size [134].
On the other hand, when both authentication and confidentiality are desired, one
iteration of AES block cipher is performed each time a block of ciphertext is going
to be generated. As a consequence, the latency of the AES-GCM algorithm in
hardware will be determined by the architecture of the AES block cipher. Apart
from pipelined architectures, designers can choose between basic iterative archi-
tecture or a more complex one using loop unrolling techniques. Figure 5.10(a)
represents the basic architecture, where one round of the cipher is implemented
as combinational logic and it is used iteratively for the number of rounds. The
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latency of this architecture, named Literative, is defined in Equation 5.3, where
Nr is the number of rounds and TCLK is the clock period.
Literative = Nr · TCLK (5.3)
In contrast, architectures with partial loop unrolling have K rounds implemented
as combinatorial logic, as it can be seen in Figure 5.10(b). Thus, the number
of clock cycles necessary to encrypt/decrypt a block decreases by a factor of K.
Nevertheless, the minimum clock period also increases by a factor slightly smaller
than K and, consequently, latency times are hardly improved. In this case, the
latency is Lloop as defined in Equation 5.4.
Lloop =
Nr ·K ′ · TCLK
K
=
K ′
K
· Literative (5.4)
As an example, values of number of cycles per encryption, maximum frequencies
and resulting latency times are listed in Table 5.2 for different values of K. Only
with K = 2 and K = 3, the overall latency was improved in the range of few
nanoseconds, as demonstrated in [53]. In this experiment, the effect of changing
the K factor for a fast and open source AES block cipher implemented on a
Xilinx Virtex 5 XC5VFX70T FPGA was analysed.
Tabla 5.2: R. Usselmann AES-128 hardware implementation results
K = 1 K = 2 K = 3 K = 4 K = 5
Cycles per encryption 12 7 6 5 4
Max. frequency (MHz) 171.615 105.530 85.970 57.977 41.892
Latency (ns) 69.92 65.80 69.79 86.24 95.48
Max. throughput (Gbit/s) 1.830 1.945 1.834 1.484 1.341
The basic iterative implementation of the AES block cipher will be considered
to estimate the latency of the MACsec IP core. Concretely, the latency of the
AES-GCM, named LAES−GCM , is computed as in Equation 5.5, where TMACsec
is the MACsec clock period.
LAES−GCM = Literative = Nr · TMACsec (5.5)
Cryptographic algorithms that are implemented in hardware are also char-
acterized using throughput, which is defined as the number of bits en-
crypted/decrypted in a unit of time and is related to latency by Equation 5.6
[135].
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Throughputcipher =
block size · number of blocks processed simultaneously
latencycipher
(5.6)
In the proposed SoC architecture, MACsec uses the AES-GCM block cipher to
compute the ciphertext and the authentication tag of Ethernet frames as they
are traversing the [G]MII interface. In contrast to file system encryption where
large amounts of data must be encrypted or decrypted, data is captured in 8 bit
nibbles at GMII interface for Gigabit Ethernet. Therefore, there is no sense in
computing several blocks in parallel using pipelining techniques. Consequently,
only one block is processed each time with this architecture and the throughput
is calculated by Equation 5.7.
ThroughputAES−GCM =
block size
LAES−GCM
=
128
Nr · TMACsec (5.7)
The minimum frequency of the MACsec IP core is the one that assures the
throughput of Gigabit Ethernet, as stated in Equations 5.8 and 5.9, which results
in 109.375 MHz when AES-256 (Nr = 14) and 78.125 MHz when AES-128 (Nr =
10).
ThroughputAES−GCM =
128 · fMACsecmin
Nr
= 1Gbit/s (5.8)
fMACsecmin =
109 ·Nr
128
(5.9)
Similarly, the maximum latency of the AES-GCM algorithm can be calculated
from the minimum frequency as stated in Equation 5.10, which results in 128
nanoseconds independently of the key size.
LAES−GCMmax =
Nr
fMACsecmin
=
Nr · 128
Nr · 109 = 128ns (5.10)
Finally, the total latency of the MACsec IP Core is defined in Equation 5.11,
with a maximum value of 960 nanoseconds.
LatencyMACsec = Lfirst block + LIFG + LSL + LAES−GCM (5.11)
5.4 TimeWardenSoC: a new SoC architecture for secure PTP 115
5.4.2.3 Data throughput and processing latency analysis of the Eth-
ernet subsystem
The data throughput and the overall processing latency of the system will be
highly influenced by each hardware component in the Ethernet subsystem within
the SoC architecture and by the software framework employed in the reception
and transmission process. The impact of this Ethernet subsystem on system
performance is analysed below for the single port and the multiple ports archi-
tectures, as well as for the particular case of an HSR node.
TimeWardenSoC architecture for an OC with a single port
In the simplest case, with only one Ethernet port, the Ethernet subsystem was
simplified in Figure 5.5, where it was represented as a compact MAC IP core.
Nevertheless, it is generally composed by a proper MAC unit, a transmission and
reception buffer and the Direct Memory Access (DMA) engine.
The purpose of the DMA controller is to access to system memory or another
device memory directly from a hardware component without requiring CPU in-
tervention. Thus, the CPU is able to continue with its work and achieve good
performance. A DMA controller is commonly used by Ethernet Controllers in or-
der to read from system memory egress frames to be transmitted to network and
write to system memory ingress frames received through the [G]MII interface.
Apart from hardware processing of Ethernet frames, software framework for frame
reception and transmission also affects latency and throughput in Ethernet Sub-
systems. Most Linux based systems currently employ the New API (NAPI) as
an alternative to pure interrupt driven technique, which presented the problem
of receive-livelock under high traffic load [136]. In this state, CPU resources were
spent on interrupt handling causing received frames not being processed and even
dropped due to buffer overflows. NAPI was included in Linux kernel version 2.5.7
in order to reduce interrupt rate in case of high traffic load by processing multiple
frames upon reception of an interrupt. Pure interrupt driven frameworks offer
the lowest latencies between the reception of a frame and its processing at low
loads, but do not work well under high load conditions. In contrast, with full
CPU utilization, NAPI decreases the interruption rate and increases the max-
imum throughput at the cost of latency, but no frames are dropped. At low
traffic loads NAPI offers the same latency than a pure interrupt driven mecha-
nism. Readers are encourage to learn more about NAPI drivers and Ethernet
frames processing in Linux based hosts in [136].
Bearing in mind the mode of operation of NAPI, in order to analyse the latency
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of the Ethernet subsystem, reception and transmission paths have been distin-
guished. On the one hand, a received frame is firstly buffered in the MAC unit
and transferred via DMA to the system memory. Once the DMA transfer is
finished, the DMA unit issues a receive interrupt so as to notify the CPU, which
invokes the associated interrupt service routine defined in the network driver.
Supposing that NAPI is supported by the driver, further processing by upper
layers will wait until next time slot allocated to that device, when input frame
is delivered to each protocol handler associated to it. Therefore, the latency of
the reception path is the time elapsed between the reception of the frame and
its processing by the corresponding protocol handler. This value is the sum rep-
resented in Equation 5.12, where LMAC is the latency of frame buffering in the
MAC unit, LDMA is the latency of the DMA transfer, Linterrupt is the receive
interrupt latency and Linput queue is the kernel latency due to NAPI scheduling.
LatencyRx = LMAC + LDMA + Linterrupt + Linput queue (5.12)
On the other hand, the latency experienced by a transmitted frame is in Equation
5.13. In this case, there are no interrupt handlers, but latency due to kernel
processing for a determined egress frame will depend on the queueing discipline
of the output queue.
LatencyTx = Loutput queue + LDMA + LMAC (5.13)
The MAC latency, named LMAC , depend on packet size (frame length), data
width (data width) and frequency (f) on [G]MII interface, as specified in Equa-
tion 5.14. The DMA latency, named LDMA, is in addition dependant on DMA
unit implementation as defined in Equations 5.15 and 5.16. As an example, the
latency introduced by the Advanced eXtensible Interface (AXI) DMA IP core
from Xilinx due to the time elapsed between the input and output interfaces is
estimated to be around 49 clock cycles in the reception path and 44 clock cycles
in the transmission path [137]. Hence, LDMA unit could be in the order of 490
and 440 nanoseconds at 100 MHz. For a typical Sync message, frame lentgh
would be 560 bits and LMAC would result in 560 nanoseconds. Supposing a DMA
interface of 64 bits and 100 MHz, LDMA would be around 500-600 nanoseconds.
LMAC =
frame length
data widthGMII · fGMII =
frame length
8 · 125 · 106 (5.14)
LDMA = LDMA unit + LDMA transfer (5.15)
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LDMA =
clock cycles
fDMA
+
frame length
data widthDMA · fDMA (5.16)
The interrupt latency is the time between the interrupt generation and the exe-
cution of the first instruction of the interrupt handler or service routine, whose
value depends on different factors such as the interrupt controller implementa-
tion, priority of the interrupt and the operating system, among others. Linux
embedded systems usually experience interrupt latency times in the order of
few microseconds. For instance, for Zynq-7000 based systems, interrupt laten-
cies around 5 microseconds under normal execution and 10 microseconds while
invoking applications were achieved in [138].
The latency between the kernel and user space processing of ingress frames, as well
as latency induced by kernel scheduling of egress grames, could be measured using
the SO TIMESTAMP option of sockets. Depending on where timestamps are
taken by the network driver, this measured latency could also include the latency
introduced by hardware components if hardware timestamping is supported by
the driver. Also, a hardware timer could be used to measure software delays, as
explained in [139], where experiments with different packet size were performed to
evaluate frame release latencies when utilizing a Zynq-7000 SoC system. Authors
admitted software latencies below 2 microseconds when transmitting packets even
under traffic load. Therefore, values of around 1-2 microseconds for Loutput queue
and Linput queue are estimated for embedded systems.
The total latency experienced by transmitted Sync messages from PTP stack
running on user space to an Ethernet port in such a SoC architecture, is estimated
to be in de order of 3 microseconds. In the case of a received Sync message, also
the interrupt latency has to be taken into account; hence, latency times could
easily increase above 10 microseconds with CPU load.
TimeWardenSoC architecture for a HC with multiple ports
If a multiple port end point is designed, as represented in Figure 5.6, the latency
introduced by the Ethernet Switch IP core must also be considered. This latency
will vary depending on the forwarding strategy. While store-and-forward switches
forward the frame once the whole packet has been received, a cut-through switch
starts transmitting the frame immediately after knowing the destination address
and the protocol, which are fields placed in the frame header. As a consequence,
the forwarding latency in cut-through architectures is independent of the frame
length and theoretical values around 200 nanoseconds can be achieved. Oth-
erwise, in store-and-forward architectures, the introduced latency is one order
118 SoC architecture for secure PTP
of magnitude greater and depends on the frame length, ranging from 6 to 14
microseconds in typical Ethernet switches.
TimeWardenSoC architecture for an HSR node
In the particular case of HSR switch IP core of Figure 5.7, the latency time to
be considered is the forwarding time between a redundant port and the interlink,
which is also dependant on the frame length because store-and-forward mode of
operation is mandatory in the interlink. In [140], latency times in the order of
2 and 10 microseconds are experienced by frames with payload size of 256 and
1280 bytes respectively.
5.4.3 Memory buffers size and silicon resources estimation
5.4.3.1 IEEE 1588 IP core register dimensioning
Typically, in IEEE 1588 IP cores used to provide PTP hardware support, there
are two memory spaces where timestamps are stored: the Register Interface in
hardware and a buffer implemented in software driver using kernel space memory.
Normally, the IEEE 1588 driver operate in an interrupt driven mode, where the
IEEE 1588 IP core generates a hardware interrupt to notify the CPU that a
timestamp has been captured. An associated interrupt service routine, defined
in the IEEE 1588 driver, is responsible for copying the contents of the registers
in the IEEE 1588 core into the timestamping queue implemented in software, as
a linked list for example.
The minimum number of timestamps that the Register Interface must be able
to keep depends on the periodicity of the PTP messages and the time that the
driver takes to retrieve them from hardware. In fact, if only the information of a
single PTP frame and its timestamp were stored in the Register Interface, there
would be a real chance of being overwritten upon arrival of the next PTP frame
before being retrieved from software.
If a Pdelay req message were received right after a Sync message, only 656 ns after
the Sync message had been captured3, a new timestamp should be stored in the
Register Interface. Considering an average interrupt latency of 5 microseconds, as
it has been commented above for experiments made in [138], if only one register
were implemented in the Register Interface, Sync timestamp would be highly
likely overwritten before having retrieved it by the interrupt service routine.
3This is the transmission time of a Sync message at Gigabit Ethernet plus the IFG.
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Figure 5.11: Maximum number of PTP messages exchanged in P2P mode
Therefore, register dimensioning of the memory space contained in the IEEE
1588 IP core, directly depends on the time spent by the CPU to handle the inter-
rupt and the number of timestamps to be captured in this interval of time. The
maximum number of messages that the core should be able to timestamp until
the CPU handles the interrupt, will depend on the propagation delay mechanism
configured in the PTP stack. The worst case is the P2P mode of operation,
where up to 5 messages could be exchanged within each Sync interval as shown
in Figure 5.11, or even within each peer delay interval if it were shorter. In IEEE
C37.238-2011 standard for PTP power profile, logSyncInterval and logMinPde-
layReqInterval attributes are specified to be 0 and, accordingly, the minimum
time interval between two consecutive Sync or Peer Delay messages would last
one second. Thus, up to three timestamps must be captured in every second:
t11, t1 and t4 in Port A; t21, t2 and t3 in Port B, as represented in Figure 5.11.
As a consequence, the memory space within the Register Interface must be ca-
pable of storing a minimum of three timestamps, together with PTP message
information. As stated in Section 5.4.2.1, this information would at least con-
sist of messageType, sequenceID and sourcePortIdentity. In total, for three PTP
event messages, 492 bits of information should be buffered.
Although the dimensioning of the Register Interface and the size of the software
input queue do not necessarily be the same, the software buffer should be capable
120 SoC architecture for secure PTP
of storing as many timestamps as the Register Interface or more. With too large
latencies in the data path, there is a minimal risk of capturing a new Sync message
and deliver the timestamping information to the driver before previous Sync
message reaches the PTP stack. In this case, having space in system memory for
more than three timestamps could be interesting. Nevertheless, this only could
happen if the data path latency, including the received frame interrupt latency
and frame processing by the Linux networking stack, were higher than the Sync
or Peer Delay interval plus the latency of the timestamping path.
In this sense, modern Linux kernels implement several techniques to avoid large
interrupt latencies and queues congestion, as it has been previously described the
case of NAPI interface, which maintains low processing latencies under normal
traffic conditions. Even when CPU is overloaded with more than 2000 frames
per second, latencies of 2,300 microseconds were observed in experiments made
in [141], where a traffic generator was connected to a Linux host that forwarded
packets back to the generator in order to measure latencies at different loads.
This large latency under overloaded conditions is still far from the one second
time interval of Sync and Pdelay req messages. Accordingly, an input buffer of
three nodes managed by the driver would be large enough to store timing infor-
mation of PTP event messages. However, since memory space can be allocated
and deallocated dynamically, supporting greater buffer sizes should not be an
inconvenient when designing IEEE 1588 drivers.
5.4.3.2 Area estimation
In this Section, the resource utilization of the proposed SoC architecture is esti-
mated taking into account the implementation results included in the datasheets
and brochures available from IP vendors when implementing them independently
in Xilinx Zynq FPGA [142]. Consequently, Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 respectively
summarize the area cost of an end node, an intermediate node and an HSR node
with MACsec support. The intermediate node includes an Ethernet Switch IP
core with four ports, providing three external ports and an internal port to the
system.
From all IP cores presented in Chapter 4, the following ones were considered for
estimating the area cost:
• IEEE 1588 IP core: PreciseTimeBasic (PTB) from SoC-e [97]
• Eth. Switch IP core: Unmanaged Ethernet Switch (UES) from SoC-e [100]
• HSR Switch IP core: HSR/PRP Switch (HPS) from SoC-e [101]
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• MACsec IP core: MACSEC for 10 Gbit Ethernet from Algotronix [127]
The Zynq XC7Z020 FPGA available resources are: 106,400 Slice Registers, 53,200
Slice LUTs, 140 RAMB36, 280 RAMB18 and 220 DSP48E1 blocks. Bearing in
mind this values, the percentage of utilization for each configuration is included
in the last column of the Tables. Because all the listed percentages are below
100%, it can be expected that implementation of any of the three configurations
would be viable in modern FPGAs. However, the high utilization of Slice LUTs
with percentages around 90% in multiport configurations could drastically worsen
system performance due to timing constraints. The less free space is in the FPGA,
the smaller are the values of maximum frequency and, accordingly, the required
latency and throughput of hardware components could be compromised.
Furthermore, the resource utilization of the MAC IP was not considered in the
Tables because Zynq FPGA already has some hard Ethernet Controllers. As a
consequence, designers could save reconfigurable logic resources by instantiating
one of them when implementing these architectures. Otherwise, the area used by
common soft MAC IP cores should be also taken into account. As an example,
the minimum utilized resources by the AXI Ethernet Subsystem IP core from
Xilinx [143] with GMII interface and without VLAN support are: 5,316 Slice
Registers, 3,808 Slice LUTs and 5 RAMB36, which even more increases the chance
to negatively affect system performance.
With the aim of overcoming the problem of limited area, a different FPGA de-
vice with more resources might be chosen. For example, instead of the Zynq
XC7Z020 device, another superior FPGA within Zynq-7000 family could be em-
ployed, which contains the programmable logic equivalent to that of the Kintex-7
family [144].
Also, IP vendors usually offer compact versions of the cores with less memory
space or even without some optional features that can be omitted depending on
the application. In the case of the Algotronix MACsec IP core, for instance, the
resource utilization can be minimized by reducing the number of implemented
secure channels and virtual SecYs 4.
In Chapter 7, the resource utilization is further analysed for the implemented
architectures that were used in the validation experiments.
4Implementation results of the Algotronix MACsec IP core shown in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 were
obtained for 32 secure channels and 16 SecYs.
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Tabla 5.3: Area cost of an IEEE 1588 OC with MACsec support in Zynq XC7Z020
Resources IEEE1588 IP MACsec IP Total Utilization
Slice Registers 1,333 14,618 15,951 14.99%
Slice LUTs 979 13,980 14959 28.12%
RAMB36 0 0 0 0%
RAMB18 0 32.5 32.5 11.61%
DSP48E1 blocks 0 0 0 0%
Tabla 5.4: Area cost of an IEEE 1588 HC with MACsec support in Zynq XC7Z020
Resources IEEE1588 IP Eth. Switch IP MACsec IP Total Utilization
Slice Registers 1,333 8,321 14,618 (x3) 53,508 50.29%
Slice LUTs 979 6,897 13,980 (x3) 49,816 93.64%
RAMB36 0 31 0 (x3) 31 22.14%
RAMB18 0 8 32.5 (x3) 105.5 37.68%
DSP48E1 blocks 0 4 0 (x3) 4 1,82%
Tabla 5.5: Area cost of an IEEE 1588 HSR node with MACsec support in Zynq
XC7Z020
Resources IEEE1588 IP HSR Switch IP MACsec IP Total Utilization
Slice Registers 1,333 17,115 14,618 (x2) 47,684 44.82%
Slice LUTs 979 18,356 13,980 (x2) 47,295 88.90%
RAMB36 0 32 0 (x2) 32 22.86%
RAMB18 0 30 32.5 (x2) 95 33.93%
DSP48E1 blocks 0 16 0 (x2) 16 7.27%
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5.5 Conclusions
An hybrid security solution consisting of a new PTP security field and an external
security mechanism like MACsec, in combination with redundancy and monitor-
ing techniques, seems to be the future in protecting distributed synchronized
systems. Concretely, the contribution of this thesis is focused on the utilization
of MACsec for providing hop-by-hop group authentication of PTP messages.
In this sense, the main contributions of the thesis are presented in this Chapter.
On the one hand, a new key management scheme for distributing MACsec keys
in substation networks is proposed. On the other hand, a secure PTP SoC archi-
tecture integrating MACsec hardware units is presented for the first time. The
mentioned key scheme, named TimeWardenKey, relies on EAPOL-Key frames
to distribute group CAKs and, consequently, modifications on current available
IEEE 802.1X stacks are required. On the contrary, the integration of MACsec
IP cores in PTP SoC architectures is expected to be an immediate step towards
a full protected PTP system.
After analysing throughput and latency analysis of the TimeWardenSoC archi-
tecture proposed in this Chapter, the latency introduced by the MACsec IP core
in the order of one microsecond is expected not to have a great influence on overall
latency if compared with latencies introduced by the Ethernet subsystem. Next
Chapters describe the experiments performed to deeply analyse implementations
of the proposed SoC architectures and to validate PTP protocol performance
when using them.
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Chapter 6
PTP SoC architecture
validation
6.1 Introduction
As stated in Chapter 4, with the increasing combination of industrial protocols in
SASs, FPGAs and reconfigurable devices in general are acquiring more and more
importance because of their flexibility to integrate new specific hardware and soft-
ware into sophisticated embedded designs. In this sense, the technology offered
by reconfigurable logic is moving forward to the next level: cost-affordable SoC
devices, where all processing units and peripherals together with reconfigurable
logic are integrated into a single chip.
Zynq device by Xilinx is a good example, as it allows developing powerful ap-
plication specific embedded systems. Therefore, it was selected as the platform
to validate PTP protocol performance using different SoC architectures. Firstly,
some basic experiments were performed in the laboratory as depicted in Section
6.2. After that, the results of testing the most efficient designs on an interoper-
ability plugfest are detailed in Section 6.3. Finally, Section 6.4 explains some tests
made over real industrial networks in a manufacturing plant. The conclusions of
this Chapter are discussed in Section 6.5.
126 PTP SoC architecture validation
6.2 Laboratory experimental setup
This Section outlines the first experiments performed in the laboratory based
on the Zedboard developement board containing the Xilinx Zynq SoC device.
Three different topologies over two setup configurations were tested employing
laboratory equipment. In Section 6.2.1, the used material and the test setup
configuration, as well as the three compared topologies, are described. The ex-
perimental results for each topology-setup are detailed in Section 6.2.2.
6.2.1 Setup description
Xilinx Zynq-7000 family of All Programmable SoC (AP SoC) devices combines a
Processing System (PS) section containing an ARM dual core Cortex-A9 proces-
sor in conjunction with on-chip memory and a wide range of powerful peripherals
(Gigabit Ethernet controllers, memory controllers, CAN bus, etc.) and a Pro-
grammable Logic (PL) section with last-generation 28nm reconfigurable logic
[142]. The general block diagram of a Zynq-7000 AP SoC device is represented
in Figure 6.1. Every device belonging to the Zynq-7000 family contains the same
PS section, but the PL and the IO resources vary between devices to adapt to
different application requirements.
Bearing in mind the general PTP SoC architecture introduced in Section 4.2
and using some of the presented software and hardware modules to provide PTP
support, several SoC topologies were designed for the Zynq SoC device. The aim
was to explore the benefits of using such a new reconfigurable logic technology
and measure the achieved performance in terms of synchronization accuracy. All
the studied topologies have some parts in common. They all include hardware
PTP support to achieve accuracies below the microsecond. Also, an open source
PTP stack is compiled to be executed by a Linux based OS running on the
ARM. Additionally, some kernel drivers to exchange information from hardware
registers to user space applications and viceversa are required.
In the experiments, the Zedboard development board from Avnet and Digilent
was used [145]. This low-cost board contains a Zynq XC7Z020-CL484 FPGA and
all the necessary memory units and peripherals to create a complete Linux system.
It also provides a number of connectors to extend the implementation possibilities.
The block diagram of the Zedboard development board is copied from [145] in
Figure 6.2. In order to extend the number of Ethernet ports provided by the
ZedBoard in multiport topologies, a TB-FMCL-GLAN board from Inrevium [146]
is attached to it through the FPGA Mezzanine Card (FMC) connector.
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Figure 6.2: Zedboard development board block diagram
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Figure 6.3: Diagrams of the laboratory experimental setups
The schemas of the two used setups are shown in Figure 6.3. The first setup,
named Test Setup A, consists of two ZedBoard Zynq-7000 All Programmable SoC
connected through an Ethernet link: one of the boards acts as a PTP master and
the other one as a slave. In contrast, in the second setup, Test Setup B, a
professional PTP master was used: the Meinberg LANTIME M600/MRS/PTP
reference time source. In the setups, also a MSO7104A oscilloscope from Agilent
Technologies and a laptop were used to see PPS signals generated by devices and
messages on the serial console respectively. The pictures of both built setups can
be seen in Figure 6.4.
The Linux OS booting files are stored in a SD card, which is connected through a
9-pin standard SD connector placed in the Zedboard. As it can be seen in Figure
6.5, the SD card was partiotioned into two partitions. The first partition con-
tained the booting files, while the second one had stored the root filesystem. The
embedded kernel compilation was executed on a Linux virtual machine created
with VirtualBox, where Xilinx Vivado tools where also installed. The Xilinx Soft-
ware Development Kit (SDK) contains the cross-compilation toolchains needed to
build Linux-based software that runs in Xilinx processors. Particularly, the Xil-
inx tools provide the arm-xilinx-linux-gnueabi for the Zynq device, and so must
be set in the CROSS COMPILE environment variable in order to be invoked
when building software for being run on it, such as the kernel drivers.
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Figure 6.4: Pictures of the laboratory experimental setups
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Figure 6.5: Block diagram of the SD card as the Linux boot medium
The implemented architectures for each topology are explained below.
Case 1: Zynq PS GMAC IEEE 1588-aware only
The block diagram of the first topology tested in the experiments is represented
in Figure 6.6. This topology is the simplest one, without no specific logic in the
PL section to support IEEE 1588 protocol. The integrated Gigabit Media Access
Controller (GMAC) of the Zynq device already includes IEEE 1588 timestamping
and timing capabilities, as shown in Figure 6.7 taken from [142]. There is a TSU
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Figure 6.6: Case 1 topology block diagram
block within the controller that captures the time at which PTP event messages
reach and leave the controller. Moreover, a timer to make timestamps and several
registers to store PTP message information are contained in the TSU.
However, the IEEE 1588 support of the Zynq GMAC is limited by software
addressing of TSU timer and registers, because they are only accessible from the
PS portion. For example, since the controller cannot generate an interrupt upon
the counter reaching a determined value, the timer in the TSU cannot be used to
directly schedule user-events in hardware. As a consequence, if these hardware
events are managed by software, the accuracy will be seriously deteriorated due
to time variances in counter read access and software workload. Similarly, precise
PPS signals commonly used for monitoring PTP synchronization accuracy cannot
be generated.
The hardware-software architecture implemented for this topology is depicted
in Figure 6.8. In order to demonstrate the limitations presented by this topol-
ogy, a simple hardware design consisting of the processing unit and several In-
put/Output (IO) peripherals, such a s the GMAC and the UART, was imple-
mented using Xilinx Vivado 2013.4 design tool. No bitstream1 is downloaded
to the Zynq device. Only if additional custom logic were instantiated, the PL
section should also have to be programmed through a compiled bitstream.
1The bitstream is called to the file that is downloaded to the FPGA in order to configure
connections between logic components in the PL section.
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Figure 16-2 shows Zynq system viewpoint for the Gigabit Ethernet controllers.
X-Ref Target - Figure 16-2
Figure 16-2: System Viewpoint
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Figure 6.7: Zynq PS IEEE 1588-aware GMAC block diagram
Regarding the software, the ARM processor in the Zynq device holds the Linaro
Ubuntu ARM Linux distribution based on kernel version 3.13.0, which runs the
Linux PTP Project stack [147] described in Section 4.2.4.2. In order to boot the
Linux OS in the ARM, the SD card was partitioned with two partitions [148],
as it has been previously represented in Figure 6.5. The first partition contained
the bootloader, the devicetree and the kernel image. The second partition had
stored the root filesystem.
The bootloader is the BOOT.BIN file which was built with Xilinx SDK from
the First Stage Boot Loader (FSBL) and the Universal Boot Loader (u-boot.elf)
specific for the Zynq platform. In this case, as mentioned above, no bitstream
is included in this step, since no logic had to be programmed. The devicetree
was also built with Xilinx SDK and contains essential information about register
addresses and interrupts of each peripheral connected to the system bus. The
uImage file is the kernel image resulted from compiling the kernel sources in the
Linux virtual machine. Some configuration options must be enabled in the kernel
‘.config’ file before compiling the sources such as the hardware timestamping for
the Xilinx PS GMAC and the PTP clock support [147, 149].
After compiling the Linux PTP project stack on each Zedboard, one is configured
to act as the master and the other one as the slave executing the ‘ptp4l’ command
with the corresponding parameters as command line arguments. In the slave, the
Zynq PS GMAC PTP timer appears in the kernel tree as ‘/dev/ptp0’, which is
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Figure 6.8: Hardware-software architecture for Case 1 topology
also synchronized to the master reference time using the ’ptp4l’ application. At
the same time, in both master and slave, the system clock is synchronized to
‘/dev/ptp0’ using the ‘phc2sys’ application, which takes advantage of the PTP
Class Driver within the Linux PHC infrastructure [150].
Since the Zedboard has no battery-backed RTC in hardware, by configuring
the kernel to support the ‘Test driver/device’ option within the ‘RTC Class’
driver [151, 152], two software RTCs appear in the kernel tree as ‘/dev/rtc0’ and
‘/dev/rtc1’. These software clocks get the time from the system clock, so a poor
PPS signal can be generated via software by reading them using the ’ioctl’ inter-
face. Concretely, in this case it was generated from a user space application using
the Linux ‘RTC Class’ drivers and the ‘ioctl’ interface to detect changes on the
‘/dev/rtc0’ timer value using polling techniques. As a result, the state of some PS
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Figure 6.9: Case 2 topology block diagram
General Purpose Input Output (GPIO) ports, which were previously configured
as outputs, was changed every second through the ‘sysfs’ Linux interface to be
employed as PPS outputs [153, 154].
Case 2: Zynq PS GMAC IEEE 1588-aware combined with a IEEE
1588 IP on PL
With the aim of overcoming the limitations prompted by the utilization of the
Zynq GMAC IEEE 1588 support, it is necessary to implement additional logic
on the PL section. Figure 6.9 shows the block diagram of a design architecture
that combines PS IEEE 1588-aware GMAC with an IEEE 1588 IP Core. Alike
previous architecture, an IEEE 1588 IP core was instantiated in the reconfigurable
portion of the Zynq device. Concretely, the Precise Time Basic Zynq Edition from
SoC-e [155] was used in this case, which has been described in Section 4.2.5.
This IP takes benefit from the IEEE 1588 logic implemented on the PS GMAC
and adds support for synchronized signal generation by hardware. Timestamps
are still taken by the GMAC and passed through dedicated signals to the PL
section. The IEEE 1588 IP core is responsible for interfacing with the PTP stack
running on the ARM through the AXI bus, in order to send to it the timing
information of PTP frames. In addition, it also maintains its PTP hardware
clock synchronized and generates a precise PPS output that is routed to a PL
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GPIO port. Hence, in order to implement this architecture, the PL section of
the FPGA also had to be programmed.
Again, the SD card was partitioned with two partitions following the block di-
agram of Figure 6.5, but the bitstream was also included in the boot image
creating process. The Xilinx ISE Design Suite 14.4 was the set of implemen-
tation tools used to build the Zedboard booting files. The hardware platform
and the bitstream file was created using the Xilinx Embedded Development Kit
(EDK) tool.
The general hardware-software architecture of this topology is represented in
Figure 6.10. The same Linux kernel that in the previous Subsection was booted
in the Zynq. However, in this case, instead of the Linux PTP Project stack, a
modified ‘PTPd’ open source protocol stack was utilized. Moreover, in addition
to the kernel and the PTP Stack, new software modules, named ‘1588 Drivers’,
have been included. These drivers consist of kernel code responsible for accessing
the hardware within the IEEE 1588 IP core. Hence, the RTC and the TSU com-
ponents of the IEEE 1588 IP core, called 1588Timer and 1588Capture in Figure
6.10, need drivers to allow user space applications to access to hardware registers
that contain the configuration parameters and other revealing information. The
sources of both drivers and ‘PTPd’ stack were provided by SoC-e in conjunction
with the IP core.
The ‘1588 Drivers’ for the IEEE 1588 IP core were cross-compiled in a Linux
host using the cross-compilation tool provided by Xilinx SDK 201.4 and the em-
bedded kernel sources. The resulting modules were loaded through the ‘insmod’
command before executing the PTP stack. ‘PTPd’ stack was directly compiled
in the target and executed from command line passing through the corresponding
configuration file name as an argument. This configuration file sets different PTP
configuration options like master or slave, PTP transport type and propagation
delay measurement mechanism among others.
Case 3: Zynq PS GMAC IEEE 1588-aware combined with a IEEE
1588 IP and Ethernet switch IP on PL
Typically, IEDs in SASs need two or more Ethernet ports and, consequently,
hardware switching among all or many of its ports is sometimes desirable. This
switching functionality can be implemented using Ethernet switch IPs that can
be placed on the PL section of the platform. Figure 6.11 represents a Zynq-
based architecture using an Ethernet Switch IP with three ports. Two of these
ports are external to the reconfigurable device and the remaining one is internally
connected to PS GMAC. Only the traffic addressed to the device MAC address
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Figure 6.10: Hardware-software architecture for Case 2 topology
is derived to the switch port attached to the PS GMAC.
The Ethernet Switch IP used in the experiments was the Unmanaged Ethernet
Switch (UES) IP core from SoC-e described in Section 4.2.5, which supports IEEE
1588 TC functionalities. This IEEE 1588 support allows to perform the peer
delay mechanism, as explained in Section 3.2.3.4, and update the correctionField
taking into account asymmetric latencies introduced by hardware switching due
to frame processing or waiting queues.
The hardware-software architecture for this topology, shown in Figure 6.12, is
nearly the same as in Case 2 topology, with the exception that also the UES IP
core is added in the reconfigurable portion. Therefore, the UES IP was appended
in the PL section in the EDK project and the GPIO pins routed to the FMC
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connector in the Zedboard are used as MII signals to be used by the TB-FMCL-
GLAN board from Inrevium. With the aim of demonstrating the negative effect
of asymmetric latencies in hardware switching, two different bitstreams were
generated: firstly, the UES IP was configured not to implement the TC function-
ality; secondly, IEEE 1588 support was included. Consequently, since two new
bitstreams were created, two new boot images had to be built with the Xilinx
SDK tool to test the multiport proposed architecture.
If Figures 6.12 and 6.10 are compared, it can be seen that no software design
changes are needed with respect to single port architecture described above. This
happens because, as its name says, the Unmanaged Ethernet Switch IP is not
managed by any software module.
6.2.2 Experimental results
This Section depicts the experimental results obtained for each topology pre-
sented in Section 6.2.1. Figures 6.13 to 6.16 show the screen captures from the
oscilloscope when testing each topology with Test Setup A and B. In the graphics,
the horizontal axis represents the time and the vertical axis represents voltages.
The vertical scales are indicated at the upper-left corner of the screenshots, while
the horizontal scale is specified near the upper-right corner next to the trigger
term. The statistics for the mean and standard deviation values of the phase
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Figure 6.12: Hardware-software architecture for Case 3 topology
shift measurement between PPS signals from master and slave are included in
the bottom part of the screen.
With the Case 1 topology, the results of synchronizing two ZedBoards (Test
Setup A), and a ZedBoard to a Meinberg Time Reference Source (Test Setup B),
are respectively shown in Figures 6.13(a) and 6.13(b). Despite using hardware
timestamping, due to long and varying latencies introduced by software when
synchronizing system clock and changing the PS GPIO state of the PPS output,
both setups produced poor results regarding time offset of PPS signals. The slave
offset from master is in the range of milliseconds with large standard deviations of
hundreds of microseconds, although digital offsets showed by ‘ptp4l’ application
on the serial console had values close to zero nanoseconds.
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(a) Case 1, Test Setup A
(b) Case 1, Test Setup B
Figure 6.13: Time offset when using Case 1 topology
In contrast to results obtained in Case 1, Figures 6.14(a) and 6.14(b) demonstrate
that a high precision PPS signal can be generated from a timer implemented in
the PL section of the FPGA, when implementing Case 2 topology. On the one
hand, with Test Setup A, accuracies in the range of 40 nanoseconds are achieved.
In addition, the precision of the measurements is also highly improved because
the standard deviation decreases to less than 10 nanoseconds.
On the other hand, in Test Setup B, the achieved accuracy is a bit worse, around
100-200 nanoseconds. However, the standard deviation maintains lower than 10
nanoseconds. This offset might happen due to the inaccuracy introduced by the
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(a) Case 2, Test Setup A
(b) Case 2, Test Setup B
Figure 6.14: Time offset when using Case 2 topology
Meinberg equipment, because in its datasheet, a PPS output signal accuracy up
to 250 nanoseconds is specified depending on the oscillator [156]. Nevertheless,
this time offset could be reduced doing calibration processes in the slave. This
calibration process consist on adjusting the inbound and outbound asymmetry
parameters through software configuration until the time offset is closed to zero.
As it can be observed in Figure 6.15(a), if Case 3 topology without TC capabilities
is implemented, the time offset keeps near to zero in the Test Setup A because no
asymmetries are introduced. However, the standard deviation gets a bit worse due
to the imprecision of hardware timestamping. This negative effect is the result of
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(a) Case 3 without TC, Test Setup A
(b) Case 3 without TC, Test Setup B
Figure 6.15: Time offset when using Case 3 topology without IEEE 1588 support
the timestamping quantization error imposed by hardware clock frequency when
capturing ingress and egress PTP messages and also when the slave generates
the PPS signal by hardware.
The effect of asymmetric latencies in hardware switching is demonstrated in Test
Setup B. Since GMAC in the Zynq device works in Gigabit Ethernet and the
Meinberg output is Fast Ethernet, the Ethernet Switch IP must do the speed
conversion from Fast to Gigabit and viceversa. In this way, due to the Switch
IP is store-and-forward, the whole frame has to be stored before starting the
retransmission and this processing time differs in some microseconds on each
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(a) Case 3 with TC, Test Setup A
(b) Case 3 with TC, Test Setup B
Figure 6.16: Time offset when using Case 3 topology with IEEE 1588 support
direction due to speed conversion. Therefore, significant asymmetries that cause
time offsets of few microseconds in the slave are introduced by the switch, as
observed with the oscilloscope in Figure 6.15(b).
Figure 6.16 show remarkable experimental results when introducing TC capabili-
ties in Case 3 topology. In Test Setup A, the time accuracy of the slave is again in
the range of few nanoseconds, with standard deviations around 10 nanoseconds.
With the Meinberg equipment as the master in Test Setup B, the P2P TC in the
UES IP eliminates time errors caused by asymmetries and the slave once more
achieves accuracies in the range of 40 nanoseconds.
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The measurements from the oscilloscope when comparing master and slave PPS
outputs are summarized in Table 6.1 for all Cases.
Tabla 6.1: Synchronization results comparison of all topologies-setups
Mean Offset Min. Offset Max. Offset Std. Dev.
Case 1
Test Setup A 1.8085 ms 0 s 1.95 ms 439.22 us
Test Setup B 4.3457 ms 4.25 ms 5 ms 228.03 us
Case 2
Test Setup A 1.1058 ns -14.5 ns 17 ns 7.6083 ns
Test Setup B -143.07 ns 154.5 ns -135 ns 5.4814 ns
Case 3
Test Setup A -5.75 ns -26.8 ns 27.2 ns 10.682 ns
Test Setup B 3.696 us 3.68 us 3.72 us 9.404 ns
Case 3’
Test Setup A 930.85 ps -18.0 ns 25.5 ns 10.979 ns
Test Setup B -10.678 ns -30.0 ns 13.0 ns 8.626 ns
6.3 UCA interoperability testing
Some of the previously presented topologies were tested in the interoperability
test that took place in Bilbao, in July 2014 [157]. This technical event was or-
ganized by UCA International Users Group, System-on-Chip engineering (SoC-
e) and the University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU), and consisted on
performing several interoperability tests over an HSR ring. Participants were
Siemens, RuggedComm, General Electric, Schneider Electric, ZIV, Ingeteam
Power Technology, NR Electric, OMICRON, Flexibilis and SoC-e. This Section
describes the test setups and the obtained results in the mentioned plugfest.
6.3.1 Setup description
SoC-e company decided to implement Case 2 and Case 3 topologies over Zedboard
and ZC702 boards respectively, as explained in Section 6.2.1, to participate in
two different tests and evaluate their performance in terms of synchronization
accuracy when being connected to the HSR ring. Two different setups were
configured: Test Setup A, as a Fast Ethernet HSR ring, and Test Setup B, as a
Gigabit Ethernet HSR ring.
The first PTP test, named Test Setup A, consisted of 5 IEDs and 4 RedBoxes
connected through the HSR ring, and the grandmaster connected to the ring
through a TC, as represented in Figure 6.17(a). The ring employed both fiber and
copper wiring and PPS signals from all slaves were checked with the oscilloscope.
Concretely, SoC-e company employed the Case 3 topology to implement an IED
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Figure 6.17: Diagrams of the HSR and IEEE 1588 network configurations tested
in the UCA technical interoperability test
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over a Xilinx ZC702 [158], but replacing the UES IP core shown in Figure 6.12
by an HSR switch with TC functionality.
In the Test Setup B, IEEE 1588-aware nodes were connected through a full copper
HSR ring at Gigabit Ethernet, as represented in Figure 6.17(b). Apart from the
SoC-e IED, an additional IEEE 1588 slave was connected through the RedBox.
This slave was implemented over a Zedboard using Case 2 topology and the
hardware-software architecture in Figure 6.10.
Figure 6.18 shows two pictures taken on the Interoperability Test.
6.3.2 Experimental results
After doing some HSR operation initial tests, the network was configured as
Test Setup A in order to check that all slaves embedded in IEDs from different
vendors were synchronized below one microsecond. Thus, time offsets between
PPS signals from all slaves and the master were observed with the oscilloscope
provided to each company. The PPS signal from the SoC-e IED can be seen in
Figure 6.19(a)2. Through the persistence mode of operation in the oscilloscope,
it can be conclude that the precision of the measurements was ±25 nanoseconds.
Although the signal in the Figure is centred, it was moved horizontally to the
left 596 nanoseconds, because a constant time offset of approx 450 nanoseconds
was observed in all the nodes. This time offset was generated by asymmetries
introduced by the non IEEE 1588-aware copper-fiber media converter. Additional
traffic was also injected into the ring and all nodes showed good performance with
up to 80% throughput with 64 and 1518 bytes length frames.
In the second case, where the ring configured as Test Setup B, all nodes were syn-
chronized to the master below 500 nanoseconds. Both SoC-e slaves participating
in the test with Case 2 and Case 3 topologies presented excellent synchronization
results as shown in Figure 6.19(b). In this Figure, two PPS signals from the
two slave clocks without horizontal shift can be seen. It can be conclude that
the time offset from master has been reduced to 100 nanoseconds approximately,
while the accuracy remained as expected.
2The PPS signal from master acted as the input trigger signal for the oscilloscope, so the
horizontal position denotes the time offset from master.
146 PTP SoC architecture validation
6.4 Validation on a real manufacturing plant
With the evolution of traditional industrial automation systems to Cyber-
Physical Production Systems (CPPS), distributed computed philosophy has also
been adopted in advanced manufacturing plants. Therefore, sensors, actuators
and controllers are integrated in the communication system and must be precisely
synchronized, as well as in the substation automation scenario. Consequently, the
layout of the an industrial plant in Ermua (Biscay, Spain) of a real manufacturing
company called Microdeco was selected as the initial application scenario for the
evaluation of the proposed Zynq-based SoC architecture.
6.4.1 Setup description
The network configuration for this setup consisted of nine lathe machines in-
terconnected through fiber cables and Zynq-based devices from SoC-e, named
CPPS Zynqbox [159], configured in a ring topology as represented in Figure 6.20.
On each machine within the industrial plant, a CPPS Zynqbos was installed as
shown by the picture illustrated in Figure 6.21.
The architecture inside CPPS Zynqbox nodes was the Case 3 topology presented
in Section 6.2.1, with the addition of HSR support in the switch as described in
Section 6.3.1. One node was configured as a PTP master, while the rest where
configured as slaves.
6.4.2 Experimental results
In Figures 6.22 and 6.23, the time offset of 4 slaves is plotted based on the
measurements collected over one hour of PTP synchronization (at 4 samples per
second aprox.). As it can be seen in Figure 6.22(a), there was an unstable initial
phase with huge offsets but, in less than 40 seconds, all slaves where synchro-
nized below one microsecond, as plotted in Figure 6.22(b). In the stable phase,
represented in Figure 6.23, time offsets oscillated between ±50 nanoseconds.
The probability density function of the time offset is represented in Figure 6.24.
It can be seen that most of the measured values were concentrated between ±20
nanoseconds, and the probability density function of each slave could be modelled
as a Gaussian distribution defined by parameters listed in Table 6.2, which were
computed over 12,750 samples.
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Tabla 6.2: Time offset statistical parameters
Mean Offset (ns) Std. Deviation (ns)
Slave 1 0.31 15.70
Slave 2 0.27 17.20
Slave 3 0.10 8.29
Slave 4 1.10 10.30
6.5 Conclusions
While the digital offset showed by user application was close to zero nanoseconds
when using the IEEE 1588-aware GMAC alone in Case 1 topology, the offset
between PPS signals was higher than 1 millisecond, with standard deviations in
the range of hundred of microseconds. This time offset is not acceptable for many
SAS applications such as the synchronization of MUs responsible for transmitting
SV frames in the process bus network. With the support of an IEEE 1588 IP
Core in the PL section, as demonstrated in Case 2 experiment, PPS signals can
be generated very precisely in hardware. Thus, PPS signal precision is hugely
improved achieving accuracies in the range of 40 nanoseconds, with standard
deviations lower than 10 nanoseconds.
Case 3 topology was implemented in order to demonstrate the need of IEEE
1588 capability of internal hardware switching, when the device provides two
or more Ethernet ports. If a non IEEE 1588-aware Switch IP was used, the
processing times on each direction were different due to speed conversion causing
undetectable asymmetries. Therefore, time synchronization errors were produced
in the slave that was running on the ARM. In order to achieve highly accurate
slave clocks, with accuracies in the range of nanoseconds, TC functionality must
be implemented in the Switch IP that connects external Ethernet ports to the
GMAC.
Since the most precise way of measuring the time offset from master is to compare
the PPS signals, they must be as accurate as possible. In order to test that an IED
with an integrated PTP slave fulfils strong synchronization requirements of SASs,
a very precise PPS signal should be generated from a synchronized hardware clock
as considered in Cases 2 and 3. The only method to achieve such a precise PPS
output on new Xilinx Zynq devices is to add in the PL section an IEEE 1588 IP
core with a synchronized timer capable of generating the PPS signal directly on
hardware. Similarly, other user logic in the PL can use this hardware clock to
perform protection and control functions or the PPS output may allow the slave
to precisely synchronize MUs in the process bus with submicrosecond accuracy.
Case 2 and 3 topologies were also tested in the technical test that took place
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in Bilbao in July 2014, where synchronization accuracies were demonstrated to
be in the nanoseconds range, even under traffic congestion. Additionally, Case 3
topology was also tested in a real manufacturing plant. The protocol performance
was excellent when synchronizing several Zynq-based CPPS devices, as it has
been demonstrated by the outstanding results obtained.
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Figure 6.18: Pictures of the UCA technical interoperability test held in Bilbao
150 PTP SoC architecture validation
(a) Test setup A time offset
(b) Test setup B time offset
Figure 6.19: IEC 61850 and IEC 62439 technical interoperability test, Bilbao 2014.
SoC-e IED time offset from grandmaster using Case 4 topology
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Figure 6.21: Picture of a CPPS Zynqbox installed in the industrial plant
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(a) Initial phase synchronization
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(b) Zoom of initial phase synchronization
Figure 6.22: CPPS time offset oscillation in the initial phase
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Figure 6.23: CPPS time offset oscillation in the stable phase
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Figure 6.24: CPPS time offset probability density function
Chapter 7
Secure PTP SoC
architecture validation
7.1 Introduction
In Chapter 6, beginning experiments without MACsec support were presented in
order to obtain initial results that show the viability of PTP SoC architectures.
This Chapter is a forward step in the validation of the proposed TimeWardenSoC
architecture. For this purpose, a device running an IEEE 1588-2008 Ordinary
Clock implementation will be secured.
Firstly, Section 7.2 describes the implemented topologies and the experimental
setups. Secondly, implementation and synchronization results are compared for
the different implemented topologies. Finally, Section 7.3 summarizes the con-
clusions.
7.2 Proof-of-concept design
Experiments described in this Section were conducted in the laboratory for two
different topologies over the same setup configuration. These topologies and test
setups are explained below.
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7.2.1 Experimental setup description
With the aim of evaluating the effect of MACsec security mechanisms on PTP
protocol performance, two similar SoC architectures represented in Figure 7.1
were designed for the Zynq device. Like in Section 6.2.1, the Avnet Zedboard
has been used as the experimental platform. Both designs will include hardware
PTP support to timestamp messages at physical layer and software PTP stack
running on the ARM processor, as explained in previous Chapter. Additionally,
one of the architectures will include a MACsec IP core to provide layer 2 security
mechanisms. The selected MACsec IP core in this case was the one from Al-
gotronix introduced in Section 4.3.4, which targets modern FPGA families from
Xilinx and assures throughputs up to 40 Gbit/s. This company was interested
in having a demonstration design based on the Zynq device and it agreed in de-
livering the VHDL code of the core in exchange for obtaining some experimental
results using the mentioned platform.
In contrast to the architecture represented in Figure 5.5, the MACsec IP core was
not placed between the MAC and the PHY. It was placed after the MAC in the
receiving direction, as depicted in Figure 7.1(b). This decision was taken to ease
the integration of the Algotronix IP core, because its interfaces and data flow
seemed to adapt better with the AXI system bus than with the GMII interface.
As a consequence, instead of using the GMAC located in the PS part of the Zynq
device, a soft MAC IP core and the corresponding DMA controller had to be
instantiated in the PL section, so as to forward incoming and outgoing packets
to and from processor through the AXI high-performance interface as detailed
in [160]. The hardware-software architectures of the implemented designs are
deeply described below.
The schema of the laboratory setup is displayed in Figure 7.2 and it consisted
of two ZedBoards connected through a triple speed Ethernet link. In the setup,
also the Tektronix DPO 7054C digital oscilloscope and a computer were used
to display PPS signals generated by the ZedBoards and the serial output. The
Linux OS booting files are stored in the SD card, which is partitioned once more
into two partitions as represented in Figure 6.5.
Two different test cases are distinguished in this Section: Case 1 corresponds to
topology in Figure 7.1(a), while Case 2 implements Figure 7.1(b) topology.
Case 1: Zynq IEEE 1588-aware PL Ethernet design
Case 1 topology was built as the IEEE 1588-aware reference design from which
the secure PTP SoC architecture would be validated. As mentioned above, the
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(a) Case 1 topology
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Figure 7.1: TimeWardenSoC architectures with (below) and without (bottom)
MACsec support
Algotronix MACsec IP core was designed to be integrated after the MAC; there-
fore, the GMAC Ethernet controller instantiated in the PS could not be used.
Accordingly, an Ethernet controller was instantiated as soft logic in the PL region
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Figure 7.2: Diagram of the laboratory experimental setup for TimeWardenSoC
validation
as specified in [160]. This hardware design was implemented using Vivado 2014.4
design tool, which mainly consisted of the AXI Ethernet, AXI DMA and AXI In-
terconnect. The IEEE 1588-2008 hardware support was included by instantiating
the PTB IP core from SoC-e [97] described in Section 4.2.5.
Figure 7.3 shows the hardware-software architecture for Case 1 topology. For data
movement purposes between the AXI Ethernet peripheral and the system mem-
ory, instead of using General Purpose AXI ports of the PS, the High-Performance
AXI ports were employed. They provide high-bandwidth and low latency trans-
fers to and from DDR3 memories [161]. In this sense, the AXI DMA IP core
was needed to provide direct memory access between the AXI4 memory-mapped
and AXI4-Stream interfaces through AXI4 Memory Mapped-to-Stream (MM2S)
and Stream-to-Memory-Mapped (S2MM) channels. AXI Ethernet subsystem
and AXI DMA were connected through an AXI4-Stream interface that provides
point-to-point high-speed streaming data, as recommended for applications with
high-bandwidth demand. In addition, the scatter/gather port of the AXI DMA
was used to read descriptors from system memory, as required in processor-based
systems [137] for oﬄoading DMA management work from the CPU.
Details on hardware implementation using Vivado design tool are included in
Appendix B. The resulted bitstream was used to create the new BOOT.BIN file
with the Xilinx SDK, which was copied into the booting files partition of the SD
card in conjunction with new generated devicetree.
Like in Chapter 6, the ARM software infrastructure to support IEEE 1588-2008
was composed by the same Linux distribution, the modified ‘PTPd’ software
stack and the IEEE 1588 drivers for the PTB core.
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Case 2: Zynq IEEE 1588-aware PL Ethernet design with MACsec
support
MACsec hardware support was added to previous topology by integrating the
Algotronix IP core between the AXI Ethernet and the AXI DMA. In order to
adapt Algotronix interfaces to AXI4-Stream interfaces, the implementation of
the so called MACsec ‘sandwich’ was needed, which consisted of some buffers
and specifically designed state machines. The resulting core was named AXI
Stream MACsec IP core and the corresponding hardware-software architecture
of this topology is represented in Figure 7.4.
Concretely, the MACsec ‘sandwich’ consisted of a set of hardware modules de-
signed in VHDL code as shown in Figure 7.5. With the aim of implementing
the functionalities described in Section 5.4.1, two different state machines were
designed on each submodule named TX Channel from System, TX Channel to
MAC, RX Channel from MAC and RX Channel to System. These state machines
control the writing and reading accesses to memory buffers and adapt data bus
width.
On the other hand, the implemented memory buffers follow a First In First Out
(FIFO) strategy to enqueue 64 bit data blocks, because the input data width
of the Algotronix IP core is 64 bits. Thus, in the receive channel, Finite State
Machine (FSM) RX number 1 in Figure 7.5 is responsible for managing AXI
stream slave interface and writing incoming Ethernet frames to the FIFO buffer,
while FSM RX number 2 reads the FIFO output and provides two 64-bit data
words to the Algotronix IP core every 10 or 14 clock cycles1. FSM RX number 3
and 4 re-adapt proprietary Algotronix interface to standard AXI stream interface.
At the transmitting side the processing path controlled by FSM TX number 1,
2, 3 and 4 is quite similar but in the opposite direction. Moreover, an AXI lite
processor interface was also designed for configuration purposes, which includes
a FSM to control the read and write accesses on Algotronix registers. Details on
the designed FSMs are described in Annex B.
Moreover, an AXI lite processor interface was also designed for configuration
purposes, as it is shown in Figure 7.5. This interface also includes a FSM to
control the read and write accesses on the registers of the Algotronix IP. The
Algotronix IP requires specific software support to manage these read and write
operations. This software support was provided by pseudo drivers, which are
parts of code compiled with ‘gcc’ as normal C files that provide simple hardware
access from user space [162]. They basically map regions of memory assigned
1The FIFO output read time access depends on the cryptographic algorithm configured in
the Algotronix IP core, which takes 10 or 14 clock cycles to process a 128-bit data block with
AES-GCM-128 or AES-GCM-256 respectively.
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Figure 7.4: Hardware-software architecture for TimeWardenSoC Case 2 topology
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Figure 7.5: Block diagram of the AXI Stream MACsec IP Core
to the hardware device into user space memory through the ‘/dev/mem’ Linux
device. They do not replace a kernel mode driver, but provide a simpler method
to allow designers accessing hardware registers infrequently.
Hence, the developed pseudo driver, named MACsec Config shown in Figure 7.4,
initialized the Algotronix MACsec IP and assigned different Ethernet destination
addresses to different SecYs. Firstly, it configured a SecY to be used as default
to prevent frames with unassigned destination address from being dropped. Sec-
ondly, it assigned PTP multicast and peer delay addresses to a different SecY. The
transmit and receive channels within this SecY were configured as represented
in Figure 7.6, where the corresponding SCIs and other MACsec parameters are
detailed. These configuration pseudo drivers also installed pre-shared SAKs. In
this case, a unique SAK was used to protect the transmission and reception of
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Tabla 7.1: Area cost of TimeWardenSoC Case 1 topology in Zynq XC7Z020
Resources PTB IP AXI Ethernet IP AXI DMA IP Others Total Utilization
Slice Registers 1,333 5,747 3,784 4,632 15,496 14.56%
Slice LUTs 1,412 4,592 4,465 4,680 15,149 28.48%
RAMB36 4 4 1 0 9 6.43%
RAMB18 2 0 1 0 3 1.07%
DSP48E1 blocks 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Tabla 7.2: Area cost of TimeWardenSoC Case 2 topology in Zynq XC7Z020
Resources PTB IP AXI Stream MACsec AXI Ethernet IP AXI DMA IP Others Total Utilization
Slice Registers 1,538 17,320 4,984 3,406 3,830 31,078 29.21%
Slice LUTs 1,361 17,960 4,159 2,998 3,918 30,396 57.14%
RAMB36 4 20 4 1 0 29 20.71%
RAMB18 2 1 0 1 0 4 0.71%
DSP48E1 blocks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
PTP frames.
Additionally, the pseudo driver also included some functionalities, in order to
model a cyber-security attack that compromises the PTP protocol performance.
A wrong SAK was maliciously installed in the master and, after a short period of
time, the correct SAK was reinstalled. This experiment is thoroughly explained
in Section 7.2.3.
7.2.2 Resource utilization
In this Section, the resource utilization of both implemented topologies, Case 1
and Case 2, is analysed so as to know the viability of the proposed solution. The
utilization report was generated using the Vivado 2014.4 design tool for the Zynq
XC7Z020 device. Implementation results are summarized in Tables 7.1 and 7.2
for Case 1 and Case 2 topologies respectively. Also, the device utilization was
graphically captured from Vivado and shown in Figure 7.7.
As expected, the integration of the MACsec IP core increases considerably the
area cost. Anyway, the obtained results ensures the viability of using the same
low-cost device, the Xilinx Zynq XCZ7020 for the secure and non-secure designs.
Consequently, a non-effective increment on the device cost would offer a very
interesting solution for industry.
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* RX Channel Conﬁg:
   - SCI: 000A350001230001
   - SC Index: 0
   - AN: 0
   - SAK: 97CFAA28 2FB33DAC
             AB82B1D0 4A4144FE
             270F36AA A64BE501
             4FC6B7BF 1C4E777A
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* TX Channel Conﬁg:
    - Destination Addresses:
          01:1B:19:00:00:00
          01:80:C2:00:00:0E
    - SecY Index: 1
    - SCI: 000A350001230001
    - Control parameters:
          Replay Protection: True
          Validate Frames: Check 
          Conﬁdentiality: False
          Protect Frames: True
          Use SCB: False
          Use ES: False
          CP Enabled: True
    - AN: 0
    - SAK: 97CFAA28 2FB33DAC
              AB82B1D0 4A4144FE
              270F36AA A64BE501
              4FC6B7BF 1C4E777A
* RX Channel Conﬁg:
    - SCI: 000A350001220001
    - SC Index: 0
    - AN: 0
    - SAK: 97CFAA28 2FB33DAC
              AB82B1D0 4A4144FE
              270F36AA A64BE501
              4FC6B7BF 1C4E777A
Figure 7.6: MACsec parameters configured from software
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(a) Case 1 topology (b) Case 2 topology
Figure 7.7: TimeWardenSoC FPGA utilization
7.2.3 Experimental results
This Section outlines the experimental results obtained for the non-secure and
secure PTP topologies presented in Section 7.2.1. Screen captures from the oscil-
loscope when executing both topologies are shown in Figures 7.8 and 7.9. In the
graphics, the horizontal axis represents the time and the vertical axis represents
voltages. The statistics for the mean and standard deviation values of the phase
shift measurement between PPS signals from master and slave ZedBoards are
included in the bottom part of the screen.
Concretely Figure 7.8 presents the clock accuracies obtained for ‘Case 1’ and
‘Case 2’ topologies when P2P mode of operation is used. On the other hand,
Figure 7.9 shows the equivalent results for the E2E mode of operation. Whereas
the vertical scale was set to 60 millivolts/division, the value of the horizontal
scale was 50 nanoseconds/division. The statistics shown at the bottom of the
screenshots were computed over 350 samples captured within a short period of
time of around five minutes. Time error mean and standard deviation values
should not be representative of protocol performance for such a short time interval
and, hence, synchronization accuracies obtained from slave’s serial output over
larger periods are presented below.
Three different experiments were performed in the laboratory over the test setup
shown in Figure 7.2. Firstly, the slave ZedBoard was synchronized to the master
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(a) Case 1, normal operation of PTP
(b) Case 2, PTP protected with MACsec
Figure 7.8: Oscilloscope captures when using P2P mode of operation during ‘Test
1’ and ‘Test 2’ experiments
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(a) Case 1, normal operation of PTP
(b) Case 2, PTP protected with MACsec
Figure 7.9: Oscilloscope captures when using E2E mode of operation during ‘Test
1’ and ‘Test 2’ experiments
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Tabla 7.3: Time offset statistical parameters during ‘Test 1’ and ‘Test 2’
experiments
Mean Offset (ns) Std. Deviation (ns)
Case 1 - Conventional PTP
P2P -0.82 18.54
E2E 0.25 19.84
Case 2 - PTP over MACsec
P2P -0.36 16.90
E2E -1.58 15.78
Zedboard during one hour approximately using the generated bitstream for the
Case 1 topology represented in Figure 7.3. This experiment is called ‘Test 1’ in
this Section. ‘Test 2’ was performed during one hour using the Case 2 topology
represented in Figure 7.4 that additionally allows the protection of PTP mes-
sages with a static pre-configured MACsec SAK. The installation of such a key
was done by means of the initialization and configuration pseudo drivers executed
from Linux console, as explained in Section 7.2.1. Finally, during ‘Test 3’ exper-
iment an incorrect SAK was installed in the master after some minutes and the
correct one was reinstalled later. This experiment was performed using the Case
2 topology to test the protocol behaviour under an unsuccessful re-authentication
process that might result in different SAKs installed in PTP nodes, for example.
Figure 7.10 shows the time offset of the slave during the execution of ‘Test 1’ and
‘Test 2’ experiments in the initialization and the stable synchronization phases.
The measurements were collected over one hour of PTP synchronization in both
P2P and E2E modes of operation with and without MACsec protection. In all
cases, the slave was synchronized below one microsecond in less than 30 seconds.
It is worth mentioning that the integration of MACsec in ‘Test 2’ experiments did
not have a negative impact on PTP performance, since synchronization accuracies
were similar to those obtained in ‘Test 1’. In fact, the standard deviation was
still between 15 and 20 nanoseconds for all cases, as summarized in Table 7.3,
which was a really good indicator of high precise synchronization. The probability
density function of time offset from master is represented in Figure 7.11.
The last experiment made in the laboratory, named ‘Test 3’, consisted of installing
an incorrect SAK in the master Zedboard after 400 seconds approximately, with
the aim of modelling how the system behaves against an unsuccessful reauthen-
tication process. The correct SAK is reinstalled 200 seconds later.
The time offset values over the time captured from the slave serial console are
represented in Figure 7.12. The shaded area in this Figure represents the time
interval while the slave lost the synchronization from master due to an incorrect
installed SAK. As mentioned above, time offset values represented in the Figure
were captured from the serial console and, since the ‘PTPd’ stack does not output
them until synchronization in the slave is recovered, no values were obtained
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(a) Initial synchronization phase
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(b) Stable synchronization phase
Figure 7.10: Time offset oscillation during ‘Test 1’ and ‘Test 2’ experiments
170 Secure PTP SoC architecture validation
Time offset (s)
2000
1500
1000
500
0
2e-0071.5e-0071e-0075e-0080
Test 1 P2P
Test 1 E2E
Test 2 P2P
Test 2 E2E
-5e-008-1e-007-1.5e-007
N
um
be
r o
f s
am
pl
es
Figure 7.11: Time offset probability density function during ‘Test 1’ and ‘Test 2’
experiments
during this interval.
In order to overcome this problem, ‘Test 3’ was repeated and time offset values
were directly stored on the hard disk drive of the Tektronix oscilloscope through
the ‘Action on Event’ functionality, which was configured to save the delay mea-
surement between two PPS signals on each trigger event.
Figure 7.13 depicts the results of the repeated experiment. In this graphic, the
time offset from master measured with the oscilloscope reaches values higher than
30 microseconds. Actually, in less than two minutes, there were captured synchro-
nization errors of more than one microsecond, which is the time synchronization
accuracy allowed for substation communications.
7.3 Conclusions
This Chapter aims to validate the secure PTP SoC architecture proposed in
Chapter 5. In order to analyse the effect of integrating MACsec hardware units
in common PTP SoC architectures, two different topologies were designed, im-
plemented and tested over the described experimental setup. The experimental
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Figure 7.12: Time offset values during ‘Test 3’ experiment
Time (s)
4e-005
3e-005
2e-005
1e-005
0
-1e-005
-2e-005
1000800600400200
Measurements from oscilloscope
Slave serial output results
0
O
ffs
et
 fr
om
 m
as
te
r (
s)
Figure 7.13: Time offset values during repeated ‘Test 3’ experiment
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setup utilized two ZedBoards based on Xilinx Zynq FPGA. Case 1 topology con-
sisted of an AXI Ethernet Subsystem IP plus an AXI DMA IP connected to the
ARM processor through an AXI interconnect core combined with the Precise
Time Basic IP core from SoC-e to provide IEEE 1588 support. In order to add
MACsec capabilities, a MACsec IP core from Algotronix was included between
the AXI Ethernet and the AXI DMA cores in the Case 2 topology, and specific
AXI Stream interfaces were designed to allow the integration of the Algotronix
IP.
Synchronization accuracies were measured with normal PTP and with PTP over
MACsec by performing two basic experiments called ‘Test 1’ and ‘Test 2’. Ex-
perimental results demonstrated the viability of using MACsec to protect PTP
messages, since the standard variation of the time offset from master remains
near 15 nanoseconds in all cases.
An additional experiment was performed using the Case 2 topology to study the
behaviour of the PTP protocol under an authentication error. In the stable phase
of the synchronization protocol, where the slave reaches synchronization accura-
cies below 50 nanoseconds, a false SAK was installed in the master. How fast the
slave could lose synchronization was modelled by acquiring delay measurements
between two PPS signals captured with the oscilloscope. In less than two minutes,
the slave time offset from master was higher than one microsecond. In fact, time
errors around 30 microseconds were observed after five minutes approximately.
Chapter 8
Conclusions and future work
8.1 Conclusions
In this work, the basis for securing communications in critical infrastructures like
SASs was provided. In particular, precise synchronization protocol to be used
in substations was demonstrated to be highly vulnerable. In this context, the
challenge of integrating a hop-by-hop security solution into common SoC archi-
tectures without compromising PTP performance became the highest priority.
In the state of the art, two clearly parts were studied. First part analyses general
aspects of cyber-security in substation communications, as well as PTP protocol
operation and emerged security proposals. The interest of the research commu-
nity regarding how to protect substation communications raised when the cyber-
security of several industrial plants was compromised by some viruses and worms
capable of taking control of the machines and turning them into failure. The
security mechanisms specified in current versions of the standards present some
inconsistencies. On the one hand, for IEC 61850 communications with stringent
performance requirements such as GOOSE and SV, the security is defined in the
IEC 62351-6, which mandates that RSA cryptography must be used to provide
source authenticity. However, despite expensive processors with crypto accelera-
tors were employed, execution times would exceed the maximum allowed transfer
times. On the other hand, the optional PTP security extension, introduced in
the standard in 2008, was based on old keyed hash algorithms that has also been
demonstrated to be suboptimal due to latency and required resources. Therefore,
it is highlighted the need for defining a new security framework which encom-
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passes an end-to-end source authentication mechanism and a hop-by-hop group
authentication and integrity protection scheme.
Since the work of P1588 Security SC has been mainly concentrated on end-to-end
security mechanisms integrated in PTP, the utilization of external security solu-
tions to provide hop-by-hop authentication and integrity services was detected as
an interesting research field. Particularly, MACsec was the security standard that
best fits in substation environments, since it protects communications at layer 2.
In addition, the nature of MACsec intrinsically fulfils most of PTP security re-
quirements because the corresponding security tag is verified and regenerated on
each hop in the forwarding path, as required by TC functionality of intermediate
nodes.
In the second part of the state of the art, a deep study about how to develop SoC
architectures integrating precise time synchronization and MACsec was provided.
Taking advantage of the experience of the research group with regard to FPGA-
based systems and SoC designs, the research work explained in this manuscript
was intentionally focused on the development of SoC architectures to provide
secure synchronization in SASs with accuracies in the nanoseconds range. As
a consequence, available hardware IP cores and open source software solutions
to implement MACsec-aware PTP nodes were explored. In this sense, SoC-
e and Flexibilis companies were discovered to be the main competitors in the
PTP IP cores market nowadays and two open source PTP software solutions
were identified. Regarding security, the utilization of MACsec-aware physical
transceivers from Microsemi or the complete MACsec IP core from Algotronix is
suggested, in addition to an open source software implementation of IEEE 802.1X
found in the literature.
Addressing the findings in the state of the art, the design and security require-
ments were collected as the basis for defining the hybrid proposal: the integration
of a security tag within PTP message, which provides source authentication us-
ing TESLA key chains, and the utilization of MACsec and IEEE 802.1X mecha-
nisms to provide hop-by-hop group authentication ranging an entire PTP domain
within a LAN. During the development of this thesis, efforts were focused on the
external utilization of MACsec as stated above and, as a consequence, two pro-
posals were presented as contributions. Firstly, a new authentication scheme to
derive MACsec group keys using EAP methods was proposed for layer 2 net-
works, which includes a new key hierarchy and the associated EAPOL message
exchange. Secondly, a MACsec-aware PTP SoC architecture was described for
a single port ordinary clock and a multi-port hybrid clock, as well as for a dou-
bled attached HSR node. After analysing the throughput and latency of these
architectures, the viability of adding MACsec support to conventional PTP SoC
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architectures was theoretically demonstrated. Information from datasheets of
some related IP cores was also used to estimate the area cost in modern System-
on-Programmable-Chips such as the Xilinx Zynq platform.
Initial experiments without MACsec support were performed in order to demon-
strate the viability of PTP SoC architectures using modern low-cost reconfig-
urable devices. Those experiments were executed on a variety of setups, ranging
from basic experiments in the laboratory with few nodes to real experiments in
an industrial plant over an HSR ring topology. As expected, synchronization
accuracies in the nanoseconds range were achieved demonstrating the potential
of hardware assisted P solutions. The validation part in this manuscript also
includes the design, implementation and validation of a more complex SoC ar-
chitecture which integrates MACsec support in conjunction with PTP hardware
assistance. The synchronization accuracies obtained in the laboratory experi-
ments when performing PTP over MACsec were nearly the same as when per-
forming normal PTP over Ethernet without cyber-security. As a consequence,
the utilization of low-cost reconfigurable devices to provide hop-by-hop authen-
ticity and integrity protection in substation networks, which present stringent
synchronization requirements and limited resources, is demonstrated to be an
appealing solution for future deployments.
8.2 Main contributions
In this Section the main contributions of this thesis are listed. A short description
of each point is given and a reference to the part of this manuscript, where the
corresponding topic is discussed in greater detail. The order of the list is deter-
mined by the order the different contributions were presented in this manuscript
and the importance of each point.
1. General issues concerning cyber-security in substations.
The evolution of traditional SCADA systems to modern digital communi-
cation networks in substations lead power utilities to great opportunities
but, the interconnection of station and process bus to external and public
networks for remote monitoring and controlling increases the risk of cyber-
attacks. In this thesis, a general introduction to standard protocols for
substation communications and cyber-security requirements is included in
Chapter 2, in which the challenging process of securing the recommended
precise synchronization protocol is highlighted. In this sense, the need for
deploying an hybrid solution that provides end-to-end source authentication
and hop-by-hop group authentication is introduced.
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As a result, a scientific article was published in the Renewable & Sustainable
Energy Reviews journal (JCR: 6.798).
2. Overview of cyber-security mechanisms for protecting PTP.
PTP networks, as defined in the second version of IEEE 1588 standard, rely
on intermediate nodes participation in order to compute the propagation
delay and compensate slaves time offset from master. PTP messages are
modified on each hop due to TC functionality and, consequently, security
checksums and authentication tags must be checked and regenerated each
time the message traverse a network node. Chapter 3 gives an overview on
PTP protocol operation, types of messages, devices and security features.
The work done by the members of the P1588 Security SC is also summa-
rized and related information was gathered into a congress paper that was
presented at the ISPCS conference held in 2015.
3. Secure PTP SoC architectures for programmable devices.
A complete state of the art about designing secure PTP SoC architec-
tures is presented in Chapter 4. Concretely, a very detailed evaluation of
open source software and most relevant commercial off-the-shelf IP cores for
hardware assisted PTP solutions was included in this manuscript. A pre-
liminary work regarding PTP SoC architectures for being implemented in
FPGAs was published in proceedings of the DCIS conference and presented
in a poster session in 2012. Additionally, it was also implemented a new
TC architecture based on a shared memory where ingress timestamps were
stored, which was accessed via wishbone bus, and results were presented at
the ISIE conference in 2013.
4. TimeWardenKey: a new key management scheme based on IEEE
802.1X authentication protocol for distributing MACsec group
keys.
Over the years working on secure PTP SoC architectures, the idea of shar-
ing a group CAK between PTP nodes within the same LAN to secure PTP
traffic gained more and more importance. It emerged from the problem
of deploying the traditional authentication scheme defined in IEEE 802.1X
standard, which states the utilization of pairwise CAKs derived from EAP
methods between a supplicant and the authenticator located in the peer
PAE entity. As a matter of fact, both supplicant and authenticator state
machines should be implemented in intermediate nodes. In order to simplify
authentication message exchange and minimize CPU load due to execution
of PAE state machines, the new conceptual authentication and key distribu-
tion scheme as described in Section 5.3 comprises a multi-host authenticator
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accessible after some hops from every PTP node acting as supplicant in the
LAN. The new authentication message exchange and the new key hierarchy
to allow the derivation and distribution of group CAKs from EAP methods
is also proposed.
The utilization of group CAKs in PTP over Ethernet networks was firstly
proposed within the conference paper presented at the ISPCS 2015. After
that, it gradually evolved to a more mature proposal which was introduced
to the P1588 Security SC in January 2016 for the first time.
5. TimeWardenSoC: a new PTP SoC architecture integrating MAC-
sec hop-by-hop security mechanisms.
With the aim of providing hop-by-hop authentication and integrity ser-
vices in PTP networks, MACsec units must be integrated in conventional
PTP SoC architectures. Besides hardware timestamping assistance, cryp-
tographic algorithms must also be implemented in hardware so as to avoid
throughput bottlenecks. Otherwise, if authentication tags were computed
by software, PTP protocol performance could drastically get worse. In Sec-
tion 5.4, the block diagrams of a single port PTP entity and a multiport
intermediate node are described. Also, the particular case of an HSR node
for substation environments is represented. The throughput and latency,
as well as area cost, of these hardware-software architectures is thoroughly
analysed to check the viability of implementing such a SoC architecture in
modern programmable devices.
Both the TimeWardenKey and the TimeWardenSoC theoretical concepts
were introduced as described in Chapter 5 in a journal article, which is
currently under review process by the IEEE Transactions on Industrial
Electronics (JCR: 6.383).
6. Experimental evaluation of PTP SoC architectures
Several experiments were executed to validate the single port and multiport
PTP SoC architectures without MACsec, as described in Chapter 6. Zynq
device from Xilinx was the selected platform to implement the hardware
support in the reconfigurable logic part and a Linux host system was built
in the processing system part in order to run the PTP software stack. Apart
from experiments in the laboratory, the architecture was also validated in
an interoperability test held in Bilbao in 2014 and in a real industrial plant
in Ermua in 2015. Synchronization accuracies in the range of nanoseconds
were achieved in all the described setups.
These outstanding results allowed the presentation of a poster at the IS-
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PCS 2014 first and, secondly, the publication of an article at the IEEE
Transactions on Smart Grids journal (JCR: 3.19).
7. Experimental evaluation of PTP over MACsec
Two new architectures were implemented to validate the operation of PTP
over MACsec using the TimeWardenSoC architecture by performing three
different tests. Chapter 7 outlines the test setup description and the exper-
imental results obtained during the three tests. Once more, Xilinx Zynq
device was the targeted platform to implement the hardware-software de-
sign. This design included some developed hardware modules needed for
interfacing the commercial off-the-shelf employed MACsec and IEEE 1588
IP cores with several Xilinx soft-cores that formed the Ethernet Subsystem.
In the experiments, the time offset from master measured with the oscillo-
scope demonstrated mean synchronization error near to zero, with standard
deviations below 20 nanoseconds even when PTP traffic was protected by
MACsec authentication and integrity mechanisms.
An article regarding the validation of the proposed SoC architecture was
submitted for review at the IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics
journal (JCR: 6.383), as commented above.
8.3 Scientific publications in the context of this
work
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8.4 Future work
This Section proposes some lines of research in order to give continuity to the
work presented in this thesis. These lines are the following:
• Development of the TimeWardenKey proposal.
Although one of the contributions of this thesis is precisely the new key
management scheme called TimeWardenKey, it was only theoretically pre-
sented. A development process consisting of the definition of new PAE com-
ponents and states machines according to the proposed EAPOL frames ad-
dressing and EAPOL message exchange to distribute MACsec group CAKs
as described in Chapter 5 should be carried out. Additionally, it could
be interesting to study the application of such a group key management
mechanism to establish and distribute keys to provide source authentica-
tion through the Security TLV, like initial TESLA keys, instead of using
external asymmetric cryptographic based authentication mechanisms. The
enhancements on the TimeWardenKey scheme could be proposed to the
P1588 Security SC to be considered in future versions of the standard.
• Validation of the TimeWardenKey proposal.
The experimental work presented in this manuscript was focused on the
validation of the proposed TimeWardenSoC using Xilinx Zynq device and
static pre-configured SAKs due to the expertise of the author on design-
ing FPGA-based SoC systems. Nevertheless, with the aim of achieving a
full authenticated PTP system for SASs, which would minimally impact
substation communications performance, also MACsec group keys should
be established and distributed through TimeWardenKey scheme proposed
in Chapter 5. For this purpose, future efforts could be focused on study-
ing and implementing the required modifications on current versions of
‘hostapd’ and ‘wpa supplicant’ open source applications to support Time-
WardenKey.
• Validation of the multiport version of TimeWardenSoC proposal.
Another important branch of future research would be expanding the imple-
mented TimeWardenSoC architecture for an ordinary clock to a multiport
architecture including Transparent Clock functionality. This is another vi-
tal step forward a full authenticated PTP system, since intermediate nodes
with Transparent Clock functionality are required in most deployed substa-
tion network topologies. Since the TC functionality of the switch IP core
is responsible for modifying the correctionField of PTP messages, MACsec
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ICV should be check on its ingress and egress ports and, accordingly, multi-
ple MACsec IP cores might be integrated at [G]MII interfaces instead of the
AXI stream interface employed in Chapter 7. Moreover, for implementa-
tions with more than two ports, the utilization of Zynq devices larger than
ZC7Z020 should be considered so as to overcome the problem of limited
area identified in Chapter 5.
• Utilization of more complex and real test scenarios.
After having implemented the TimeWardenSoC with multiport capability
and the TimeWardenKey as a set of modifications on available IEEE 802.1X
software, new experimental setups could be configured in the laboratory.
The definition of these new test setups would include intermediate nodes
comprising more complex network topologies and they would allow the ex-
ecution of more sophisticated experiments to validate the cyber-security
proposal. Finally, the adaptation of such test setups to real industrial sce-
narios like the validation experiments described in Chapter 6 in conjunction
with dynamic group MACsec keys management could represent a turning
point in the integration of cyber-security mechanisms in industrial commu-
nications.
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Appendix A
MACsec-based PTP
security proposal details
A.1 Security and design requirements of PTP
networks in SASs
R1: Source authentication. In the PTP power profile only multicast ad-
dressing is specified for PTP messages, so a multicast key management
scheme for distributing a group key is needed. However, source authen-
tication is not guaranteed if multicast PTP messages are protected using
traditional symmetric cryptography and group keys, because the destina-
tion node cannot verify that the received frame was sent by an authorized
node. For example, an attacker could highjack an intermediate node not
authorized to act as a master and start sending malicious Announce or Sync
messages to align slaves to a false reference time. In order to overcome this
problem, a new Security TLV containing an ICV computed by the sender
with a TESLA key chain must be defined.
R2: Group authentication. Second version of the IEEE 1588 standard intro-
duced the concept of TC and, consequently, most PTP messages need to
be modified by TC functionalities within intermediate nodes. By possess-
ing a group key, intermediate nodes demonstrate they were authenticated
against an authenticator and they belong to the group of nodes authorized
to modify PTP packets. In this sense the MKA protocol must be used to
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verify the possession of a group CAK and, after that, establish the session
SAKs.
R3: Hop-by-hop integrity. Besides group authentication, hop-by-hop in-
tegrity is also needed because all PTP messages, except from Announce
messages, must be verified and regenerated on each hop. MACsec encap-
sulation is employed, which appends an ICV at the end of the frame. This
ICV is computed using pairwise SAKs that are previously negotiated using
the MKA protocol.
R4: End-to-end integrity. The end-to-end integrity protection is provided
with the ICV contained in the Security TLV. This ICV must protect fields
of PTP messages that are not modified by intermediate nodes and it is com-
puted using symmetric cryptographic algorithms like the HMAC-SHA256
or the AES-GMAC-128.
R5: Replay protection. The replay check is another security mechanism to
protect against replay of old packets by an attacker, which generally consist
of an ascending packet counter integrated in every message and it is check
in the receiver. MACsec SecTAG contains a packet number field to provide
replay protection on each link. End-to-end replay protection is also pro-
vided with a sequence number in the Security TLV, for example, to avoid
injection of old packets with false correctionField by an internal attacker
that has previously highjacked an intermediate node.
R5: Unicast key management. A unicast key management scheme would
highly likely be required to provide authentication and authorization ser-
vices in early stages of authentication protocols. The utilization of external
protocols like TLS or IKE could resolve the problem of unicast key dis-
tribution, as it was defined at the unicast operation of NTS. Nodes are
normally authenticated against a key distribution centre using asymmetric
cryptography and, as a result, they obtain a unicast key. IEEE 802.1X-2010
standard also uses EAP methods based on asymmetric cryptography in the
first stage of the authentication procedure to stablish pairwise CAKs.
R6: Multicast key management. The multicast key management scheme
must consist of two clearly separated parts: PTP master and slaves must
share one TESLA key for computing the ICV in the Security TLV and the
group CAK key must be distributed to all PTP nodes for computing the
MACsec ICV. The former may be distributed inband from master to slaves
or using a unicast key previously negotiated with a key distribution centre.
The latter is distributed from a local key server to all PTP nodes using
a modified IEEE 802.1X scheme to transport group CAKs over EAPOL
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messages.
R7: Sub-microsecond accuracy. The power profile specifies that sub-
microsecond synchronization must be achieved within substation environ-
ments. The only manner to achieve synchronization accuracies in the range
of nanoseconds is utilizing hardware assisted IEEE 1588 solutions, in addi-
tion to TC functionality in intermediate nodes. The proposed SoC archi-
tecture integrate MACsec hardware units and IEEE 1588 IP cores.
R8: Avoid negative impact on time-critical SAS communications. The
hop-by-hop security solution must not negatively affect the performance
of time-critical communications in substations, like the transmission of
GOOSE and SV messages. These time-critical messages must be trans-
mitted without SecTAG-ICV fields and MACsec crypto units must forward
them through the uncontrolled port of the SecY. Also, cut-trough switching
in intermediate nodes must be implemented to reduce propagation delays
due to congestion conditions in the network.
R9: Avoid throughput bottlenecks. Special attention must be paid to the
implementation of cryptography when designing the SoC architecture, in
order to avoid throughput bottlenecks. Protecting PTP messages in soft-
ware could drastically decrease PTP protocol performance, due to CPU
resource utilization by cryptographic algorithms. Therefore, MACsec en-
cryption units must be implemented in hardware and specific crypto ac-
celerator cores1 should be utilized to compute the ICV contained in the
Security TLV, as well as to protect MKA frames used to negotiate MACsec
key material.
R10: Reduce the probability of external attackers. The utilization of an
external hop-by-hop security solution, like MACsec, reduces considerably
the risk of external attackers in PTP networks. Since an external attacker
does not know the cryptographic keys, it is only exposed to protected traffic
with no possibility of neither tampering PTP messages nor generate new
traffic it cannot and replayed messages are discarded on destination by the
replay protection mechanism. However, these replayed messages can af-
fect network performance and induce congestion conditions if intermediate
nodes are saturated with false authentication requests. Moreover, packet
delay attacks cannot be eliminated and interception and removal of pack-
ets is still possible, which could cause a reduction on the accuracy of the
protocol. Additional redundancy techniques should also be included for
1This crypto cores are hardware modules that implement efficiently the cryptographic algo-
rithms and they can usually be accessed through the Linux crypto API, for example.
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mitigating the risk of delay manipulation by MITM attackers, which is out
of the scope of this thesis.
R11: Reduce the probability of internal attackers. Internal attacker can
also be minimized but never eliminated. An attacker that highjacks an in-
termediate node could have access to cryptographic keys and, consequently,
intercept a PTP message at some point in the forwarding path inside the
node and modify maliciously the correctionField, causing the slave to be
aligned to a false reference time. If switching and TC functionalities are
completely implemented in hardware, an internal injector attacker could
only retransmit PTP messages received through the interlink port2, which
are discarded in the destination because of the end-to-end replay protection.
End nodes could also become internal attackers if they are highjacked. For
instance, a malicious software could intercept PTP messages before security
mechanisms being applied in transmission, or after verifying the security
checksums in reception. Secure and reliable programming techniques should
be employed when implementing the PTP stack, so as to reduce software
vulnerabilities.
2The interlink is commonly known as the communication port between the internal Ethernet
switch and the processor network interface.
Appendix B
PTP over MACsec
validation design details
B.1 Hardware implementation on Xilinx Zynq
device
The schematics of the ‘Case 1’ and ‘Case 2’ designs implemented with Vivado are
captured in Figures B.1 and B.2. Most interesting parts of these block diagrams
have been enlarged in Figures B.3, B.4 and B.5.
In both topologies, the AXI DMA scatter/gather, MM2S and S2MM ports were
connected to the AXI-HP interface through an AXI interconnect. When im-
plementing ‘Case 1’ topology, another two AXI interconnets were required to
connect AXI4-Lite ports from AXI DMA, AXI Ethernet and PTB IP cores to PS
AXI-GP master interfaces. Moreover, a Concat IP was used for concatenating all
PL interrupts and connect them to the PS General Interrupt Controller (GIC)
[163].
In ‘Case 2’ topology, an additional AXI interconnect IP is required in order to
connect the AXI4-Lite port of the AXI Stream MACsec IP for configuration
purposes.
188 PTP over MACsec validation design details
gm
ii_tx_clk
D
D
R
FIXED
_IO
a
xi_m
em
_intercon
AXI Interconnect
S00_AXI
M
00_AXI
S01_AXI
S02_AXI
ACLK
AR
ESETN[0:0]
S00_ACLK
S00_ARESETN[0:0]
M
00_ACLK
M
00_ARESETN[0:0]
S01_ACLK
S01_ARESETN[0:0]
S02_ACLK
S02_ARESETN[0:0]
a
xi_dm
a_0
AXI D
irect M
em
ory Access
S_AXI_LITE
M
_AXI_SG
M
_AXI_M
M
2S
M
_AXI_S2M
M
M
_AXIS_M
M
2S
S_AXIS_S2M
M
M
_AXIS_CNTRL
S_AXIS_STS
s_
a
xi_lite_aclk
m
_
a
xi_sg_aclk
m
_
a
xi_m
m
2s_aclk
m
_
a
xi_s2m
m
_aclk
a
xi_resetn
m
m
2s_prm
ry_reset_out_n
m
m
2s_cntrl_reset_out_n
s2m
m
_prm
ry_reset_out_n
s2m
m
_sts_reset_out_n
m
m
2s_introut
s2m
m
_introut
processing_system
7_0
ZYNQ7 Processing System
PTP_ETH
ER
N
ET_0
D
D
R
FIXED
_IO
USBIND_0
S_AXI_HP0_FIFO
_CTRL
M
_AXI_G
P0
M
_AXI_G
P1
S_AXI_HP0
TTC0_W
AVE0_O
UT
TTC0_W
AVE1_O
UT
TTC0_W
AVE2_O
UT
M
_AXI_G
P0_ACLK
M
_AXI_G
P1_ACLK
S_AXI_HP0_ACLK
IRQ_F2P[4:0]
FCLK_CLK0
FCLK_RESET0_N
processing_system
7_0_axi_periph
AXI Interconnect
S00_AXI
M
00_AXI
M
01_AXI
ACLK
AR
ESETN[0:0]
S00_ACLK
S00_ARESETN[0:0]
M
00_ACLK
M
00_ARESETN[0:0]
M
01_ACLK
M
01_ARESETN[0:0]
a
xi_interconnect_1
AXI Interconnect
S00_AXI
M
00_AXI
M
01_AXI
M
02_AXI
ACLK
AR
ESETN[0:0]
S00_ACLK
S00_ARESETN[0:0]
M
00_ACLK
M
00_ARESETN[0:0]
M
01_ACLK
M
01_ARESETN[0:0]
M
02_ACLK
M
02_ARESETN[0:0]
PreciseTim
eBasic
s_
a
xi_cap_tx
s_
a
xi_cap_rx
s_
a
xi_tim
er
s_
a
xi_aclk
s_
a
xi_aresetn[0:0]
capture_interrupt
capture_interrupt1
phy_rx_data[7:0]
pps_div_out
phy_rx_dv
phy_tx_en
phy_tx_data[7:0]
phy_rx_clk
phy_tx_clk
pps_out
phy_if_type
pps_div_sel[2:0]
rst_processing_system
7_0_100M
Processor System
 Reset
slow
est_sync_clk
e
xt_reset_in
a
u
x_
re
set_in
m
b_debug_sys_rst
dcm
_locked
m
b_reset
bus_struct_reset[0:0]
peripheral_reset[0:0]
interconnect_aresetn[0:0]
peripheral_aresetn[0:0]
xlconcat_0
Concat
In0[0:0]
In1[0:0]
In2[0:0]
In3[0:0]
In4[0:0]
dout[4:0]
proc_sys_reset_0
Processor System
 Reset
slow
est_sync_clk
e
xt_reset_in
a
u
x_
re
set_in
m
b_debug_sys_rst
dcm
_locked
m
b_reset
bus_struct_reset[0:0]
peripheral_reset[0:0]
interconnect_aresetn[0:0]
peripheral_aresetn[0:0]
pps_div_out
pps_out
a
xi_ethernet_0
AXI Ethernet Subsystem
s_
a
xi
s_
a
xis_txd
s_
a
xis_txc
m
_
a
xis_rxd
m
_
a
xis_rxs
m
dio
gm
ii
gm
ii_rx_dv
gm
ii_rx_er
gm
ii_rxd[7:0]
gm
ii_tx_en
gm
ii_tx_er
gm
ii_txd[7:0]
s_
a
xi_lite_resetn
s_
a
xi_lite_clk
m
a
c_irq
a
xis_clk
a
xi_txd_arstn
a
xi_txc_arstn
a
xi_rxd_arstn
a
xi_rxs_arstn
interrupt
gtx_clk
phy_rst_n
clk_en
gm
ii_tx_en
clk_w
iz_0
Clocking W
izard
clk_in1
clk_out1
clk_out2
clk_out3
clk_out4
clk_out5
gm
ii_txd[7:0]
gm
ii_gtx_clk
clk_100
phy_rst_n
m
dio
gm
ii_tx_er
gm
ii_rx_er
gm
ii_rx_dv
gm
ii_rxd[7:0]
gm
ii_rx_clk
phy_if_type
pps_div_sel[2:0]
F
ig
u
r
e
B
.1
:
V
iv
a
d
o
b
lo
c
k
d
ia
g
r
a
m
o
f
‘C
a
se
1
’
to
p
o
lo
g
y
im
p
le
m
e
n
te
d
d
e
sig
n
B.1 Hardware implementation on Xilinx Zynq device 189
gm
ii_
tx
_c
lk
a
xi
_s
tre
am
_m
ac
se
c_
0
a
xi
_s
tre
am
_m
ac
se
c_
v3
_0
s0
0_
ax
i
s_
a
xi
s_
fro
m
_s
ys
te
m
_t
xd
s_
a
xi
s_
fro
m
_s
ys
te
m
_t
xd
_t
st
rb
[3:
0]
s_
a
xi
s_
fro
m
_s
ys
te
m
_t
xc
s_
a
xi
s_
fro
m
_s
ys
te
m
_t
xc
_t
st
rb
[3:
0]
m
_
a
xi
s_
to
_m
ac
_t
xd
m
_
a
xi
s_
to
_m
ac
_t
xd
_t
st
rb
[3:
0]
m
_
a
xi
s_
to
_m
ac
_t
xc
m
_
a
xi
s_
to
_m
ac
_t
xc
_t
st
rb
[3:
0]
s_
a
xi
s_
fro
m
_m
ac
_r
xd
s_
a
xi
s_
fro
m
_m
ac
_r
xd
_t
st
rb
[3:
0]
s_
a
xi
s_
fro
m
_m
ac
_r
xs
s_
a
xi
s_
fro
m
_m
ac
_r
xs
_t
st
rb
[3:
0]
m
_
a
xi
s_
to
_s
ys
te
m
_r
xd
m
_
a
xi
s_
to
_s
ys
te
m
_r
xd
_t
st
rb
[3:
0]
m
_
a
xi
s_
to
_s
ys
te
m
_r
xs
m
_
a
xi
s_
to
_s
ys
te
m
_r
xs
_t
st
rb
[3:
0]
m
a
cs
e
c_
cl
oc
k
m
a
cs
e
c_
re
se
t
s0
0_
ax
i_
ac
lk
s0
0_
ax
i_
ar
es
et
n
s_
a
xi
s_
fro
m
_s
ys
te
m
_a
clk
s_
a
xi
s_
fro
m
_s
ys
te
m
_t
xd
_a
re
se
tn
s_
a
xi
s_
fro
m
_s
ys
te
m
_t
xc
_a
re
se
tn
s_
a
xi
s_
fro
m
_m
ac
_a
clk
s_
a
xi
s_
fro
m
_m
ac
_r
xd
_a
re
se
tn
s_
a
xi
s_
fro
m
_m
ac
_r
xs
_a
re
se
tn
m
_
a
xi
s_
to
_s
ys
te
m
_a
clk
m
_
a
xi
s_
to
_s
ys
te
m
_r
xd
_a
re
se
tn
m
_
a
xi
s_
to
_s
ys
te
m
_r
xs
_a
re
se
tn
m
_
a
xi
s_
to
_m
ac
_a
cl
k
m
_
a
xi
s_
to
_m
ac
_t
xd
_a
re
se
tn
m
_
a
xi
s_
to
_m
ac
_t
xc
_a
re
se
tn
a
xi
_e
th
er
ne
t_
0
AX
I E
th
er
ne
t S
ub
sy
st
em
s_
a
xi
s_
a
xi
s_
tx
d
s_
a
xi
s_
tx
d_
tk
ee
p[3
:0]
s_
a
xi
s_
tx
c
s_
a
xi
s_
tx
c_
tk
ee
p[3
:0]
m
_
a
xi
s_
rx
d
m
_
a
xi
s_
rx
d_
tk
ee
p[3
:0]
m
_
a
xi
s_
rx
s
m
_
a
xi
s_
rx
s_
tk
ee
p[3
:0]
m
di
o
gm
ii
gm
ii_
rx
_d
v
gm
ii_
rx
_e
r
gm
ii_
rx
d[7
:0]
gm
ii_
tx
_e
n
gm
ii_
tx
_e
r
gm
ii_
tx
d[7
:0]
s_
a
xi
_l
ite
_r
es
et
n
s_
a
xi
_l
ite
_c
lk
m
a
c_
irq
a
xi
s_
cl
k
a
xi
_t
xd
_a
rs
tn
a
xi
_t
xc
_a
rs
tn
a
xi
_r
xd
_a
rs
tn
a
xi
_r
xs
_a
rs
tn
in
te
rru
pt
gt
x_
clk
ph
y_
rs
t_
n
cl
k_
en
a
xi
_m
em
_i
nt
er
co
n
AX
I I
nt
er
co
nn
ec
t
S0
0_
AX
I
M
00
_A
XI
S0
1_
AX
I
S0
2_
AX
I
AC
LK
AR
ES
ET
N[
0:0
]
S0
0_
AC
LK
S0
0_
AR
ES
ET
N[
0:0
]
M
00
_A
CL
K
M
00
_A
RE
SE
TN
[0:
0]
S0
1_
AC
LK
S0
1_
AR
ES
ET
N[
0:0
]
S0
2_
AC
LK
S0
2_
AR
ES
ET
N[
0:0
]
a
xi
_d
m
a_
0
AX
I D
ire
ct
 M
em
or
y 
Ac
ce
ss
S_
AX
I_
LI
TE
M
_A
XI
_S
G
M
_A
XI
_M
M
2S
M
_A
XI
_S
2M
M
M
_A
XI
S_
M
M
2S
m
_
a
xi
s_
m
m
2s
_t
ke
ep
[3:
0]
S_
AX
IS
_S
2M
M
s_
a
xi
s_
s2
m
m
_t
ke
ep
[3:
0]
M
_A
XI
S_
CN
TR
L
m
_
a
xi
s_
m
m
2s
_c
nt
rl_
tk
ee
p[3
:0]
S_
AX
IS
_S
TS
s_
a
xi
s_
s2
m
m
_s
ts
_t
ke
ep
[3:
0]
s_
a
xi
_l
ite
_a
cl
k
m
_
a
xi
_s
g_
ac
lk
m
_
a
xi
_m
m
2s
_a
cl
k
m
_
a
xi
_s
2m
m
_a
cl
k
a
xi
_r
es
et
n
m
m
2s
_p
rm
ry
_r
es
et
_o
ut
_n
m
m
2s
_c
nt
rl_
re
se
t_
ou
t_
n
s2
m
m
_p
rm
ry
_r
es
et
_o
ut
_n
s2
m
m
_s
ts
_r
es
et
_o
ut
_n
m
m
2s
_i
nt
ro
ut
s2
m
m
_i
nt
ro
ut
gm
ii_
rx
_e
r
D
D
R
FI
XE
D
_I
O
xl
co
nc
at
_0
Co
nc
at
In
0[0
:0]
In
1[0
:0]
In
2[0
:0]
In
3[0
:0]
In
4[0
:0]
do
ut
[4:
0]
pr
oc
es
sin
g_
sy
st
em
7_
0
ZY
N
Q7
 P
ro
ce
ss
ing
 S
ys
te
m
PT
P_
ET
H
ER
N
ET
_0
D
D
R
FI
XE
D
_I
O
US
BI
ND
_0
S_
AX
I_
HP
0_
FI
FO
_C
TR
L
M
_A
XI
_G
P0
M
_A
XI
_G
P1
S_
AX
I_
HP
0
TT
C0
_W
AV
E0
_O
UT
TT
C0
_W
AV
E1
_O
UT
TT
C0
_W
AV
E2
_O
UT
M
_A
XI
_G
P0
_A
CL
K
M
_A
XI
_G
P1
_A
CL
K
S_
AX
I_
HP
0_
AC
LK
IR
Q_
F2
P[
4:0
]
FC
LK
_C
LK
0
FC
LK
_R
ES
ET
0_
N
pr
oc
es
sin
g_
sy
st
em
7_
0_
ax
i_
pe
rip
h
AX
I I
nt
er
co
nn
ec
t
S0
0_
AX
I
M
00
_A
XI
M
01
_A
XI
AC
LK
AR
ES
ET
N[
0:0
]
S0
0_
AC
LK
S0
0_
AR
ES
ET
N[
0:0
]
M
00
_A
CL
K
M
00
_A
R
ES
ET
N[
0:0
]
M
01
_A
CL
K
M
01
_A
R
ES
ET
N[
0:0
]
rs
t_
pr
oc
es
sin
g_
sy
st
em
7_
0_
10
0M
Pr
oc
es
so
r S
ys
te
m
 R
es
et
sl
ow
es
t_
sy
nc
_c
lk
e
xt
_r
es
et
_i
n
a
u
x_
re
se
t_
in
m
b_
de
bu
g_
sy
s_
rs
t
dc
m
_l
oc
ke
d
m
b_
re
se
t
bu
s_
st
ru
ct
_r
es
et
[0:
0]
pe
rip
he
ra
l_
re
se
t[0
:0]
in
te
rc
on
ne
ct
_a
re
se
tn
[0:
0]
pe
rip
he
ra
l_
ar
es
et
n[0
:0]
a
xi
_i
nt
er
co
nn
ec
t_
1
AX
I I
nt
er
co
nn
ec
t
S0
0_
AX
I
M
00
_A
XI
M
01
_A
XI
M
02
_A
XI
AC
LK
AR
ES
ET
N[
0:0
]
S0
0_
AC
LK
S0
0_
AR
ES
ET
N[
0:0
]
M
00
_A
CL
K
M
00
_A
RE
SE
TN
[0:
0]
M
01
_A
CL
K
M
01
_A
RE
SE
TN
[0:
0]
M
02
_A
CL
K
M
02
_A
RE
SE
TN
[0:
0]
a
xi
_i
nt
er
co
nn
ec
t_
0
AX
I I
nt
er
co
nn
ec
t
S0
0_
AX
I
M
00
_A
XI
M
01
_A
XI
AC
LK
AR
ES
ET
N[
0:0
]
S0
0_
AC
LK
S0
0_
AR
ES
ET
N[
0:0
]
M
00
_A
CL
K
M
00
_A
RE
SE
TN
[0:
0]
M
01
_A
CL
K
M
01
_A
RE
SE
TN
[0:
0]
pr
oc
_s
ys
_r
es
et
_0
Pr
oc
es
so
r S
ys
te
m
 R
es
et
sl
ow
es
t_
sy
nc
_c
lk
e
xt
_r
es
et
_i
n
a
u
x_
re
se
t_
in
m
b_
de
bu
g_
sy
s_
rs
t
dc
m
_l
oc
ke
d
m
b_
re
se
t
bu
s_
st
ru
ct
_r
es
et
[0:
0]
pe
rip
he
ra
l_
re
se
t[0
:0]
in
te
rc
on
ne
ct
_a
re
se
tn
[0:
0]
pe
rip
he
ra
l_
ar
es
et
n[0
:0]
Pr
ec
is
eT
im
eB
as
ic
s_
a
xi
_c
ap
_t
x
s_
a
xi
_c
ap
_r
x
s_
a
xi
_t
im
er
s_
a
xi
_a
cl
k
s_
a
xi
_a
re
se
tn
[0:
0]
ca
pt
ur
e_
in
te
rru
pt
ca
pt
ur
e_
in
te
rru
pt
1
ph
y_
rx
_d
at
a[7
:0]
pp
s_
di
v_
ou
t
ph
y_
rx
_d
v
ph
y_
tx
_e
n
ph
y_
tx
_d
at
a[7
:0]
ph
y_
rx
_c
lk
ph
y_
tx
_c
lk
pp
s_
ou
t
ph
y_
if_
ty
pe
pp
s_
di
v_
se
l[2
:0]
pp
s_
di
v_
ou
t
pp
s_
ou
t
gm
ii_
rx
_d
v
gm
ii_
rx
d[7
:0]
gm
ii_
tx
_e
r
m
di
o
ph
y_
rs
t_
n
gm
ii_
tx
_e
n
gm
ii_
tx
d[7
:0]
cl
k_
w
iz
_0
Cl
oc
kin
g 
W
iza
rd
cl
k_
in
1
cl
k_
ou
t1
cl
k_
ou
t2
cl
k_
ou
t3
cl
k_
ou
t4
cl
k_
ou
t5
gm
ii_
gt
x_
clk
cl
k_
10
0
gm
ii_
rx
_c
lk
ph
y_
if_
ty
pe
pp
s_
di
v_
se
l[2
:0]
F
ig
u
r
e
B
.2
:
V
iv
a
d
o
b
lo
c
k
d
ia
g
r
a
m
o
f
‘C
a
se
2
’
to
p
o
lo
g
y
im
p
le
m
e
n
te
d
d
e
si
g
n
190 PTP over MACsec validation design details
axi_mem_intercon
AXI Interconnect
S00_AXI
M00_AXI
S01_AXI
S02_AXI
ACLK
ARESETN[0:0]
S00_ACLK
S00_ARESETN[0:0]
M00_ACLK
M00_ARESETN[0:0]
S01_ACLK
S01_ARESETN[0:0]
S02_ACLK
S02_ARESETN[0:0]
axi_dma_0
AXI Direct Memory Access
S_AXI_LITE
M_AXI_SG
M_AXI_MM2S
M_AXI_S2MM
M_AXIS_MM2S
S_AXIS_S2MM
M_AXIS_CNTRL
S_AXIS_STS
s_axi_lite_aclk
m_axi_sg_aclk
m_axi_mm2s_aclk
m_axi_s2mm_aclk
axi_resetn
mm2s_prmry_reset_out_n
mm2s_cntrl_reset_out_n
s2mm_prmry_reset_out_n
s2mm_sts_reset_out_n
mm2s_introut
s2mm_introut
processing_system7_0
ZYNQ7 Processing System
PTP_ETHERNET_0
DDR
FIXED_IO
USBIND_0
S_AXI_HP0_FIFO_CTRL
M_AXI_GP0
M_AXI_GP1
S_AXI_HP0
TTC0_WAVE0_OUT
TTC0_WAVE1_OUT
TTC0_WAVE2_OUT
M_AXI_GP0_ACLK
M_AXI_GP1_ACLK
S_AXI_HP0_ACLK
IRQ_F2P[4:0]
FCLK_CLK0
FCLK_RESET0_N
axi_interconnect_1
AXI Interconnect
S00_AXI
ACLK
ARESETN[0:0]
S00_ACLK
S00_ARESETN[0:0]
M00_ACLK
M00_ARESETN[0:0]
M01_ACLK
M01_ARESETN[0:0]
M02_ACLK
M02_ARESETN[0:0]
xlconcat_0
Concat
In0[0:0]
In1[0:0]
In2[0:0]
In3[0:0]
In4[0:0]
dout[4:0]
proc_sys_reset_0
Processor System Reset
slowest_sync_clk
ext_reset_in
aux_reset_in
mb_debug_sys_rst
dcm_locked
mb_reset
bus_struct_reset[0:0]
peripheral_reset[0:0]
interconnect_aresetn[0:0]
peripheral_aresetn[0:0]
axi_ethernet_0
AXI Ethernet Subsystem
s_axis_txd
s_axis_txc
m_axis_rxd
m_axis_rxs
mdio
gmii
gmii_rx_dv
gmii_rx_er
gmii_rxd[7:0]
gmii_tx_en
gmii_tx_er
gmii_txd[7:0]
s_axi_lite_resetn
s_axi_lite_clk
mac_irq
axi_txd_arstn
axi_txc_arstn
axi_rxd_arstn
axi_rxs_arstn
interrupt
phy_rst_n
Clocking Wizard
clk_in1
(a) Case 1 AXI DMA connections
gmii_tx_clk axi_dma_0
AXI Direct Memory Access
S_AXI_LITE
M_AXI_SG
M_AXI_MM2S
M_AXI_S2MM
M_AXIS_MM2S
S_AXIS_S2MM
M_AXIS_CNTRL
S_AXIS_STS
s_axi_lite_aclk
m_axi_sg_aclk
m_axi_mm2s_aclk
m_axi_s2mm_aclk
axi_resetn
mm2s_prmry_reset_out_n
mm2s_cntrl_reset_out_n
s2mm_prmry_reset_out_n
s2mm_sts_reset_out_n
mm2s_introut
s2mm_introut
processing_system7_0_axi_periph
AXI Interconnect
S00_AXI
M00_AXI
M01_AXI
ACLK
ARESETN[0:0]
S00_ACLK
S00_ARESETN[0:0]
M00_ACLK
M00_ARESETN[0:0]
M01_ACLK
M01_ARESETN[0:0]
rst_processing_system7_0_100M
Processor System Reset
slowest_sync_clk
ext_reset_in
aux_reset_in
mb_debug_sys_rst
dcm_locked
mb_reset
bus_struct_reset[0:0]
peripheral_reset[0:0]
interconnect_aresetn[0:0]
peripheral_aresetn[0:0]
axi_ethernet_0
AXI Ethernet Subsystem
s_axi
s_axis_txd
s_axis_txc
m_axis_rxd
m_axis_rxs
mdio
gmii
gmii_rx_dv
gmii_rx_er
gmii_rxd[7:0]
gmii_tx_en
gmii_tx_er
gmii_txd[7:0]
s_axi_lite_resetn
s_axi_lite_clk
mac_irq
axis_clk
axi_txd_arstn
axi_txc_arstn
axi_rxd_arstn
axi_rxs_arstn
interrupt
gtx_clk
phy_rst_n
clk_en
gmii_rx_er
gmii_rx_dv
gmii_rxd[7:0]
gmii_rx_clk
phy_if_type
pps_div_sel[2:0]
(b) Case 1 AXI Ethernet connections
Figure B.3: Vivado block diagrams of AXI DMA and AXI Ethernet Subsystems
of ‘Case 1’ topology
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Figure B.4: Vivado block diagram of PTB core of ‘Case 1’ topology
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Figure B.5: Vivado block diagrams of AXI Stream MACsec of ‘Case 2’ topology
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B.2 State machine diagrams of the implemented
AXI Stream MACsec IP core
In order to validate the proposed SoC architecture using Xilinx Zynq device,
the selected MACsec IP core had to be integrated between the AXI Ethernet
Subsystem and the AXI DMA. Different state machines were designed in VHDL
to implement the required MACsec ‘sandwich’ responsible for adapting interfaces
and the resulted IP was named AXI Stream MACsec IP, as represented in Figure
7.5.
FSM RX number 1 in Figure 7.5 manages AXI stream slave interface and writes
incoming Ethernet frames to the corresponding FIFO buffer. Thus, after receiv-
ing six control words, as specified in [143], this FSM writes a new 64-bit data
block after receiving two followed 32-bit data words from the AXI stream inter-
face. Finally, it saves the number of written blocks and waits until the Algotronix
MACsec core has processed the whole frame to notify the AXI stream master in-
terface that it is ready to receive a new frame. In Figure B.6, the state diagram
of the FSM RX number 1 is drawn.
FSM number 2 reads FIFO output and provides two 64-bit data words to Al-
gotronix core every 10 or 14 clock cycles, which is the time it takes to process
a 128-bit data block with AES-GCM-128 or AES-GCM-256 algorithms. It also
generates flow control signals as required by the Algotronix core, which basically
are first word, final word and length of the final word. The state diagram of the
FSM RX number 2 is shown in Figure B.7.
Figures B.8 and B.9 represent the state diagrams of the two remainder state
machines within the receive channel. FSM RX number 3 is responsible for storing
in the corresponding FIFO 64-bit output data blocks from the Algotronix core,
while it prepares the control words that are required by the AXI stream interface
to the AXI DMA. In addition, it causes the buffer to be emptied when it detects
that a packet has to be dropped due to a false ICV for example. Otherwise, if
the packet is successfully verified, it generates the initialization signals for FSM
RX number 4 during last states. This number 4 FSM finally generates the AXI
stream control and data signals, which are provided to the AXI DMA core in
data words of 32 bits.
In the transmission channel, FSM TX number 1 and FSM TX number 4 are
practically identical to FSM RX 1 and FSM RX 4 and the state diagrams are
equal to that represented in Figures B.6 and B.9. The state diagram of the FSM
TX number 2 is the state diagram of a FSM RX number 2 but duplicated in
order to send frames through the controlled or uncontrolled port depending on
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Figure B.6: State diagram of the FSM RX 1
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Figure B.7: State diagram of the FSM RX 2
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Figure B.8: State diagram of the FSM RX 3
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Figure B.9: State diagram of the FSM RX 4
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Figure B.10: State diagram of the FSM TX 2
the value of the Ethertype field, as it can be seen in Figure B.10. Thus, only PTP
over Ethernet frames, whose Ethertype is 0x88F7 in hexadecimal, are transmitted
through the controlled port in this case.
The state diagram of the FSM TX number 3 is represented in Figure B.11. It
was simplified from that of the FSM RX 3 by removing replicated data word load
and finish stream states shown in Figure B.8. These states were only needed in
the receive channel to gather AXI stream control information required by the
AXI DMA.
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Figure B.11: State diagram of the FSM TX 3
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